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I. INTRODUCTION
W" W ,'' you say to yourself, "it doesn't get any better than
VV • Indeed, it does not, at least for a civil' trial attorney
like you. After your opponent informed you of the existence of a very
important 2 witness, you discovered that this witness agrees with your po-
sition on a critical, disputed issue in an upcoming trial. If that was not
good enough, the witness has very close ties to your opponent, so the
jurors will be quite likely to trust her testimony on this issue.3
Thrilled with this good news, you make sure that the witness's name is
on your witness list and you prepare to present her testimony.4 In your
opening statement, you work in a few references to this witness's testi-
mony and her close ties to your opponent. After all, these are matters
1. Although controversies regarding expert witnesses who could provide testimony
helpful to the opponents of the party who originally retained them could, and presumably
do, occur in criminal trials, this article will discuss these issues in civil litigation.
2. See infra note 413.
3. See infra notes 256-67 and accompanying text.
4. Depending upon the circumstances, you might call the witness to the stand at trial
or use her prior deposition testimony. See infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
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that you fully intend to introduce during your case-in-chief.5
Before you get the chance to do so, though, your opponent files a mo-
tion that seeks to prevent you from presenting any testimony from this
witness or, in the alternative, from presenting evidence establishing her
ties to opposing counsel and her client. Your instincts and experience as
a trial attorney tell you that this motion has little chance of success. After
all, the jury is entitled to receive "every person's evidence ' 6 and the bias
of a witness is relevant.7
At the mid-trial hearing on the motion, however, the judge shocks you.
She starts the hearing by saying that, at a minimum, she will grant the
alternative relief sought by your opponent because she believes that evi-
dence of the close relationship between the witness and your opponent
would constitute "explosive prejudice" against your opponent.8 Despite
your surprise, discretion leads you to thwart your instinct to remind the
judge that evidence of bias, like all other evidence, is introduced for the
purpose of "prejudicing" the other side's case.9
Instead, you concentrate on the issue that the judge said she has not yet
decided, i.e., whether you will be allowed to present the witness's testi-
mony. You argue that relevant testimony is generally admissible 10 and
that this testimony on a critical issue is certainly relevant.1 You remind
the judge that your opponent has already introduced the testimony of a
fact witness who has close ties to your client. "Your Honor," you say in
that voice of righteous indignation that you save for courtroom moments
when something that seems patently unjust is about to happen, "I shud-
der to think what you would have said if I had objected on the grounds
that it would have been 'unfair' to use our 'own' witness against us. No
party should be given the right to unilaterally prevent the jury from re-
ceiving important evidence from a witness who is, by that party's own
declaration, qualified to present it, just by declaring that she 'owns' the
witness.' 12
After you finish, the judge announces her ruling. Believe it or not, she
sustains your opponent's objection because admitting her own expert's
testimony against her would be "unfair. ' 13 As you slump into your chair,
you mumble to yourself, "Maybe it does get better than this after all."
5. See infra notes 63-70 and accompanying text. In the opening statement, an attor-
ney summarizes the evidence she will present during the trial. THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL
TECHNIQUES 62 (5th ed. 2000) (advising attorneys to discuss their "side's version of the
disputed facts" in opening statements); Ralphael E. Yalden II, Trial Practice in Dramshop
Cases, in ILLINoIs DRAMSHOP ACT PRACTICE, ch. 5 (Ill. Inst. for Continuing Legal Educ.
2000) (instructing attorneys to "be as detailed as possible with regard to... testimony that
certainly support[s] the attorney's position" in opening statements).
6. See infra note 202.
7. See infra notes 257-65 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 251-52 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 269-71 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 210-13 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 102-03, 176-77 and accompanying text.
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Although this narrative may seem far-fetched, the decisions of several
courts suggest that neither the circumstances nor the results outlined
above are extraordinary. In several reported cases and, presumably,
many more unreported cases, parties have attempted to introduce the tes-
timony of retained' 4 experts who had been identified as potential trial
witnesses by their opponents. 15 Of course, while it is not entirely unprece-
dented for an identified expert witness to reach opinions favorable to the
party opposing the one who hired her, this turn of events is also not com-
mon.16 As a result, perhaps, courts appear to be less than certain about
how to handle such events,1 7 though most reported decisions constrain
the parties who would present such testimony, by either prohibiting such
testimony entirely' 8 or excluding evidence of the relationship between
the expert and the party who initially hired her.19
Part II of this article reviews these decisions, after delineating the gen-
eral patterns of retention, disclosure, and discovery of expert witnesses.
Part III examines the concerns that apparently have driven courts to re-
strict parties who seek to use the testimony of experts identified by their
opponents. It also argues that none of these concerns justifies the courts'
restrictions. 20 Part IV advocates an alternative approach that would gen-
14. This article discusses experts retained by the attorneys representing one of the
parties in civil litigation. Experts who are employees of one of the parties are outside the
scope of this article, though some of its analysis may be applicable to these experts. Also,
the issues discussed in this article do not arise when an expert is neither retained nor em-
ployed by either party. See infra notes 22, 130 and accompanying text.
15. For purposes of simplification, this article will assume a simple two-party case, with
one plaintiff and one defendant. Although many cases involve more than two parties, this
should not change the analysis. For purposes of this discussion, all parties other than the
one originally retaining an expert witness can be seen as "opposing" parties because any
attempt to use the testimony of the expert might be opposed by the party who originally
retained the expert. If the party who originally retained the expert does not object to
another party's use of that expert's testimony, the disputes discussed in this article will not
occur.
16. In re Vestavia Assocs., 105 B.R. 680, 683 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (noting other
court decisions suggesting that admitting deposition or trial testimony from expert wit-
nesses over the objections of their original employers would constitute "an aberration"); cf.
House v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 168 F.R.D. 236, 240 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (discussing the
"pertinent case law, of which there is surprisingly little").
17. House, 168 F.R.D. at 238 (referring to "the vexing and surprisingly little explored
question of whether one party should be able to depose or call at trial an expert designated
by an opposing party as expected to be called at trial, but whom the designating party has
announced it will not call at trial"); In re Vestavia, 105 B.R. at 684 (describing these con-
flicts as situations where judges "are called upon to make decisions on issues where there
are two or more opposing but equally cogent arguments" that ultimately must be resolved
based on "judicial hunch"); cf. Dayton-Phoenix Group, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C-
3-95-480, 1997 WL 1764760, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 19, 1997) ("The few cases which have
considered this question have not reached consistent results.").
18. See infra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 250-53 and accompanying text.
20. To some extent, this article focuses upon federal cases, because part of its analysis
is based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence. See
infra notes 102-74, 187-205, 235-84 and accompanying text. However, this article also dis-
cusses policy considerations and related factors that are and should be considered by state
courts facing controversies about attorneys pursuing and using evidence from and about
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erally allow testimony from experts identified by opponents and evidence
regarding the opponents' hiring of the experts presenting that testimony.
Part V reviews the advantages of this proposal, including juror access to
potentially valuable evidence that can help them resolve important fac-
tual disputes, elimination of unnecessary distinctions between expert and
fact witnesses, clarification of the consequences of disclosing experts as
possible trial witnesses, and making the often overly cozy relationship be-
tween attorneys and the experts they hire a bit less comfortable.
II. THE INDEFINITE STATE OF THE LAW REGARDING RED
ROVER EXPERT WITNESSES
This section reviews the current law regarding parties' attempts to in-
troduce the opinions of expert witnesses originally retained by opposing
counsel and evidence of this retention. It begins with a review of the
most common fact patterns that result in these situations, starting with an
outline of the typical employment relationship between an attorney and
an expert. It then identifies the decisions courts face about experts ini-
tially retained by parties other than the ones offering their testimony and
surveys the varied decisions that courts have reached on these issues.
A. EXPERT WITNESS RETENTION, DISCLOSURE, AND DISCOVERY
Although the facts in which these issues arise vary from case to case,
most cases fall somewhere in a defined set of patterns. Understanding
these fact patterns requires a preliminary comprehension of the basic
framework for the hiring and disclosing of expert witnesses in civil cases.
Often an attorney21 who is searching for an expert to testify at trial
experts that were originally retained by their opponents. In addition, several states have
disclosure, discovery, and evidence rules or statutes that parallel the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence. As a result, the article does not ignore state
civil cases.
21. For purposes of the issues discussed in this article, there is no significant difference
between an attorney retaining the expert directly and the party itself retaining and paying
the expert. Even if the client technically retains and directly pays the expert, the attorney
is usually the person who searches for, chooses, informs, directs, and otherwise influences
the expert. See infra notes 320-33 and accompanying text; Stephen D. Easton, Ammuni-
tion for the Shoot-Out with the Hired Gun's Hired Gun: A Proposal for Full Expert Witness
Disclosure, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 465, 492-99 (2000). Sometimes a particularly active client or
client representative also exercises influence over the expert, but this influence is generally
added to, rather than substituted for, the influence of the trial attorney. Id. at 494 n.88.
This article will alternatively refer to either the attorney or the party retaining the expert.
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initially retains22 the expert as a consultant,2 3 if the court's deadline2 4 for
the disclosure of experts who may testify at trial is not imminent.25 This
common tactic gives the attorney time to have the expert review the
available evidence, conduct an investigation, and reach preliminary opin-
ions before the attorney decides whether to name the expert as a witness
who might present trial testimony. If the expert's preliminary opinions
are not favorable to the party the attorney represents, the attorney does
not list the expert as a trial witness and the expert remains a non-testify-
ing consultant.
As long as the attorney never discloses the expert as a person who may
present expert testimony at trial, there will usually be no discovery26 re-
garding this mere consultant. Under Rule 26(b)(4)(B) of the Federal
22. This article concerns expert witnesses who are retained, i.e., hired and paid, by one
of the parties or attorneys. While there can be expert witness who are not retained by
either party, such as highway patrol officers, medical examiners, and fire marshals, see
Stephen D. Easton, Can We Talk?: Removing Counterproductive Ethical Restraints Upon
Ex Parte Communication Between Attorneys and Adverse Expert Witnesses, 76 IN. L.J.
647, 653 n.25, 655-56 (2001), it seems unlikely that any party would claim the right to
render such witnesses ineligible to testify at a deposition or trial because that claim is usu-
ally based upon a retaining party's investment in, and allegedly resultant control over, a
retained expert. See infra notes 174-78, 207-10 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 1984); Dayton-Phoenix
Group, Inc., 1997 WL 1764760, at *1 n.l; White v. Vanderbilt Univ., 21 S.W.3d 215, 224-25
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); Castellanos v. Littlejohn, 945 S.W.2d 236, 238 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1997, orig. proceeding).
24. The expert witness disclosures required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
are to be made "at the times and in the sequence directed by the court" or pursuant to
default deadlines when the court does not outline the disclosure schedule. FEi. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(2)(C). Federal and state courts often set expert witness disclosure deadlines. See,
e.g., Thrasher v. B & B Chem. Co., 2 F.3d 995, 998 (10th Cir. 1993); Hurst v. Poelstra, No.
94-CA-61, 1995 WL 765968, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 22, 1995).
25. There are instances where an expert is initially hired as a trial witness rather than a
consultant or where the attorney designates the expert as a trial witness before the expert
has reviewed the available evidence, conducted her investigation or examination, and ad-
vised the attorney of her preliminary opinion. See, e.g., Peterson v. Willie, 81 F.3d 1033,
1036-38 (11th Cir. 1996); Agron v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 176 F.R.D. 445, 453 (S.D.N.Y.
1997); House v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 168 F.R.D. 236, 238 (N.D. Iowa 1996). It is
safe to assume that many of these instances involve either an attorney who is not aware of
the tactical advantages to be gained by initially retaining the expert as a consultant or an
attorney who has not retained an expert until shortly before, or sometimes even after, the
applicable deadline for the naming of experts who are expected to be witnesses at trial.
House, 168 F.R.D. at 247 ("All too often, parties designate expert witnesses as likely to
testify at trial to meet a court-imposed deadline, even though they have not actually hired
the expert, but are only planning to, and even though the expert has not conducted any
examination of the opposing party, if necessary to the expert's opinion, or even been pro-
vided with pertinent information from which the expert's opinion will be derived.").
26. Occasionally, attorneys become aware of consultants who have been retained by
opposing attorneys outside of the regular discovery process. See infra note 30. Sometimes
attorneys seek to depose these experts or call them as trial witnesses. See, e.g., Koch Ref.
Co. v. Jennifer L. Boudreaux MV, 85 F.3d 1178, 1181-83 (5th Cir. 1996); Good v. GAF
Corp., No. 87-2195, 1989 WL 54017, at *1-3 (4th Cir. May 23,1989); Marine Petroleum Co.
v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 641 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Hau-
gen, 184 F.R.D. 410 (D. Utah 1999); Perry v. United States, No. CA3:96-CV-2038-T, 1997
WL 53136 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 1997); Rocky Mountain Natural Gas Co. v. Cooper Indus.,
Inc., 166 F.R.D. 481 (D. Colo. 1996). This article will not address the interesting issues
raised by efforts by one attorney to depose or call experts who have been consulted, but
never disclosed as possible trial witnesses, by opposing counsel. Instead, the recommenda-
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Rules of Civil Procedure, a party is entitled to use interrogatories or dep-
ositions to discover information about an expert "who is not expected to
be called as a witness at trial"27 only28  "upon a showing of exceptional
circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking dis-
covery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means."'29
In most instances, 30 if the expert remains a mere consultant because the
retaining attorney never, identifies her as a likely trial witness, the oppos-
ing attorney will never even learn that she worked on the case. 31
tions in this article apply only when the retaining attorney has disclosed the expert as a
possible trial witness.
For discussion regarding consultants, see Kathleen Michaela Brennan, Must the Show
Go On? Defining When One Party May Call or Compel an Opposing Party's Consultative
Expert to Testify, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1191 (1994); Maureen Geary, Riddled with Controversy:
Calling Opposing Counsel's Non-Testifying Expert in Light of the Decision in Oregon v.
Riddle, 63 UNIV. Prl-r. L. REV. 441 (2002); Jeffrey Messing, Expert Witnesses and Conflicts
of Interest, ARiz. A-i'y, Nov. 2001, at 28.
27. FED. R. CiV. P. 26(b)(4)(B) (discussing "an expert who has been retained or spe-
cially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial").
28. To be complete, it should be noted that the Federal Rules also allow the discovery
"as provided in Rule 35(b)." FED. R. CiV. P. 26(b)(4)(B). Rule 35(b) provides that parties
are entitled to receive reports from doctors who conduct physical or mental examinations
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 35(a). FED. R. CiV. P. 35.
The provisions of Rule 35(b) are, in most instances, outside the scope of this article,
because these provisions define the parameters of discovery regarding persons who con-
duct Rule 35 physical or mental examinations only when those persons are not designated
as witnesses by the attorneys who retained them. When the Rule 35 examiner is desig-
nated as a trial witness, the opposing party is entitled to receive information about her
through disclosures and discovery. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(2), 26(a)(5), 35(b)(3). In
other words, while Rule 35(b) does provide a discovery device for undisclosed consultants
that is not available for other undisclosed consultants, an undisclosed Rule 35 consultant is
still not a person who was at any time disclosed by her employer as a person who was
expected to present expert testimony at trial. This article argues that the disclosure of a
person as an expert expected to testify at trial is the event that renders that person's testi-
mony admissible when offered by the opposing party. See infra Part III.A. This argument
does not necessarily apply to a Rule 35 examiner who is never so identified, because such a
person may be the equivalent of an undisclosed expert consultant who did not conduct a
Rule 35 examination. See infra notes 179-92 and accompanying text.
For discussions of issues raised when the persons conducting Rule 35 examinations are
never listed as possible trial witness, see, for example, Lehan v. Ambassador Programs,
Inc., 190 F.R.D. 670, 671-72 (E.D. Wash. 2000) (citing previous cases); House, 168 F.R.D.
at 243-45, 249.
29. FED. R. CiV. P. 26(b)(4)(B); see also House, 168 F.R.D. at 240 (quoting Rule
26(b)(4)(B)); In re Vestavia Assocs., 105 B.R. 680, 681 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) ("If the
expert has been retained in anticipation of trial but will not be called as a witness, Rule 26
limits discovery to exceptional circumstances where the ability of the party to gather such
information is impractical.").
30. It is possible, of course, that the opposing attorney will learn that the expert
worked as a consultant through happenstance, even though the retaining attorney is never
required to disclose her relationship with the consultant. See, e.g., Steele v. Seglie, No. 84-
2200, 1986 WL 30765, at *2 (D. Kan. Mar. 27, 1986) (noting that defense attorney learned
that doctors had examined real party in interest for plaintiff through use of medical records
release signed by plaintiff); Healy v. Counts, 100 F.R.D. 493, 494 (D. Colo. 1984) (report-
ing that a physician asked by attorney to review medical records glanced at them, realized
that he had been retained by opposing counsel in the same matter, and so informed the
attorney who asked him to review the records); In re Vestavia, 105 B.R. at 682.
31. Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hosp. & Training Sch. for Nurses, 622 F.2d 496, 501
(10th Cir. 1980) (noting that even the "identity" of an expert who serves only as a consult-
ant is outside the scope of discovery); Scott D. Sheftall & Brian M. Torres. Expert Wit-
2002] 1433
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On the other hand, if the expert's conclusions are consistent with the
positions that the attorney plans to advocate at trial, she may want to
preserve the option of calling her as a trial witness. After the attorney
decides the expert may testify at trial, she cannot keep her relationship
with the expert hidden from opposing counsel.3 2 Instead, under Rule
26(a)(2)(A), "a party shall disclose to other parties the identify of any
person who may be used at trial to present" expert witness testimony.33
Therefore, before the court's deadline has expired, the attorney must dis-
close the expert as a possible trial witness. 34
Once the expert is disclosed, the opposing attorney acquires informa-
tion about her through various means. 35 First, due to provisions added to
nesses, in FLA. BAR, FLORIDA CIVIL TRIAL PRACTICE, ch. 12, § 12.3 (2001) (regarding
protection of a consultant's "identity").
32. See infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
33. In the language of Rule 26(a)(2)(A), a party must disclose "the identity of any
person who may be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence." FEo. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A). The listed evidentiary rules
concern expert witness testimony. FED. R. Evi). 702, 703 & 705.
34. See, e.g., Agron v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 176 F.R.D. 445, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1997);
Dayton-Phoenix Group, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C-3-95-480, 1997 WL 1764760, at
*1 n.l (S.D. Ohio Feb. 19, 1997); cf. Taylor v. Kohli, 642 N.E.2d 467, 468 (Il1. 1994) (noting
disclosure of expert witness under Illinois "Rule 220").
Prior to the 1993 amendments to Rule 26, there were no automatic disclosures, includ-
ing no automatically required disclosures of persons who might present expert testimony at
trial. Instead, it was customary for parties in civil cases to serve their opponents with inter-
rogatories requiring them to list persons who were expected to testify as experts. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A), 28 U.S.C.A. (1992) (rescinded 1993), discussed in CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARI) L. MARCUS, 8 FEDERAL PRAC-I ICE ANI) PROCE-
DURE [hereinafter "WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCuS"] § 2030 (1994); Martin v. Easton Publ'g
Co., 85 F.R.D. 312, 314 (E.D. Pa. 1980); cf. In re Vestavia, 105 B.R. at 681. Reported Red
Rover cases decided under the pre-1993 version of Rule 26 often refer to a party's designa-
tion of experts in Rule 26(b)(4)(A) interrogatory answers. See Collins v. Wayne Corp., 621
F.2d 777, 780 (5th Cir. 1980); House, 168 F.R.D. at 240 (apparently decided under the pre-
1993 version of Rule 26); cf. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Jackson, 636 So. 2d 310, 313-14 (Miss.
1992) (applying state rule similar to pre-1993 version of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure); Brown v. Hamid, 856 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Mo. 1993) ("[Missouri] Rule
56.01(b)(4)(a) requires a party to disclose, upon interrogatory, the names of its expert
witnesses.").
35. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Zotos Int'l, Inc., No. 98-CV-838S(F), 2000 WL 1843258,
at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2000); House, 168 F.R.D. at 245 ("Rule 26 designation waives the
'free consultation' privilege a party enjoys as to its non-testifying experts."); cf. Tom L.
Scott, Inc. v. Mcllhany, 798 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Tex. 1990) ("Designating these experts as
testifying experts subjects their work product to discovery [under the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure]."); White v. Vanderbilt Univ., 21 S.W.3d 215, 225 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (noting
the similar effect under Tennessee law).
Parties sometimes claim that their retained experts have the dual status of both testify-
ing experts and consultants to counsel and that communications between experts and attor-
neys that are solely concerned with the latter role are non-discoverable work product.
Although some courts have accepted this notion, see W.R. Grace & Co., 2000 WL 1843258,
at *6-12; Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., No. 3:94-CV-1 706, 1998 WL 422858, at *2 (D.
Conn. June 29, 1998); Nat'l Steel Prods. Co. v. Super. Ct., 210 Cal. Rptr 535, 542 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1985), the decisions of other courts suggest that all information considered by an
expert witness is discoverable, even if the expert is also serving as a consultant. Furniture
World, Inc. v. D.A.V. Thrift Stores, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 61, 63 (D.N.M. 1996) (allowing non-
disclosure of items considered by the expert only in her consulting capacity would create
"an unmanageable situation by requiring a question-by-question analysis of an expert...
to determine whether the work product doctrine applies"); cf. Culbertson v. Shelter Mut.
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Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1993,36 the expert
must prepare and sign a report 37 setting forth her opinions, the reasons
for her opinions, the information she considered in forming her opinions,
the exhibits she will use, her publications in the previous ten years, and all
cases in which she has testified in the last four years. 38 The opposing
attorney also has the right to depose the expert 39 and to use other discov-
ery devices to acquire information about the expert and her observations
and conclusions, including interrogatories, requests for production, re-
Ins. Co., No. 97-1609, 1999 WL 109566, at *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 2. 1999) (when a party desig-
nated a former expert as a fact witness, work product documents provided to the witness
must be produced); Delcastor, Inc., v. Vail Assocs., 108 F.R.D. 405 (D. Colo. 1985) (al-
lowing discovery regarding facts observed, and opinions held, by an expert despite retain-
ing party's attempt to limit expert's testimony to factual observations and to protect
opinions from discovery by claiming that expert was a non-testifying consultant for pur-
poses of discovery of opinions).
36. The 1993 amendments to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure changed
several procedures regarding information about expert witnesses. These amendments
eliminated the language in pre-1993 Rule 26(b)(4) outlining interrogatories about expert
witnesses, see supra note 34, and inserted a provision giving a party the right to depose
disclosed expert witnesses, see FED, R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A). The post-1993 version of Rule
26 also mandates disclosure, even in the absence of discovery requests, of specified infor-
mation about expert witnesses, including mandatory reports written by experts. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2).
Many states retain expert witness discovery provisions similar or identical to the pre-
1993 versions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a) and 26(b)(4). See ALA. R. Civ. P.
26(a), (b)(4); ARK. R. Civ. P. 26(a), (b)(4); DEL. CT. C.P.R. 26(a), (b)(4); D.C. SCR-CiviL
26(a), (b)(4); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-26(a), (b)(4) (Supp. 1998); HAW. R. Civ. P. 26(a),
(b)(4); I.R.C.P. 26(a), (b)(4) (Idaho); IND. R. Civ. P. 26(a), (b)(4); Ky. R. Civ. P. 26.02(1),
(4); ME. R. Civ. P. 26(a), (b)(4); MASS. R. Civ. P. 26(a), (b)(4); MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.02(a),
(d); M.R.C.P. 26(a), (b)(4) (Mississippi); MONT. R. Civ. P. 26(a), (b)(4); NEB. R. Civ. P.
26(a), (b)(4); N.H. R. Civ. P. 35(a), (b)(3); N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-026(A), (B)(5); N.C. R. Civ.
P. 26(a), (b)(4); OHIo R. Civ. P. 26(A), (B)(4); PA. R.C.P. 4003.5; SUPER. R. Civ. P. 30(a),
(b)(4) (Rhode Island); S.D. RCP § 15-6-26(a), (b)(4); UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(a), (b)(4); VA.
R. Civ. P. 4:1(a), (b)(4).
A few states have embraced the 1993 amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
26(a)(2) and 26(b)(4). See ALASKA R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2), (b)(4); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE
§ 2034 (West 1998); C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2), (b)(4) (Colorado); WASH. R. Civ. P. 26(a), (b)(5).
Several states have adopted some, but not all, of the 1993 amendments to Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) and 26(b)(4). The majority allow depositions of expert wit-
nesses, but do not require expert witness reports. See ARIZ. ST. R.C.P. 26(a), (b)(4);
CONN. R. Civ. P. §§ 13-2, 13-4; FLA. R. Civ. P. 1-280(a), (b)(4); IOWA R. Civ. P. 1.508;
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-226(a), (b)(5) (West 1997); LA. CODE Civ. PROC. ANN. art. 1422,
1425 (West 1998); MD. RULE 2-401(a), (e); M. C. R. 2.302(A), (B)(4) (Michigan); Mo. R.
Civ. P. 56.01(a), (b)(4); N.J. R. Civ. P. 4:10-2(a), (d); N.D. R. Civ. P. 26(a), (b)(4); OKLA.
STAi. ANN. tit. 12, § 3226(A), (B)(3) (West 1993); S.C. R. Civ. P. 26(a), (b)(4); TENN. CIv.
PROC. RULE 26.01, 26.02(4); TEX. R. Civ. P. 195.1; Vr. R. Civ. P. 26(a), (b)(4); Wis. R.
Civ. P. 804.01(l), (2)(d); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 26(a), (b)(4): Wvo. R. Civ. PRoc. 26(a), (b)(4).
On the other hand, two states now require expert witness reports, but do not provide an
automatic right to expert witness depositions. See NEV. R. C. P. 26(b)(5); N.Y. C.P.L.R.
3101(d) (McKinney 1998).
37. Retained expert witnesses must prepare and sign a report. See infra note 130.
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4); W.R. Grace & Co., 2000 WL 1843258, at *4; Commerce &
Indus. Ins. Co. v. Grinnell Corp., Nos. Civ. A. 97-0775, 97-0803, 1999 WL 731410, at *1
(E.D. La. Sept. 20, 1999) ("[A] party may depose a testifying expert, but may not depose a
consulting expert."); House, 168 F.R.D. at 245 ("The practical effect of a Rule 26 designa-
tion of an expert is to make an expert available for deposition by the opposing party ... 
cf. White, 21 S.W.3d at 225 (noting the similar effect under Tennessee law).
20021 1435
SMU LAW REVIEW
quests for inspection, and requests for admissions. 40 In addition, the op-
posing attorney will often conduct her own independent investigation to
acquire information about the expert, performing such tasks as reviewing
the expert's publications and prior testimony. 4' In some instances, this
investigation may include direct contact with the expert by the opposing
attorney. 42
Through these processes, the opposing attorney may become aware of
observations, opinions, findings, or conclusions by the expert that are
consistent with that attorney's positions.43 If this occurs, the opposing
attorney may engage in efforts to present the expert's observations and
conclusions at trial, including taking the expert's deposition, if this has
not already been done,44 and including the expert on her own list of trial
witnesses. 45 Although some have referred to these circumstances as in-
stances of "side-switching experts,' 46 this terminology is misleading be-
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(5); see also Furniture World, Inc., 168 F.R.D. at 62 (holding
that the combination of the Rule 26(a)(2) reporting requirement and the Rule 34(c) re-
quest for production of documents makes it "clear that all documents provided to a party's
expert witness must be produced on request").
The rule also provides that the opposing party can obtain expert information through
permission to enter land or property and physical and mental examinations, FED. R. Civ.
P. 26(a)(5), but these discovery devices are presumably used only rarely to acquire infor-
mation about experts.
41. Attorneys conducting investigations of experts use various techniques outside for-
mal disclosure and discovery, including contacting of other experts and attorneys, search-
ing of paper and electronic databases, reading of prior testimony and publications, and
checking of expert credentials. See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE METHODS OF AT-
TACKING SCIENTIFic EVIDENCE § 9-8(a), at 254 (3d. ed. 1997); MAUET, supra note 5, at 378
(advising attorneys to "obtain a copy of everything the expert has ever published"); Eas-
ton, supra note 22, at 691.
Attorneys conduct their own investigations of experts because the formal disclosure and
discovery process has several substantial limitations and problems, including the efforts of
retaining attorneys to limit the information provided in mandatory disclosures and discov-
ery responses, cost, and delays in recovery information. See Easton, supra note 22, at 671-
74.
42. See Campbell Indus. v. M/V Gemini, 619 F.2d 24, 26 (9th Cir. 1980); Brown v.
Hamid, 856 S.W.2d 51, 53-54 (Mo. 1993); Phila. Bar Assn. Prof. Guidance Comm., Gui-
dance Op. 94-22 (1995) (noting that attorney inquired about acceptability of ex parte con-
tact with opponent's expert witness); Easton, supra note 22, at 674-75; Steven Lubet,
Expert Witnesses: Ethics and Professionalism, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 465, 480 (t999);
Bruce P. McMoran, Ex Parte Contacts, in 2 8-H ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMI'LOYMENT LAW,
at 991, 989 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 615, 1999).
43. See infra notes 214-17 and accompanying text.
44. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Jackson, 636 So. 2d 310, 313-15 (Miss. 1992) (applying
state rule similar to pre-1993 version of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
45. See Lehan v. Ambassador Programs, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 670, 670 (E.D. Wash. 2000);
Agron v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 176 F.R.D. 445, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); see also County of
L.A. v. Super. Ct., 271 Cal. Rptr. 689, 700 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (state case); Jackson, 636
So. 2d at 313 (applying state rule similar to pre-1993 version of Rule 26 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure); Kreymer v. N. Tex. Mun. Water Dist., 842 S.W.2d 750, 75.1 (Tex.
Ct. App.-Dallas 1992, n.w.h.) (noting that both parties listed the same expert as a trial
witness); cf. FMC Corp. v. Vendo Co., 196 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1047 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (chastis-
ing party for failing to "cross-designate" another party's expert).
46. See, e.g., Koch Ref. Co. v. Jennifer L. Boudreaux MV, 85 F.3d 1178, 1181 (5th Cir.
1996) (referring to and distinguishing other cases "in which the expert clearly switched
sides"); Erickson v. Newmar Corp., 87 F.3d 298, 300 (9th Cir. 1996); City of Springfield v.
Rexnord Corp., I11 F. Supp. 2d 71, 74 (D. Mass. 2000) (distinguishing "'side-switching'
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cause it suggests that the expert is the person who initiates the efforts that
result in the presentation of her testimony at trial by the attorney oppos-
ing the one who initially retained her. Although this happens occasion-
ally, it is more common for the opposing counsel to initiate these efforts,
often against the wishes of the expert.47 To more accurately reflect the
common dynamics of these situations, this article will refer to an expert
whose testimony is offered by an attorney opposing the party who ini-
tially retained her 48 as a "Red Rover expert. '4 9
B. "DE-DISCLOSURE" EFFORTS AND THEIR IMPACT ON DISCOVERY
Of course, these events do not occur in a vacuum. Instead, while the
opposing attorney is reviewing the expert witness report, listening to
the testimony at her deposition, reading her publications and prior testi-
mony, and otherwise gathering information about her, the attorney
who originally retained her is communicating with her,50 helping her
prepare her report, 51 listening to her deposition testimony,52 and other-
wise acquiring information about her. Before or after the opposing
attorney discloses her intent to use the expert's testimony in her case-
in-chief, the attorney who initially retained her might discern that the
cases"); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp., 734 F. Supp. 334, 338
(N.D. I11. 1990) (discussing "'switching sides' expert" cases), STEVEN LUBETI, EXPERT TES-
TIMONY: A GUIDE FOR EXPERT WITNESSES AND THE LAWYERS WHO EXAMINE THEM 178-
79 (1998) (section in book for expert witnesses entitled "switching sides"); Douglas R.
Richmond, Expert Witness Conflicts and Compensation, 67 TENN. L. REV. 909, 929 (2000).
47. See, e.g., Peterson v. Willie, 81 F.3d 1033, 1036-37 (11th Cir. 1996): Commerce &
Indus. Ins. Co. v. Grinnell Corp., Nos. CIV.A.97-0775, 97-0803, 1999 WL 731410 (E.D. La.
Sept. 20, 1999); Dayton-Phoenix Group, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C-3-95-480, 1997
WL 1764760 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 19, 1997); House v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 168 F.R.D.
236, 238-39 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Furniture World, Inc. v. D.A.V. Thrift Stores, Inc., 168
F.R.D. 61, 62 (D.N.M. 1996); see also LUBET, supra note 46, at 179 (observing that "there
are few cases dealing with the ... phenomenon" of experts who voluntarily defect from
one party to another, "no doubt because it seldom occurs").
48. A shorthand term seems appropriate, so that the reader will be spared the burden
of repeatedly wading through phrases like "an expert whose testimony is offered by an
attorney opposing the party who initially retained her."
49. In the children's playground game of "Red Rover," each of two teams forms a
human barrier by holding hands. One team identifies a person from the other team who
must attempt to run through this barrier by shouting, "Red Rover, Red Rover, send [the
chosen person] right over." The identified opposing team member then charges toward the
shouting team's human chain, trying to break through. If the chain holds, the person who
attempted to break it joins the unbroken chain. As the game continues in this fashion,
persons who were originally members of one team become members of the opposing team.
See D.W. CRISFIELD, PICK-UP GAMES 164 (1993).
Thus, the Red Rover designation suggests that a person becomes a witness for the party
opposing the one who initially retained her through the initiative of the party who now
seeks to use that expert's testimony.
50. See Gen. Motors Corp v. Jackson, 636 So. 2d 310, 313 (Miss. 1992) (noting that
retaining attorneys learned that their expert disagreed with their theory through communi-
cations with the expert).
51. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(2) advisory comm. notes (1993) ("Rule 26(a)(2)(B) does
not preclude counsel from providing assistance to experts in preparing the reports, and
indeed, with experts such as automobile mechanics, this assistance may be needed.").
52. By virtue of the deposition notice required by Rule 30(b), the retaining attorney is
given the opportunity to participate in the expert's deposition. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b).
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expert's testimony could do her client 53 more harm than good. 54
If so, she may attempt to "de-disclose" 55 the expert by issuing some
53. Red Rover-like discovery issues sometimes arise in other contexts. In Commerce
& Indus. Ins. Co., 1999 WL 731410, at *1, the party that had disclosed the expert as a
possible trial witness was dismissed via summary judgment. When another party noticed
the deposition of the dismissed party's expert, the dismissed party claimed that its dismissal
converted the expert from a disclosed expert to a consultant who was outside the scope of
discovery. Id. The court rejected this argument and allowed the deposition of the expert.
Id. at *2. A Texas court reached the opposite conclusion, denying depositions and other
discovery regarding the disclosed expert witnesses of a party who settled with another
party pursuant to a settlement agreement that assigned these experts to the remaining
party as consultants, see Axelson, Inc. v. Mcllhany, 755 S.W.2d 170, 172, 173-74 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1988, orig. proceeding), but the Texas Supreme Court reversed this deci-
sion and required the experts to testify in depositions, see Tom L. Scott, Inc. v. Mcllhany,
798 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. 1990); Axelson, Inc. v. Mcllhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 552 n.3 (Tex. 1990)
(noting that the Scott decision rendered the same day dealt with issues regarding deposi-
tions of redesignated experts). A California court dealing with facts similar to those faced
by the Texas courts also allowed discovery regarding an expert previously disclosed by a
party who had settled. See Williamson v. Super. Ct., 582 P.2d 126, 128 (Cal. 1978). A
recent federal decision, however, refused to allow the deposition of an expert retained by a
settling party where the settling party agreed to "withdraw its expert designation" and to
not make the expert's work product available to a non-settling party. FMC Corp. v. Vendo
Co., 196 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1041 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
54. An individual expert witness may reach several germane opinions. When the at-
torney who retained the expert decides not to call that expert as a witness at trial, there is
often at least one opinion that disagrees with a position the attorney wishes to take at trial.
See infra notes 214-17 and accompanying text. When this is the case, the expert may have
reached other opinions that are helpful to the attorney who retained her. See Collins v.
Wayne Corp., 621 F.2d 777, 781 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that expert reached opinions re-
garding the speed of an accident that were consistent with those reached by the opposing
expert, but also reached opinions regarding the crashworthiness of the involved bus that
were helpful to the attorney who retained him). It seems reasonable to assume that many
of the attorneys who decide not to call experts they previously disclosed have concluded
that their testimony will do their clients more harm than good, even if some of their opin-
ions would indeed do some good.
55. The term "de-disclose" is an intentionally awkward one. It is derived from Rule
26(a)(2)(A)'s language, which requires a party to "disclose to other parties the identity of
any person who may be used at trial to present" expert testimony. FED. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(2)(A). Once this disclosure has taken place, a party seeking to somehow negate its
effect is attempting to do something which is impossible, because once something is dis-
closed, it cannot somehow be returned to unknown status. Because the result that a party
seeks when attempting to nullify its previous disclosure is illusory, it is perhaps best encap-
sulated in an intentionally unsound term like "de-disclose."
The obvious alternative term would be "undisclose." That verb would lead to the adjec-
tive "undisclosed," however, and that adjective would be misleading. If an attorney dis-
closes the identity of an expert who may present testimony at trial and later attempts to
withdraw that disclosure, it is not correct to refer to the witness as an "undisclosed expert."
According to the primary definition in one dictionary, "un" is "a prefix meaning 'not ....'
RANDoM HOUSE, THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1426 (rev. ed. 1982).
Therefore, the term "undisclosed expert" would suggest an expert who had never been
disclosed, not one whose disclosure had supposedly been withdrawn. The same dictionary
suggests that "de" is "used as a prefix to indicate privation, removal, and separation (dehu-
midify), negation (demerit; derange), descent (degrade; deduce), reversal (detract), and in-
tensity (decompound)." Because the attorney who engages in an attempted withdrawal of
a previous disclosure of an expert is hoping to reverse or negate the earlier disclosure, "de-
disclose" is an appropriate verb. Its inherent awkwardness reflects the reality that once a
piece of information is disclosed, it cannot truly be returned to its pre-disclosed status. The
term also echoes at least one court's similar nomenclature. See Castellanos v. Littlejohn,
945 S.W.2d 236, 239-41 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, orig. proceeding) (observing that
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type of declaration that she wi156 not use the expert as a witness at
trial.57
If an attorney tries to de-disclose the expert she originally hired, the
court will have to decide what consequence, if any, this attempted de-
disclosure warrants.58 If the attempted de-disclosure occurs before the
expert witness is deposed, the court must decide whether the opposing
party retains the right to depose the expert.59 Some courts have held that
a party's de-disclosure does not extinguish the opposing party's right to
one party "attempted to 'de-designate' [an expert] as a testifying expert and instead name
him as a consulting expert").
Given the various stages of expert status, this article will attempt to be somewhat precise
in its terminology regarding experts. An expert who has never been disclosed as a person
who may present trial testimony will be called a consultant or an undisclosed expert.
When an expert is disclosed as a person who may present trial testimony, she will be re-
ferred to as a disclosed expert or an expert witness. If a party attempts to de-disclose that
expert witness, the expert may be referred to as a "de-disclosed expert," but the terms
disclosed expert and expert witness remain applicable to such an expert. "Red Rover ex-
pert" or "Red Rover" will refer to an expert whose testimony is sought (through a deposi-
tion) or offered (at trial) by a party other than the party whose attorney originally retained
the expert. Of course, these terminology rules cannot and will not be applied to quoted
language, unless changes to the quoted language are indicated with [brackets].
56. Although most de-disclosures concern the future, at least one was apparently is-
sued in the present or past tense. In that case, a party listed an expert as a "'will call'"
witness, but rested without calling him. Koch Ref. Co. v. Jennifer L. Boudreaux MV, 85
F.3d 1178, 1181 (5th Cir. 1996). Similarly, in a bankruptcy case involving a hearing rather
than a trial, the retaining attorney's de-disclosure did not occur until "the middle of [the]
final evidentiary hearing." In re Vestavia Assocs., 105 B.R. 680, 682 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1989).
57. See Peterson v. Willie, 81 F.3d 1033, 1036-37 (11th Cir. 1996); Durflinger v. Artiles,
727 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 1984); Lehan v. Ambassador Programs, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 670,
671 (E.D. Wash. 2000); House v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 168 F.R.D. 236, 238 (N.D.
Iowa 1996); cf. Collins, 621 F.2d at 780 (in a case that pre-dated the 1993 amendments to
Rule 26, a party moved in limine to exclude the testimony of an expert it had previously
identified as a witness, on the ground that the expert, who had been deposed, had become
"a consultant whose opinions were not discoverable under Rule 26" after the deposition);
Ross v. Burlington N. R.R., 136 F.R.D. 638, 638 (N.D. II. 1991) (in a case that pre-dated
the 1993 changes to Rule 26, the expert "was originally designated by plaintiff as a testify-
ing expert witness, but he has now been labelled a consulting expert witness"); Bailey v.
Meister Brau, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11, 13 (N.D. 11. 1972) (in a pre-1993 case, a party originally
identified an expert as a likely trial witness on several issues, but later notified the other
party that his testimony would be limited to one issue); County of L.A. v. Super. Ct., 271
Cal. Rptr. 689, 699 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Broward County v. Cento, 611 So.2d 1339, 1339
(Fla. Ct. App. 1993); Taylor v. Kohli, 642 N.E.2d 467, 468 (Il. 1994); Reeves v. Boyd &
Sons, Inc., 654 N.E.2d 864, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (elimination of expert's name from
revised witness list in state case); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Jackson, 636 So. 2d 310, 313 (Miss.
1992) (state rule similar to pre-1993 version of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure); In re Doctors' Hosp. of Laredo, 2 S.W.3d 504, 506 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997,
orig. proceeding) (noting that an expert was "re-designated" as a consultant under state
rules); Castellanos, 945 S.W.2d at 237 (similar).
58. See Williamson, 126 P.2d at 130 ("Big Four argues that its withdrawal of Kurt as a
witness restored the immunity from discovery which Kurt's report originally enjoyed.").
59. Because a deposition generally is the preferred method to discover expert witness
information, the controversy regarding the effect of de-disclosure on the opposing party's
discovery rights occurs most often in the context of attempts to depose de-disclosed ex-
perts. It is of course possible that the same issue could arise in the context of some other
discovery effort pursued by the opposing party, such as an interrogatory or a request for
production seeking information regarding the de-disclosed expert. See FED. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(5) (authorizing several means of expert witness discovery).
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depose the expert. 60 Several other courts, however, have held that the
opposing party has no right to depose a de-disclosed expert because the
retaining attorney's de-disclosure returns the witness to consultant
status. 6
1
C. RED ROVER ISSUES AT TRIAL
Red Rover issues are not always raised during discovery. It is not unu-
sual for the retaining attorney to try to de-disclose the Red Rover expert
or otherwise attempt to stop her opponent from acquiring or using her
testimony after she has been deposed.62 Sometimes the retaining attor-
ney objects to her opponent's attempts to introduce portions of the ex-
60. House, 168 F.R.D. at 240, 249; Toni L. Scott, Inc., 798 S.W.2d at 557 (party cannot
obtain control of another party's expert witnesses by settling with that party and then pre-
vent depositions of the experts by "changing the designation of these experts from 'testify-
ing' experts to 'consulting-only' experts"); cf. Koch Ref. Co., 85 F.3d at 1182 (where party,
rather than expert, switched sides, another party "could have deposed [the expert] at any
time"); Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co. v. Grinnell Corp., Nos. CIV.A.97-0775, 97-0803, 1999
WL 731410 (E.D. La. Sept. 20, 1999) (where party who had disclosed the expert had been
dismissed from the case, a party remaining in the case retained the right to depose the
expert); Harnischfeger Corp. v. Stone, 814 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1991, no writ) (permitting discovery about a firm whose employee had been dis-
closed as an expert witness in a "companion suit," even though another employee of the
firm was serving as a consultant in the case at hand); White v. Vanderbilt Univ., 21 S.W.3d
215, 224 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). For a summary of the cases before 1996, see House, 168
F.R.D. at 242-44.
61. See Callaway Golf Co. v. Dunlop Slazenger Group Ams., Inc., No. CIV.A.01-
669(M PT), 2002 WL 1906628, at *4 (D. Del. Aug. 14, 2002) (disallowing deposition, except
possibly regarding facts known by expert before being retained); FMC Corp. v. Vendo Co.,
196 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1048 (E.D. Cal. 2002); Dayton-Phoenix Group, Inc. v. Gen. Motors
Corp., No. C-3-95-480, 1997 WL 1764760, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 19, 1997) (disallowing
general deposition of expert, but allowing deposition regarding expert's pre-litigation
knowledge, because such a deposition would be allowed for consultants who had never
been disclosed as experts); Ross, 136 F.R.D. at 638; County of L.A., 271 Cal. Rptr. at 705;
see also Durflinger, 727 F.2d at 891 (de-disclosed expert was a Rule 26(b)(4)(B) consult-
ant); Lehan, 190 F.R.D. at 672; cf. Campbell Indus. v. M/V Gemini, 619 F.2d 24, 26 (9th
Cir. 1980) (prohibiting a deposition of an expert who had been identified as a potential
trial witness in a case decided before the 1993 amendments to Rule 26, even though the
expert had indicated a willingness to testify on behalf of the opposing party); Bailey, 57
F.R.D. at 13 (determining that a partially de-disclosed expert could not be deposed regard-
ing issues upon which he had been de-disclosed, in a case predating the 1993 amendments
to Rule 26); Reeves, 654 N.E.2d at 874-75 (affirming denial of deposition in state case
decided under rule similar to pre-1993 Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure);
Jackson, 636 So. 2d at 313-14 (holding that a deposition should not have been allowed in a
state case under a rule similar to pre-1993 version of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure); In re Doctors' Hosp. of Laredo, 2 S.W.3d at 506 (holding that de-disclosure
returned an expert witness to consultant status under state rules and therefore prevented
an opposing party from deposing the expert); White, 21 S.W.3d at 224 n.9 ("Courts constru-
ing rules similar to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 26 have held that a party may place a previously
designated testifying expert beyond the reach of an opposing party by redesignating the
expert from a testifying witness to a consultant prior to the witness's deposition.").
62. See Peterson, 81 F.3d at 1036-37; Collins, 621 F.2d at 780; Lunghi v. Clark Equip.
Co., 200 Cal. Rptr. 387, 388 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Onti, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 1998 WL
671263, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 1998); Jackson, 636 So. 2d at 313 (noting objection of
retaining party to deposition of de-disclosed expert and retaining party's later objection to
the use of deposition testimony at trial).
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pert's deposition63 at trial,64 to her opponent's designation of a de-
disclosed expert as her own trial witness,65 or to her subpoenaing of the
expert to the trial.66
63. See Lunghi, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 389; Onti, Inc., 1998 WL 671263, at *1; Broward
County v. Cento, 611 So.2d 1339, 1339 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993); Taylor v. Kohli, 642 N.E.2d
467, 468 (111. 1994); Jackson, 636 So. 2d at 313; White, 21 S.W.3d at 222.
64. The portions of the Federal Rules that apply most frequently to an opposing
party's attempts to introduce portions of a Red Rover expert's deposition testimony during
that party's case-in-chief provide:
Rule 32. Use of Deposition in Court Proceedings
(A) Use of Depositions. At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an
interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible
under the rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present
and testifying, may be used against any party who was present or represented
at the taking of the deposition or who had reasonable notice thereof, in ac-
cordance with the following provisions:
(3) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by
any party for any purpose if the court finds:
(A) that the witness is dead; or
(B) that the witness is at a greater distance than 100 miles from the
place of trial or hearing, or is out of the United States, unless it appears
that the absence of the witness was procured by the party offering the
deposition; or
(C) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, ill-
ness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or
(D) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure
the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or
(E) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances
exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due
regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses
orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used.
FED. R. Civ. P. 32; see also White, 21 S.W.3d at 226 (summarizing somewhat similar provi-
sions of Tennessee law). Because expert witnesses often live a substantial distance from
the site of a particular trial, parties sometimes offer portions of deposition transcripts
under Rule 32(a)(3)(B) or similar state rules. Id. at 226; Taylor, 642 N.E.2d at 468.
65. See Lehan, 190 F.R.D. at 670; Lunghi, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 388; see also Kreymer v. N.
Tex. Mun. Water Dist., 842 S.W.2d 750, 751 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, n.w.h.) (where both
parties listed the same expert as a trial witness).
To be safe, some attorneys list their opponent's experts as possible trial witnesses on
their list of witnesses who may be called at trial. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(A). If the
expert has also been listed as a possible trial witness by the attorney that originally re-
tained her, this precaution may not be necessary. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3) advisory com-
mittee's note (1993).
66. Cf. In re Vestavia Assocs., 105 B.R. 680, 681 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (objecting to
subpoena issued to expert for evidentiary hearing, which is the equivalent of a trial in
bankruptcy proceedings).
Although the law is far from uniform, see DOUGLAS DANNER & LARRY L. VARN, I
EXPERT WITNESS CHECKLISTS § 1:07 (2002); Mark Labaton, Note, Discovery and Testi-
mony of Unretained Experts: Creating a Clear and Equitable Standard to Govern Compli-
ance with Subpoenas, 1987 DUKE L.J. 140, 146-49, courts often have held that an attorney
cannot force an expert to form new opinions, but a subpoena can be used to compel an
expert to testify to factual observations or opinions that she has already developed. See
Alper v. United States, 190 F.R.D. 281, 283 (D. Mass. 2000) ("Plaintiff has the right to
command that Dr. Becker appear at trial .... ); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Otte, 474 F.2d 529,
536 (2d Cir. 1972) ("The weight of authority holds that, although it is not the usual prac-
tice, a court does have the power to subpoena an expert witness and ... require him to
state whatever opinions he may have previously formed."), quoted in Kaufman v. Edel-
stein, 539 F.2d 811, 817 (2d Cir. 1976); Cogdell v. Brown, 531 A.2d 1379, 1382 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1987); Fitspatrick v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 979, 980 (E.D. Pa. 1981);
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There are also occasions when attorneys who surmise that some of
their experts' testimony may hurt their cases do not remove them from
their trial witness lists. If an attorney concludes that her expert's testi-
mony might still do more good than harm, she may wish to preserve the
option of presenting the expert's testimony at trial, despite the realization
that some of the expert's testimony will hurt her case. In an effort to
control the presentation of the witness's testimony, she may resist her
opponent's attempts to use the expert's testimony in her case-in-chief. 67
Because a plaintiff presents its case-in-chief before the defendant, usually
it is a defense attorney who is objecting to a plaintiff's attorney's use of
Red Rover opinions when the objecting attorney also desires to preserve
the option of using the expert's testimony in her own case-in-chief.68 Al-
though the relative dearth of reported cases suggests that these types of
maneuvers 69 are less common than attempting to keep Red Rover testi-
Bryant v. Cary (In re: Cary), 167 B.R. 163, 166 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994); see also, e.g.,
Mitzel v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 878 F.2d 233, 235 (8th Cir. 1989); Estock v. Lane, 842
F.2d 184, 189 (7th Cir. 1988); Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co of Pa.,
148 F.R.D. 552, 557-58 (S.D. W. Va. 1993); United States v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 406 F.
Supp. 175,176-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); cf. Kaufman, 539 F.2d at 821 ("We can find no justifica-
tion for a federal rule that would wholly exempt experts from placing before a tribunal
factual knowledge relating to the case at hand, opinions already formulated, or, even, in
the rare case where a party may seek this and the witness feels able to answer, a freshly
formed opinion, simply because they have become expert in a particular calling.").
Under Rule 45(c)(3)(B)(ii), a court faced with a timely motion to quash must quash a
subpoena "requir[ing] disclosure of an unretained expert's opinion or information not
describing specific events or occurrences in dispute and resulting from the expert's study
made not at the request of any party." FED. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(B)(ii). When an opposing
party subpoenas a Red Rover expert, this provision is not applicable, because such an
expert has studied the events in question at the request of a party.
67. In White, 21 S.W.3d at 222, the trial court ruled that the plaintiff could not intro-
duce portions of the defendants' expert's deposition if the defendants decided not to call
him during their case-in-chief. The appellate court disagreed with this ruling. Id. at 221.
In Onti, Inc., 1998 WL 671263, at *1, the defendant objected to the plaintiff's designation
of portions of the transcripts of depositions of experts the defendant called as witnesses in
a bench trial. In a post-trial ruling, the court admitted the designated portions of the depo-
sition. Id.
68. See White, 21 S.W.3d at 222 (where defendants listed their retained expert as a
possible witness and plaintiffs listed him as a potential witness, defendant objected to
plaintiffs' use of the expert in their case-in-chief); cf. Onti, Inc., 1998 WL 671263, at *1 (in a
bench trial, defendant objected to plaintiff's designation of portions of transcript of expert
called by the defendant during the trial).
69. It is also possible that an attorney might present the expert's testimony during her
case-in-chief, then resist her opponent's efforts to introduce certain opinions during cross-
examination. Under Rule 611 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "Cross-examination
should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the
credibility of the witness." FED. R. EVID. 611(b); accord UNIF. R. Evii. 611(b). If the
court enforces this rule, an attorney might be able to present her expert's testimony via
direct examination, then object to cross-examination questions that ask the expert for testi-
mony that is outside the scope of the direct examination. Several realities limit the effec-
tiveness of such a strategy, however. First, it may be difficult to argue in any given case
that the expert opinion presented during cross-examination actually is outside the scope of
the direct examination, when the expert is testifying about the same general areas of exper-
tise. Second, the above-quoted restriction is of little value to an attorney who seeks to
prevent a jury from hearing an expert's opinion on a given subject in many courtrooms.
The next sentence of the rule provides, "The court may, in the exercise of discretion, per-
mit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination." Id. Thus, an "outside the
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mony entirely out of the trial through de-disclosure or wholesale objec-
tions to any Red Rover testimony at trial, they are not entirely
extraordinary. 70
In either event, a court can face Red Rover issues at trial, rather than
in the pretrial discovery context. As the opening hypothetical passage
suggests, two fundamental issues can arise at trial.
1. Admissibility of Red Rover Testimony
First, the court might be forced to decide whether to admit Red Rover
testimony over the objection of the attorney who originally retained and
disclosed the expert. There is a significant split of authority on this is-
sue, 71 but almost 72 all of the reported decisions stop short of giving free
rein to attorneys who seek to introduce Red Rover evidence.73
Some courts admit Red Rover testimony, 74 even when the expert's ini-
scope of direct" objection by the retaining counsel may do nothing other than change the
manner in which the expert's opinion is presented during cross-examination. If, instead,
the court exercises its discretion by disallowing the expert's opinion during cross, the op-
posing attorney may have the option of presenting the expert's opinion during her case-in-
chief (if it has not yet been presented) or rebuttal (if it has). When this occurs, the opinion
that drew the retaining attorney's objections during cross may be highlighted, because the
expert's testimony presumably will be limited to this opinion when it is presented after the
expert's cross-examination. Therefore, an "outside the scope of direct" objection during
the cross-examination of an expert will often result in little or no gain for the retaining
attorney. Perhaps the paucity of reported Red Rover cases involving such objections re-
sults from this minimal potential gain.
70. The phenomenon of retaining attorneys who wish to introduce selected opinions of
an expert and to object to their opponents' attempts to introduce other testimony from the
expert further justifies this article's allusion to the playground game of Red Rover, see
supra note 49. In Red Rover, a team that has lost a particular former member to the other
team can call out that individual's name, with the possible result of reacquiring her as a
team member. Therefore, an individual player may move back and forth between the two
teams several times. In a similar fashion, the opinions and other testimony of a particular
expert could be presented at various times during a trial by both sides, such as a case-in-
chief direct examination, cross-examination, redirect, re-cross, etc., or rebuttal direct exam-
ination, cross-examination, redirect, re-cross, etc. In many or all of these instances, the
attorney offering the expert's testimony will be doing so because the attorney believes that
a particular opinion or opinions support the attorney's position. Thus, it is not difficult, or
unrealistic, to imagine a scenario involving a particular expert that rather closely resembles
a serial "send that expert right over" version of Red Rover.
71. See House v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 168 F.R.D. 236, 238 (N.D. Iowa 1996)
(noting that courts have "postulated no less than three different standards" for resolving
Red Rover disputes); In re Vestavia, 105 B.R. at 683 (observing that courts "have come to
two different policy conclusions regarding opponents calling opposing parties' expert wit-
nesses"); White, 21 S.W.3d at 224 n.9 (placing previous cases into four different categories).
72. See infra note 87.
73. See House, 168 F.R.D. at 246 ("[Tlhe court does not find that . . . designation
under [the pre-1993 version of Rule 261 creates an 'entitlement' of the opposing party to
depose or use another party's expert at trial."); White, 21 S.W.3d at 224 (similar).
74. See Peterson v. Willie, 81 F.3d 1033, 1035 (11th Cir. 1996) (affirming admission of
Red Rover testimony, but holding that admission of testimony about original retention of
Red Rover was error, though harmless); Powell v. Super. Ct., 259 Cal. Rptr. 390, 391-92
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (where opposing party did not list Red Rover in her list of trial wit-
nesses, California statutory law still allowed her to call him, because he previously had
been designated as an expert by her opponent); Lunghi v. Clark Equip. Co., 200 Cal. Rptr.
387, 388-89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Onti, 1998 WL 671263; Kreymer v. N. Tex. Mun. Water
Dist., 842 S.W.2d 750, 752-53 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, n.w.h.) (where both parties desig-
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tial employer has attempted to de-disclose her as a trial witness.75 Sev-
eral of the reported decisions reach this result only after engaging in
balancing tests76 that could result in exclusion of Red Rover testimony in
other circumstances. 77 Some rely upon the discretion of the trial court,
which could be exercised in favor of excluding Red Rover testimony in
other cases. 78 One case emphasizes that Red Rover testimony was admit-
ted only because there was no ex parte contact 79 between the opposing
attorney and the expert,80 thereby implying that the presence of such con-
tact would render Red Rover testimony inadmissible.
Other courts are even more openly hostile to Red Rover testimony.
Several courts have held that an opposing party cannot introduce the tes-
timony of a de-disclosed Red Rover expert at trial,81 even when this party
nated the same expert as a trial witness, direct and cross-examination could cover either
party's designation).
75. See Peterson, 81 F.3d at 1036-38; Agron v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 176 F.R.D. 445,
451 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); House, 168 F.R.D. at 249; Broward County v. Cento, 611 So. 2d 1339
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
76. One commentator neatly summarized the tests applied by the courts to Red Rover
issues while paraphrasing a leading decision:
The district judge in House noted that there are three possible standards to
apply when determining whether a party should have access to an adver-
sary's former expert. The first option is the "exceptional circumstances"
standard in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(B), which deals with
consulting experts. The second is a "'discretionary' or 'balancing' standard,"
which weighs the "interests of the [discovering] party and the court against
the potential for prejudice to the party who hired the expert." The third and
most lenient standard is an "entitlement" standard, drawn from a few cases
holding that a party is entitled to call an adversary's expert notwithstanding
the adversary's opposition.
Richmond, supra note 46, at 930-31, discussing and quoting House.
77. See Agron, 176 F.R.D. at 450; House, 168 F.R.D. at 246 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Moore
v. Kantha, 711 A.2d 967, 972-74 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998); White, 21 S.W.3d at 225;
cf. Lehan v. Ambassador Programs, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 670, 672 (E.D. Wash. 2000) (review-
ing, but ultimately rejecting, previous balancing cases).
78. See Peterson, 81 F.3d at 1037-38 & n.4 (finding that admission of Red Rover testi-
mony was within trial court's discretion); House, 168 F.R.D. at 246; cf. White, 21 S.W.3d at
222-24 (noting that decisions about admissibility of evidence were within the trial court's
discretion, but reversing decision to exclude Red Rover testimony).
79. In this article "ex parte contact" refers to communications between an attorney
and an expert witness retained by that attorney's opponent, without the permission or
knowledge of the retaining attorney. This article does not address ex parte contact be-
tween an attorney and a judge.
80. See Agron, 176 F.R.D. at 452 (noting the absence of a "violation of discovery
rules"); accord White, 21 S.W.3d at 225; cf. Steele v. Seglie, No. 84-2200, 1986 WL 30765, at
*4 (D. Kan. Mar. 27, 1986) (holding that inadvertent receipt of opposing party's consult-
ant's report was not "a 'flagrant' violation" of the alleged prohibition of ex parte contact).
81. See Zvolensky v. Ametek, Inc., 142 F.3d 438, No. 96-4342, 1998 WL 124047 (6th
Cir. Mar. 12, 1998); Lehan, 190 F.R.D. at 674: Ferguson v. Michael Foods. Inc., 189 F.R.D.
408 (D. Minn. 1999); In re Hidden Lake Ltd. P'ship, 247 B.R. 722, 724 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
2000); In re Vestavia, 105 B.R. at 680; Taylor v. Kohli, 642 N.E.2d 467, 468 (II. 1994) (ex-
cluding Red Rover deposition testimony where the parties agreed that an expert witness
"may be formally abandoned" under state law); infra note 84; cf. Peterson, 81 F.3d at 1037
(reviewing previous decisions).
One court faced with a different situation reached a similar result. See Kirk v. Raymark
Indus., Inc., 61 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1995). In Raynark, the expert whose testimony was ad-
mitted at trial was never disclosed as a possible trial witness by a party and, apparently,
never retained by a party in the case at hand. Instead, the expert had testified as an expert
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itself designated the expert as a probable trial witness. 82 Most of these
cases rely upon balancing tests, 83 the trial court's discretion,84 or the in-
herent power of courts to exclude expert testimony.85 Some courts have
excluded Red Rover testimony where the opposing attorney engaged in
ex parte contact with the expert witness. 86
2. Admissibility of Evidence About the Original Retention of the Red
Rover Expert
If the court admits Red Rover testimony, it will then face the issue of
whether to allow the opposing party to introduce evidence establishing
that the expert was originally retained by the party who is now opposing
for the party in "an unrelated" case. Id. at 163. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that
the expert's testimony from the previous trial was not admissible as an admission under
Rule 801(d)(2)(C) of the Federal Rules of Evidence or as former testimony of an unavaila-
ble witness under Rule 804(b)(1). Id. at 163-66.
82. See County of L.A. v. Super. Ct., 271 Cal. Rptr. 689 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
83. See FNC Corp. v. Vendo Co., 196 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1048 (E.D. Cal. 2002); Fergu-
son, 189 F.R.D. at 409.
84. See Koch Ref. Co. v. Jennifer L. Boudreaux MV, 85 F.3d 1178, 1183 (5th Cir.
1996); Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 890 (10th Cir. 1984); Campbell Indus. v. M/V
Gemini, 619 F.2d 24, 27 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Vestavia, 105 B.R. at 684 (observing that the
competing "arguments are compelling and I have vacillated back and forth" and ultimately
relying upon "judicial intuition"); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Jackson, 636 So. 2d 310, 314 (Miss.
1992); Axelson, Inc. v. Mcllhany, 755 S.W.2d 170, 174 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, orig.
proceeding) (state case involving settlement by party that had previously disclosed expert),
rev'd, Tom L. Scott, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. 1990), Axelson, Inc. v.
McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 552 n.3 (Tex. 1990) (noting that the Scott decision rendered the
same day resolved expert discovery issues).
85. See Koch Ref. Co., 85 F.3d at 1181.
86. Id. (disqualifying de-disclosed expert who had ex parte communications with op-
posing attorneys, where party, rather than expert, switched sides); Durflinger, 727 F.2d at
891; Campbell Indus., 619 F.2d at 26, 27; County of L.A., 271 Cal. Rptr. at 705 (disqualify-
ing attorney who engaged in ex parte communications with opposing party's disclosed ex-
pert witness); cf. Jackson, 636 So. 2d at 314 (asserting, in a decision affirming exclusion of
Red Rover testimony on other grounds, that the state's "rule makes no provision for ex
parte communication with an expert witness"). But cf. Durflinger, 727 F.2d at 891 ("In
different circumstances, we recognize that a trial judge might not be required to exclude
the testimony of witness [who was contacted ex parte by opposing counsel] in violation of
the rules of discovery.").
These cases, along with another decision allowing Red Rover testimony due to the ab-
sence of ex parte contact, see supra note 80, suggest that ex parte contact between an
attorney and an expert retained by the attorney's opponent somehow violates the discov-
ery provisions of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar state rules.
Although other courts have also suggested this outside the Red Rover context, see Easton,
supra note 22, at 687-89, this suggestion is incorrect. Because ex parte contact by an attor-
ney is a means of gathering expert information that is not regulated by Rule 26's discovery
provisions, nothing in Rule 26 prohibits ex parte contact. Id. at 690-700. In addition, the
portion of Rule 26 relied upon by courts who believed that it banned ex parte contact was
removed from Rule 26 in 1993 and replaced by provisions expanding discovery regarding
expert witnesses and creating mandatory disclosure about expert witnesses. Id. at 701-04.
Therefore, despite sundry opinions to the contrary, the claim that ex parte contact violates
Rule 26 is incorrect.
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the admission of her testimony. Almost 87 every federal8 8 court that has
faced this issue has determined, incorrectly,8 9 that such evidence should
not be admitted during the direct examination of the Red Rover expert
because it is unfairly prejudicial to the party who originally hired her.90
A few of these courts have suggested that such evidence might be admis-
sible on redirect examination, if the cross-examination by the attorney
who originally retained the expert suggested that the expert was not qual-
ified to render opinions.9'
Other courts have a different take on cross-examination by an attorney
who originally retained the Red Rover expert. In their view, the predica-
ment faced by an attorney's cross-examination of an expert she originally
retained 92 and the possibility that the jurors would be able to indepen-
87. In a case that predated the 1.993 amendments to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, see infra notes 129-31 and accompanying text, the Fifth Circuit held that
the district court erred in excluding evidence about a Red Rover expert's initial retention,
but held that this error was harmless. See Collins v. Wayne Corp., 621 F.2d 777, 780-83 (5th
Cir. 1980).
88. In cases that usually involve experts who served as consultants whose reports were
provided to the opposing party, a fact pattern that is admittedly outside the main focus of
this article, see supra note 26, a few state courts have allowed the opposing party to intro-
duce testimony from initially adverse experts and to establish that these experts were ini-
tially retained by the opposing party. See Broward County v. Cento, 611 So. 2d 1339, 1339
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Miller v. Marymount Med. Ctr., No. 2000-CA-000827-MR, 2001
WL 726798, at *6-8 (Ky. Ct. App. June 29, 2001) (review granted and opinion subject to
revision or withdrawal) (Ky. June 5, 2002) (involving deposed expert witness); Mayor of
Baltimore v. Zell, 367 A.2d 14 (Md. Ct. App. 1977); Fenlon v. Thayer, 506 A.2d 319, 323
(N.H. 1986); Cogdell v. Brown, 531 A.2d 1379, 1382 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987); Bd. of
Educ. of S. Sanpete Sch. Dist. v. Barton, 617 P.2d 347 (Utah 1980); cf. Marple v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 505 N.W.2d 715, 718-19 (Neb. 1993) (affirming that court's admission of
evidence of Red Rover initial retention but doing so in part due to retaining party's failure
to preserve its objection for appeal). However, one of these state courts admitted, "The
few cases in other jurisdictions dealing with the issue tend to support the [initial consulting
party's] position that it is prejudicial error to permit the disclosure of initial employment by
the adverse party." Mayor of Baltimore, 367 A.2d at 16.
89. See infra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
90. See Peterson v. Willie, 81 F.3d 1033, 1035 (1tth Cir. 1996) (holding that trial court's
admission of evidence regarding Red Rover expert's original retention was error, but
harmless); Agron v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 176 F.R.D. 445, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); House v.
Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 168 F.R.D. 236, 248-49 (N.D. Iowa 1996); cf. Jackson, 636 So.
2d at 315 (asserting that allowing Red Rover testimony and evidence of the expert's origi-
nal retention would be "highly prejudicial"); Moore v. Kantha, 711 A.2d 967, 974 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (approving trial court's exclusion of evidence of a Red Rover's
original retention).
91. See Peterson, 81 F.3d at 1038 n.5; Granger v. Wisner, 656 P.2d 1238, 1243 & n.2
(Ariz. 1982). But see Agron, 176 F.R.D. at 451 (holding that "the Court's restrictions on
defense counsel [to refrain from disclosing that plaintiff's attorney originally retained the
Red Rover expert] will apply to redirect as well as direct examination").
92. See Ferguson v. Michael Foods, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 408, 410 (D. Minn. 1999)
("[D]efendants would be placed at an awkward disadvantage when conducting their cross-
examination, forced to dance around the fact that his initial examination of plaintiff oc-
curred because defendants hired him."); cf. Peterson, 81 F.3d at 1037 (admitting that its
approach of permitting Red Rover opinion testimony, but excluding evidence of expert's
original retention, "may inhibit adequate cross examination").
Not all courts agree that the original retaining attorney would be significantly handi-
capped in conducting a cross-examination if Red Rover opinion testimony was admitted,
but evidence of the initial retention was excluded. See Agron, 176 F.R.D. at 452 ("Plaintiff
may still impeach Deutsch's testimony by showing that it differed materially from state-
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dently determine who initially retained the expert should result in the
outright exclusion of Red Rover testimony.93
III. MISPLACED CONCERNS DRIVING BANS ON RED
ROVER EVIDENCE
When courts exclude or limit Red Rover evidence, they typically 94 do
not do so on relevance grounds. 95 Red Rover testimony, including evi-
dence regarding the relationship between experts and their initial em-
ployers, usually exceeds by a rather significant margin the relevance test
of "having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of con-
sequence to the determination of the action more probable or less proba-
ble than it would be without the evidence. ' 96 In reality, the more
frequent concern is not that Red Rover evidence will have no tendency to
establish a disputed fact, but that it will be so powerful that it will have
too great a tendency to establish these facts.97
As relevant testimony, Red Rover evidence can help the jury98 deter-
mine which party is correct on a disputed factual issue. In other words,
ments made in his report. There is no need to refer to Deutsch's prior retention by Plain-
tiff in order to emphasize such inconsistencies.")
93. See Ferguson, 189 F.R.D. at 410; Dayton-Phoenix Group, Inc. v. Gen. Motors
Corp., No. C-3-95-480, 1997 WL 1764760, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 19, 1997) ("[Tlhe danger
that the jury might learn" that one party initially retained an expert "could be the basis for
refusing to allow Plaintiff to present trial testimony from" him.); In re Vestavia Assocs., 105
B.R. 680, 684 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) ("Such post-trial gerrymandering of Rules may
equally cause the lighting of the fuse to a later debacle in the midst of a jury trial.").
94. Of course, it is possible that a party would attempt to introduce Red Rover evi-
dence that is not relevant. When this occurs, the court should exclude this evidence, just as
it should exclude all other irrelevant evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining "relevant
evidence"); accord UNIF. R. EvID. 401; FED. R. EVID. 402 (stating that evidence that does
not meet the relevance standard "is not admissible"); see also UNIF. R. EVID. 402.
The common situation considered by this article involves an expert retained by one party
who reaches an opinion favorable to an opposing party on an issue that is contested by
these two parties. See infra notes 214-17 and accompanying text. In this situation, the
expert's opinion is ordinarily relevant, regardless of which party it favors. If the expert had
reached an opinion on a contested issue that favored the party that originally retained her,
the opposing party could not reasonably object on relevance grounds (though other objec-
tions might be available). The fact that the expert reached an opinion favoring the oppos-
ing party does not make that opinion any less relevant.
95. See Agron, 176 F.R.D. at 450 (noting that the party opposing Red Rover testimony
"has not challenged [its] relevance or probativeness"); Lunghi v. Clark Equip. Co., 200 Cal.
Rptr. 387, 388-89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) ("It is clear that Dr. Siegel's opinions were relevant
and admissible.").
96. FED. R. EVID. 401; accord UNIF. R. EvID. 401.
97. Several of the courts that have excluded or limited Red Rover evidence have done
so out of concern for its potentially explosive effect. See infra note 252 and accompanying
text.
98. This article assumes that a jury will be the fact-finder in a case involving Red
Rover testimony, but this assumption is not integral to the analysis in this article. To the
contrary, because this article argues for wider admission of Red Rover evidence, its argu-
ments are, if anything, perhaps even more persuasive in bench trials, because judges some-
times admit evidence in bench trials that they would exclude in jury trials. See The Hon.
Robert E. Bacharach, Motions in Limine in Oklahoma State and Federal Courts, 24 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 113, 117 (1999); Ronald S. Longhofer, Jury Trial Techniques in Complex
Civil Litigation, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 335, 339 (1999).
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Red Rover evidence can assist in the search for truth, which after all is a
fundamental purpose for conducting the trial99 and for allowing
discovery. '"
Because Red Rover evidence is usually relevant, it usually should be
admitted, unless some specific provision of the U.S. Constitution, a fed-
eral statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, or other federal rules renders it inadmissible.10' Courts that
exclude or limit Red Rover evidence generally do so on the basis of well-
intentioned, but misguided, fairness concerns that do not meet this stan-
dard. As the remainder of this section will establish, none of these fair-
ness concerns is sufficient to overcome the general policy in favor of
giving the jury all available relevant evidence, so that it can determine the
truth on the issues it must decide.
A. CONFIDENTIALITY ANXIETY
Several of the courts that have prohibited depositions of, or trial testi-
mony from, de-disclosed experts based their decisions upon a concern
that Red Rover depositions or trial testimony might unfairly lead to the
exposure of the retaining attorney's trial preparation 0 2 or other allegedly
99. See, e.g., Agron, 176 F.R.D. at 450; House v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 168
F.R.D. 236, 246 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Felder v. Wyman, 139 F.R.D. 85, 90 (D.S.C. 1991);
Reilley v. Keswani, 350 A.2d 74, 74-75 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975); cf. Lehan v. Am-
bassador Programs, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 670, 672 (E.D. Wash. 2000) (reviewing decisions that
have emphasized "that the trial is to determine the truth").
Even the Federal Rules of Evidence reflect this vision of the trial as a search for the
truth. Rule 102 says the Rules should be applied "to the end that the truth may be ascer-
tained and proceedings justly determined." FED. R. Evni). 102; accord UNIF. R. EVID. 102.
Rule 611 requires courts to control the presentation of evidence "so as to ... make the
interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth." FED. R. EVID.
61 l(a)(1); accord UNIF. R. EVID. 611 (a)(1).
Some dispute this view of the fundamental purpose of a trial, because they believe a trial
is more correctly seen as a means for individuals to assert their rights. See John S. Apple-
gate, Witness Preparation, 68 TEX. L. REV. 227, 324-26 (1989). Others suggest that a trial
cannot determine the truth about the past. See W. William Hodes, The Professional Duty
To Horseshed Witnesses-Zealously, Within the Bounds of the Law, 30 TEX. TECH L. REV.
1343, 1360 (1999) (noting that "'courtroom truth' need not match every chapter and every
verse of objective truth"). Because the arguments in this article stem from a belief that the
civil justice system should strive to enhance the truth-seeking process whenever reasona-
ble, those who question this view of the trial may not find them persuasive.
100. See Tom L. Scott, Inc. v. Mcllhany, 798 S.W.2d 556, 559 (Tex. 1990) ("The primary
policy behind discovery is to seek truth so that disputes may be decided by facts that are
revealed rather than concealed."); Harnischfeger Corp. v. Stone, 814 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist. 1991, no writ) ("The ultimate purpose of discovery is to seek
the truth, thus allowing disputes to be decided by what the facts reveal and not by what
facts are concealed.").
101. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide:
Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Con-
stitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evi-
dence which is not relevant is not admissible.
FED. R. Evius. 402; see also UNIF. R. Evis. 402.
102. See Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 1984) (contending that Rule
26(b)(4) "is designed to promote fairness by precluding unreasonable access to an oppos-
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confidential information.10 3 These decisions misapply the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure governing discovery, misinterpret Federal Rules provi-
sions requiring disclosure of information reviewed by the expert, includ-
ing trial preparation matters and other previously confidential
information revealed to the expert by the retaining attorney, and fail to
appreciate the significance of an attorney's disclosure of the expert as a
person who may testify at trial.
1. Misapplication of Discovery Provisions to Trial Issues
As previously noted,10 4 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally
do not provide for discovery regarding experts who serve only as consul-
tants to attorneys and are never disclosed as possible trial witnesses.
Under Rule 26(b)(4)(b), interrogatories and depositions can be used to
gather information about such persons10 5 only when the party seeking
discovery can show "exceptional circumstances under which it is impracti-
cable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the
same subject by other means."' 0 6 For purposes of analyzing whether par-
ties should regularly have access to the testimony of experts who have
been disclosed as possible trial witnesses by their opponents, the "excep-
tional circumstances" provision has little or no impact.107 Therefore, if
Rule 26(b)(4)(b) applies to an expert who has been disclosed and later
de-disclosed, it might limit the opposing party's access to that expert's
testimony.
Several courts have applied Rule 26(b)(4)(b) in exactly that manner.
Most of these courts have held that Rule 26(b)(4)(b) prohibits an oppos-
ing party from presenting a Red Rover expert's testimony at trial.10 8
ing party's diligent trial preparations"); Dayton-Phoenix Group, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
No. C-3-95-480, 1997 WL 1764760, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 19, 1997); In re Vestavia Assocs.,
105 B.R. 680 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (discussing Durflinger's concern about providing
access to opposing party's trial preparation).
103. See Zvolensky v. Ametek, Inc., 142 F.3d 438, No. 96-4342, 1998 WL 124047, at *2
(6th Cir. Mar. 12, 1998) (suggesting that allowing Red Rover testimony would interfere
with a party's freedom to communicate with experts "without risking exposing certain in-
formation to the opposing party"); Durflinger, 727 F.2d at 891 (noting that the expert's
report for the plaintiffs "was based on information furnished to him by plaintiffs"); cf.
County of L.A. v. Super. Ct., 271 Cal. Rptr. 698, 703, 705 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (decided
under California law) (discussing attorney work product concerns, expert's discussions
with retaining attorneys, and expert's receipt of information from retaining attorneys).
104. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
105. In Rule 26(b)(4)(B), such a consultant is defined as "an expert who has been re-
tained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation
for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial."
106. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
107. If a party in a particular case could demonstrate the required "exceptional circum-
stances," that party could then use interrogatories or depositions to acquire information
about the expert in question. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B). By definition, though, a case
with "exceptional circumstances" is not a typical case. This article argues that parties
should have access to Red Rover deposition and trial testimony in typical cases. The "ex-
ceptional circumstances" provision cannot be used to support policy for typical cases.
108. See Durflinger, 727 F.2d at 891; Lehan v. Ambassador Programs, Inc., 190 F.R.D.
670, 672 (E.D. Wash. 2000); Ferguson v. Michael Foods, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 408, 409 (D. Minn.
1999); In re Vestavia Assocs., 105 B.R. 680 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989); cf. House v. Combined
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Others have held that Rule 26(b)(4)(B) prevents the opposing party from
deposing the expert. 10 9
The former decisions incorrectly apply Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure provisions that govern the discovery process to the trial itself. These
courts seem to have forgotten that Rule 26(b)(4)(b) is a subsection of
Rule 26(b), which is entitled "Discovery Scope and Limits,"' 110 and Rule
26(b) is itself a subsection of Rule 26, which is entitled "General Provi-
sions Governing Discovery; Duty of Disclosure."' I IAs its title suggests,
Rule 26 governs the discovery and disclosure process, but does not gov-
ern the conduct of the trial itself. More precisely, as some' 12 courts have
noted, Rule 26(b)(4)(B)'s discovery provisions say nothing about whether
an expert's testimony is admissible at trial.' 13
The courts that have nevertheless held that these discovery provisions
prevent the admission of Red Rover expert testimony at trial 114 are sim-
ply incorrect. 115 Because Rule 26(b)(4)(B) does not govern trials, it is
not a rule that overcomes the baseline principle that relevant evidence is
admissible. 16
Ins. Co. of Am., 168 F.R.D. 236, 242 (N.D. Iowa 1996) ("Implicit in the decision in
Durflinger... is the assumption that whenever a party decides not to use at trial an expert
it has consulted, the 'not expected to be called as a witness' provisions of Rule 26(b)(4)(B)
come into play.").
109. See infra note 117.
110. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
111. FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
112. One of the courts that correctly observed that the language of Rule 26(b)(4) does
not apply to trials nonetheless found that this language prohibited the introduction of Red
Rover testimony at trial. See Ferguson, 189 F.R.D. at 409. Another court operating under
a state rule similar to the pre-1993 version of Rule 26(b)(4) admitted that "[t]he rules of
discovery do not address whether the testimony of a nonwitness expert retained or dis-
missed by a party is admissible at trial," but nonetheless affirmed the trial court's exclusion
of this testimony on other grounds. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Jackson, 636 So. 2d 310, 314
(Miss. 1992).
113. See Ferguson, 189 F.R.D. at 409; Agron v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 176 F.R.D. 445,
449 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Steele v. Seglie, No. 84-2200, 1986 WL 30765, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 27,
1986) ("The rule does not address itself to the admissibility at trial of the testimony of such
an expert which is elicited by the opponent."); cf. White v. Vanderbilt Univ., 21 S.W.3d
215, 224 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that the Tennessee version of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) is
inapplicable to the issue of whether an expert's testimony is admissible at trial).
114. See supra note 108.
115. To reach the apparently desired result of excluding Red Rover testimony at trial,
these courts have to engage in a rather expansive reading of Rule 26(b)(4)(B). By its
language, this provision actually allows interrogatories and depositions regarding consul-
tants, but limits these discovery devices to cases involving exceptional circumstances. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B) ("A party may, through interrogatories or by deposition, dis-
cover facts known or opinions held by an expert.., only.. . upon a showing of exceptional
circumstances .... "). Therefore, the courts that use Rule 26(b)(4)(B) to prohibit Red
Rover trial testimony must read a provision that allows discovery in certain circumstances
as a provision that prohibits certain actions during the trial. Given the policy considera-
tions favoring the admission of Red Rover testimony at trial, see infra Part V, courts
should not be overly creative in interpreting the language of the rule to prohibit Red
Rover trial testimony.
116. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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2. Unawareness of the Duty to Disclose Previously Confidential
Information Considered by a Disclosed Expert
Not all of the anti-Red Rover decisions that rely on Rule 26(b)(4)(B)
misapply its discovery provisions to the trial. Some of them do apply this
provision to the discovery process. These decisions prohibit a party from
deposing a de-disclosed expert. 117
Unfortunately, the reasoning in these decisions follows the reasoning in
the decisions prohibiting Red Rover trial testimony, 118 and this reasoning
is no longer"19 valid. These courts believe that allowing depositions of, or
trial testimony from, de-disclosed experts could unfairly disclose the trial
preparation of the attorney who initially retained the expert.' 20 While
this sentiment is laudable to some,12' it can no longer serve as the basis
for disallowing depositions of de-disclosed experts or for excluding their
testimony at trial.
To evaluate the attorney trial preparation concern, one must delineate
which elements of an attorney's trial preparation are put at risk of disclo-
sure by depositions of, or trial testimony from, de-disclosed experts. Al-
though the fact that an attorney has retained a particular expert in a
specific field in and of itself reveals certain information about that attor-
ney's trial strategy,122 this cannot be the type of work product that the
117. See Callaway Golf Co. v. Dunlop Slazenger Group Ams., Inc., No. CIV.A.01-669
(MPT), 2002 WL 1906628, at *2-3 (D. Del. Aug. 14, 2002); FMC Corp. v. Vendo Co., 196 F.
Supp. 2d 1023, 1046-47 (E.D. Cal. 2002); Dayton-Phoenix Group, Inc. v. Gen. Motors
Corp., No. C-3-95-480, 1997 WL 1764760, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 19, 1997) (prohibiting a
general deposition of a de-disclosed expert) ("Waters now appears to be covered by Rule
26(b)(4)(B), since he is presently not expected to be called as a witness at trial."); Ross v.
Burlington Northern R.R., 136 F.R.D. 638 (N.D. 11. 1991) (disallowing deposition of de-
disclosed expert in a pre-1993 case); Mantolete v. Bolger, 96 F.R.D. 179, 181-82 (D. Ariz.
1982) (same); cf. Kiser v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. CIV.A98-3669, 2000 WL 1006239, at *2
n.13 (E.D. La. 2000) (stating that de-designation terminates the opponent's right to depose
an expert); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11, 14 (N.D. II. 1972) (holding that a
partially de-disclosed expert could not be deposed regarding issues about which he had
been de-disclosed).
118. See Dayton-Phoenix Group, Inc., 1997 WL 1764760, at *1 (citing Durflinger v. Ar-
tiles, 727 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 1984)) ("[T]he purpose of Rule 26(b)(4) is to promote
fairness by preventing one party from obtaining access to the other party's trial prepara-
tion."); Ross, 136 F.R.D. at 639 (citing Durflinger).
119. Some of the decisions prohibiting Red Rover testimony at trial or deposition were
rendered before the 1993 changes to Rule 26 discussed below. See supra notes 108, 117.
These decisions may have been valid at the time that they were made, see infra notes 124-
28, but the 1993 Rule 26 amendments reduce or abolish their precedential value. See infra
notes 129-46 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 102-03. Some might also be concerned more generally that work
product or other confidential information revealed by the initially retaining attorney to the
expert could be disclosed if Red Rover depositions and trial testimony were allowed. See
supra note 103. As with trial preparation, which is a subset of attorney work product, once
any work product or other confidential information is disclosed to the expert and the ex-
pert is disclosed as a possible trial witness, the opposing party is entitled to this information
under the 1993 amendments to Rule 26. See Easton, supra note 21, at 537-43.
121. See infra notes 410-11 and accompanying text.
122. See Biovail Corp. Int'l v. Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft, No. 98-1434(MTB), 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21621, at *20 (D.N.J. Nov. 12, 1999); ef. Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hosp.
& Training School for Nurses, 622 F.2d 496, 501 (10th Cir. 1980) (Rule 26(b)(4)(B)'s prohi-
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courts that prohibit Red Rover depositions or trial testimony are trying to
protect. After all, if the opposing party is attempting to depose a certain
expert or present her testimony at trial, that attorney already knows the
identity of the expert. Instead, the courts that prohibit deposition or trial
testimony must be concerned that such testimony could result in the op-
posing party learning about the thoughts, concerns, strategy, evidence, or
other information that the retaining attorney has shared with the
expert. 123
Although these types of information may124 be protected from disclo-
bition of discovery regarding undisclosed experts "not only encompasses information and
opinions developed in anticipation of litigation, but also insulates discovery of the identity
and other collateral information concerning experts consulted informally"); Bergeson v.
Dilworth, 132 F.R.D. 277, 281 (D. Kan. 1990) (documenting an attorney's efforts to refrain
from identifying an expert because the expert "had been retained for litigation but I was
deciding not to use him").
123. A deposition of a de-disclosed expert would raise the possibility of revealing
thoughts and information that the retaining attorney has shared with her expert. If a depo-
sition has already taken place and the court is deciding whether to allow Red Rover trial
testimony, there may be a somewhat lessened probability that such items would be dis-
closed. If the Red Rover expert refused to participate in ex parte communication with
opposing counsel, see infra note 304 and accompanying text, and opposing counsel sought
only to introduce portions of the expert's deposition at trial, there would be no disclosure
of matters revealed by the retaining attorney to the expert, other than those already re-
vealed at the expert's deposition. Under these circumstances, which may be the most com-
mon, see supra note 46-47, infra note 304 and accompanying text, refusing to allow the
introduction of the expert's deposition testimony at trial does little or nothing to protect
the retaining attorney's trial preparation, because this trial preparation information has
already been added to the opposing attorney's knowledge base.
If, instead, the expert refused to participate in ex parte communications, but the oppos-
ing party subpoenaed her to testify at trial as a live witness, there would be some possibility
that questions asked at trial, but not at the expert's deposition, would result in answers
disclosing previously undisclosed data, if the examiner was willing to ignore the time-
honored trial attorney warning to avoid asking cross-examination questions when the an-
swer is unknown to the questioner. See, e.g., STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY:
ANALYSIS AND PRACrICE 121 (2d ed. 1997); MAUET, supra note 5, at § 7.4(2)(b), 252 (6th
ed. 2002). If the expert did cooperate with opposing counsel and communicated with her
ex parte, there would be a more substantial probability that previously undisclosed data
would be disclosed to opposing counsel.
124. Significantly, the provisions of Rule 26(b)(3)'s work product rule are, by the terms
of Rule 26(b)(3) itself, "[slubject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule." FED.
R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3). Rule 26(b)(4) allows depositions of experts "whose opinions may be
presented at trial." Id. at 26(b)(4). Therefore, the expert discovery provisions of Rule
26(b)(4) trump the protection of work product provided in Rule 26(b)(3). See B.C.F. Oil
Ref., Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co., 171 F.R.D. 57, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("[T]he first phrase of
Rule 26(b)(3), the codification of the work product doctrine, has always been 'Subject to
the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule.' This is further evidence that the drafters
of the rule understood the policies behind expert disclosure and the work product doctrine
and have decided that disclosure of material generated or consulted by the expert is more
important."); Applegate, supra note 99, at 297 ("By providing for discovery of expert opin-
ions 'developed in anticipation of litigation,' [pre-1993] rule 26(b)(4) carves out an excep-
tion to rule 26(b)(3) for ordinary (nonopinion) work product. Some courts have
interpreted rule 26(b)(4) as simply overriding rule 26(b)(3) for experts who will testify.").
In other words, the work product doctrine is not applicable when the expert can be de-
posed, so the deposing attorney should be able to explore materials provided by the retain-
ing attorney to the expert.
1452 [Vol. 55
SEND THAT EXPERT RIGHT OVER
sure and discovery in some circumstances when they are work product, 125
the 1993 amendments to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
establish that this work product protection is waived when the retaining
attorney reveals her work product to an expert who is disclosed as a pos-
sible trial witness. 126 While anti-Red Rover decisions protecting an attor-
ney's trial preparation and other work product revealed to experts might
125. While the courts prohibiting Red Rover deposition and trial testimony have relied
upon Rule 26(b)(4)(B), the primary protection for attorney trial preparation and other
work product is found in Rule 26(b)(3). See 8 WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 34,
§ 2022 (reviewing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), the Supreme Court case that
first articulated the work product doctrine), § 2023, at 329 (reporting that Rule 26(b)(3)
"was designed as a largely accurate codification of the doctrine announced in the Hickman
case and developed in later cases in the lower courts"); cf. Toledo Edison Co. v. GA Tech.
Inc., 847 F.2d 335, 338 (6th Cir. 1988) ("The law relating to work product began with Hick-
man .... However, since 1970, all of the standards and procedures for making claims of
work product are embraced in [FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)]."); Seal v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 135
F.R.D. 113, 114 (W.D. Pa. 1990) ("[Tlhe protection of work product arising from the case
of Hickman v. Taylor ... has been supplanted by Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. ... ); Sherman L. Cohn, The Work Product Doctrine: Protection, Not
Privilege, 71 GEO. L.J. 917, 921 (1983) ("The [Hickman] work-product doctrine was codi-
fied and incorporated in rule 26 of the revised Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."); Michael
E. Plunkett, Comment, Discoverability of Attorney Work Product Reviewed by Expert Wit-
nesses: Have the 1993 Revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Changed Anything?,
69 TEMP. L. REV. 451, 454 (1996). But cf. Easton, supra note 21, at 541 n.235 (citing mater-
ials arguing that Hickman continues to define the scope of the work product doctrine in
some situations not covered by Rule 26(b)(3)).
Rule 26(b)(3) provides that, where the expert discovery provisions of Rule 26(b)(4) are
inapplicable, see supra note 124, a party is not entitled to obtain discovery of work product,
defined as items that are "prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another
party or by or for that other party's representative (including the other party's attorney,
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent)." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); see also 8
WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 34, § 2023, at 334-35 ("34 states have adopted
verbatim copies of Rule 26(b)(3), and ten others have provisions that differ but appear
very similar in operation."). Because the issue at hand involves an attorney's trial prepara-
tion, which is sometimes not reduced to tangible form, it should be noted that, although the
rule itself states that "documents and tangible things" are outside the scope of discovery in
the applicable circumstances when they were prepared in anticipation of litigation, FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(3), courts have not limited the reach of these work product provisions to
tangible things. Instead, they have given work product protection to intangible data
sources, such as the verbal statements and memories of persons. Id. at 337-38; Easton,
supra note 22, at 706, n.224; see also Haworth, Inc. v. Herman Miller, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 289
(W.D. Mich. 1995) (holding that work product may include unrecorded conversations be-
tween attorneys and retained experts).
Because almost every dispute about the discoverability of trial preparation or work
product revealed to a disclosed expert witness focuses on whether discovery would expose
an attorney's mental impressions or opinions, the terms "attorney work product" and
"work product" are essentially interchangeable for this article. See 8 WRIGHT, MILLER &
MARCUS, supra note 34, § 2024, at 360-66 (work product issues often concern whether
formal or informal discovery would result in "disclosure of the mental impressions, conclu-
sions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concern-
ing the litigation"); Easton, supra note 22, at 707, n.225; cf. Krisa v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc'y, 196 F.R.D. 254, 256-57 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (holding that work product does
not protect drafts of opinions held, or reports or other items generated, by experts retained
to testify).
126. Issues regarding the effect of the 1993 amendments on expert discovery and disclo-
sure, including elimination of the argument that some work product and other confidential
information revealed by attorneys to their retained experts remains outside the scope of
discovery, are covered in greater depth in Easton, supra note 21, at 576-605.
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have had some127 validity before 1993,128 the amendments to Rule 26 that
127. It is important to remember that the work product doctrine does not protect the
underlying facts that are communicated to the expert when an attorney reveals trial prepa-
ration or other work product to her. See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 595 (3d
Cir. 1984) ("Of course, where the same [work product] document contains both facts and
legal theories of the attorney, the adverse party is entitled to discovery of the facts."),
followed by Haworth v. Miller, 162 F.R.D. 289, 295 (W.D. Mich. 1995); B.C.F. Oil Ref. v.
Consol. Edison Co., 171 F.R.D. 57, 62-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); 8 WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS,
supra note 34, § 2023, at 330-32, § 2024, at 337. Instead, even when the work product
doctrine does apply, it protects only the work product itself, not the facts encapsulated
within it. If an attorney is concerned about protecting the confidential status of her trial
preparation or other work product, she merely needs to find a way to communicate the
underlying factual information to the expert without revealing the work product. See Eas-
ton, supra note 22, at 711-12 & n.239.
128. In non-Red Rover cases, some courts applying pre-1993 versions of Rule 26 or
similar state discovery provisions held that revealing work product to a testifying expert
did not necessarily render it discoverable. See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587 (3d
Cir. 1984); All West Pet Supply Co. v. Hill's Pet Prods. Div., Colgate-Palmolive Co., 152
F.R.D. 634 (D. Kan. 1993) (decided shortly after the 1993 amendments, but based upon
pre-1993 precedent); Hamel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 128 F.R.D. 281 (D. Kan. 1989); Beth-
any Med. Ctr. v. Harder, Civ. A. No. 85-2415, 1987 WL 4784 (D. Kan. Mar. 12, 1987);
McKinnon v. Smock, 434 S.E.2d 92, 93 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); Grubbs v. K Mart Corp., 411
N.W. 2d 477, 480 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). Other courts held that only the work product
relied upon by experts in forming their opinions was discoverable under pre-1993 versions
of Rule 26 or similar state rules. See Dominguez v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 149 F.R.D. 158, 164(S.D. Ind. 1993); Occulto v. Adamar of N.J. Inc., 125 F.R.D. 611, 615 (D.N.J. 1989); Coyle
v. Estate of Simon, 588 A.2d 1293 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.
v. Blackmon, 810 S.W.2d 438, 440 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ); George E.
Lieberman, Experts and the Discovery/Disclosure of Protected Communication, R.I. L.J.,
Feb., 1995, at 7, 7-8. But see Squealer Feeds v. Pickering, 530 N.W.2d 678, 685 (Iowa 1995)
(Iowa rule providing for broad expert discovery "requires disclosure of all facts known to
the expert and which relate to his opinions, not just the facts which form the basis for the
expert's opinion"); Easton, supra note 21, at 556-69 (noting problems with limiting discov-
ery to items relied upon by expert); Gregory P. Joseph, Emerging Expert Issues Under the
1993 Disclosure Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 164 F.R.D. 97, 103-04
(1996).
The pre-1993 law was not uniform, however. See B.C.F. Oil Ref., 171 F.R.D. at 64-65
(reviewing divergent decisions under the pre-1993 Federal Rules); Rail Intermodal Special-
ists, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 154 F.R.D. 218 (N.D. Iowa 1994); Kathleen Waits,
Opinion Work Product: A Critical Analysis of Current Law and a New Analytical Frame-
work, 73 OR. L. REV. 385, 397-408 (1994); Bryan Lewis, Note, Discovery Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure of Attorney Opinion Work Product Provided to an Expert Witness,
53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1159, 1163-65 (1985); Dan Nelson, Comment, Discovery of Attorney-
Expert Communications: Current State of and Suggestions for, Federal and Missouri Prac-
tice, 57 Mo. L. REV. 247, 258-63 (1992). Before the 1993 amendments, several courts held
that an opposing party was allowed to discover work product revealed by an attorney to
her expert. See U.S. Energy Corp. v. Nukem, Inc., 163 F.R.D. 344, 348 (D. Colo. 1995)
(applying a pre-1993 version of Rule 26(b)(4)); William Penn Life Assurance Co. v. Brown
Transfer & Storage Co., 141 F.R.D. 142 (W.D. Mo. 1990); Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex,
Inc., 139 F.R.D. 384, 397 (N.D. Cal. 1991); In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l
Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1442, 1444 (D. Colo. 1988); Boring v. Keller, 97 F.R.D. 404, 407 (D.
Colo. 1983); Beverage Mktg. Corp. v. Ogilvy & Mather Direct Response, Inc., 563 F. Supp.
1013, 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Emergency Care Dynamics, Ltd. v. Super. Ct., 932 P.2d 297,
298 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (implementing Arizona's pre-1993 version of Rule 26(b)(4));
Stearrett v. Newcomb, 521 A.2d 636, 638 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986); Applegate, supra note 99,
at 297 ("[Tlhe courts have been extremely reluctant to accord work-product protection to
communications between a lawyer and an expert."). Therefore, even in jurisdictions that
retain pre-1993 versions of Rule 26 or other expert witness discovery provisions that do not
require disclosure of all information relied upon by expert witnesses, see supra note 36,
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became effective that year rendered these concerns moot.1 29 These
amendments included a new provision that requires a party to furnish a
report prepared and signed by each disclosed retained expert. 30 The re-
port must include a "complete statement" of "the data or other informa-
tion considered by the witness in forming the opinions." 131 Although
some courts132 have incorrectly failed to recognize the full impact of this
there is ample basis for arguing that attorney trial preparation or other work product re-
vealed to experts is discoverable.
129. The amendment and evolution of discovery and disclosure rules has generally fol-
lowed a pattern of requiring revelation of more information through discovery responses
and required disclosures. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (U.S. 1947); Graham v.
Gielchinsky, 599 A.2d 149, 151-53 (N.J. 1991); Paul R. Sugarman & Marc G. Perlin, Pro-
posed Changes to Discovery Rules in Aid of "Tort Reform": Has the Case Been Made?, 42
AM. U. L. REV. 1465, 1491 (1993); Ross T. Turner, Note, Rule 26(c)(7) Protective Orders:
Just What Are You Hiding Under There, Anyway?, 87 Ky. L.J. 1299, 1311 (1998-1999). The
1993 amendments to Rule 26 were consistent with this trend, because they required auto-
matic disclosures even without discovery requests. See 8 WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS,
supra note 34, § 2029, at 417-18 (describing the 1993 amendments as "a large step ... in
the direction of unlimited discovery of expert witnesses").
Several federal district courts resisted the 1993 amendments by adopting local rules or
standing orders that attempted to negate some or all of the expert witness disclosure re-
quirements. See Easton, supra note 22, at 703, n.210. These courts almost certainly did not
have the authority to adopt these rules under the 1993 amendments to Rule 26, because
the language allowing courts to opt out of other, non-expert, disclosure provisions in Rule
26 did not authorize local rules opting out of the expert witness disclosure provisions. See
COMMITEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE ANI) PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND EvIDENCE, 181 F.R.D. 19, 30 (Aug. 1998) (memoran-
dum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to Hon.
Alicemarie H. Stotler, Chair, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (June 30.
1998)). In any event, the language allowing local courts to opt out of the 1993 non-expert
disclosure provisions was taken out of Rule 26 by the 2000 amendments. H.R. Doc'. No.
106-228, at 101, 118-19 (2000). Therefore, it is now rather clear that district courts cannot
opt out of Rule 26's expert witness disclosure provisions by local rule. See FED. R. Clv. P.
26(a). Rule 26(a) now exempts certain proceedings from the initial disclosure require-
ments of subsection (a)(1), see FED. R. Clv. P. 26(a)(1)(E), but this provision does not
alter the expert witness disclosures required under subsection (a)(2).
130. To be complete, it should be noted that a report is required "with respect to a
witness who is retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or
whose duties as an employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony." FED.
R. CiV. P. 26(a)(2)(B). As noted above, this article concerns experts who are retained by
one of the parties. See supra note 14. All retained, disclosed experts are required to pre-
pare reports. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
To some extent, the analysis in this article may also be applicable to some experts who
are employed, rather than retained, by parties, because disclosed expert witnesses who are
employed for a given case or whose duties regularly involve giving expert testimony must
also prepare expert reports, id., identifying all items they have considered, including input
from attorneys, see infra notes 132-44 and accompanying text. To the extent that this arti-
cle discusses ex parte contact between an attorney and a disclosed expert witness, see infra
notes 304-05 and accompanying text, however, this discussion is not entirely relevant be-
cause the expert's status as an employee may require an attorney to refrain from ex parte
contact. See infra notes 306-08 and accompanying text; Easton, supra note 22, at 678,
n.116.
131. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
132. The law regarding whether work product and other previously confidential items
considered by an expert witness remain protected by the work product doctrine is not
uniform. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 97-407,
reprinted in LAws. MAN. OF PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) [hereinafter "ABA/BNA MAN-
UAL"] 1001:132, 1001:134 n.2 (1997) (reviewing various court decisions); Amy L. Fischer,
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provision, 133 several others have held that it requires a party to disclose
all tangible and intangible work product or other matters that were confi-
dential before the retaining attorney ended their confidential status 134 by
The Attorney-Client/Work Product Privileges and Surety Investigative Information: Apply-
ing Old Rules to Turn New Tricks, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 1009, 1062 (1999); Waits, supra note
128, at 391; Nelson, supra note 128, at 251. For summaries of relevant case law, see Jerald
David August, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine in Federal Tax
Controversies, 83 J. TAX'N 197 (1995); Alvin K. Hellerstein, A Comprehensive Survey of the
Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine, in CURRENT PRO13LEMS IN FEDERAL
CIVIL PRACTICE 1996 (Practicing Law Inst. 1996); Lewis, supra note 128; Carlisle G. Pack-
ard, Note, Opinion Work Product, Expert Witness Discovery, and the Interaction of Rules
26(b)(3) and 26(b)(4): Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 1985 BYU L. REV. 573 (1985);
Katherine A. Staton, Note, Discovery of Attorney Work Product Reviewed by an Expert
Witness, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 812 (1985).
133. Some courts cling to the pre-1993 view that some attorney work product and other
previously confidential information shared with an expert need not be disclosed to an op-
posing party, sometimes referring to the pre-1993 notion that the opposing party is not
entitled to items considered, but supposedly not "relied upon," by the expert. See Melhorn
v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 203 F.R.D. 176, 1_80 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Estate of Chopper
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 195 F.R.D. 648 (N.D. Iowa 2000); Estate of Moore v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 194 F.R.D. 659 (S.D. Iowa 2000); Magee v. Paul Revere Life Ins.
Co., 172 F.R.D. 627, 642-43 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); N.M. Tech Research Found. v. Ciba-Geigy
Corp., 37 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 971 (D.R.I. 1997); Haworth, Inc. v. Herman Miller,
Inc., 162 F.R.D. 289 (W.D. Mich. 1995); Ladd Furniture, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, No.
2:95CV00403, 1998 WL 1093901, at *12 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 27, 1998); ABA Formal Op. 97-
407, supra note 132, at 1001:134 n. 2 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRo) OF LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 141 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 March 29, 1996) as "adopting the Bogosian
approach"); see also Maynard v. Whirlpool Corp., 160 F.R.D. 85 (S.D. W. Va. 1995) (no
discussion of Rule 26(A)(2)); cf. Smith v. Transducer Tech., Inc., No. 1995-28, 2000 WL
1717333 (D.V.I. Nov. 2, 2000), 2000 WL 1707929 (D.V.I. July 19, 2000) (allowing party to
redact core work product from documents shown to expert); Krisa v. Equitable Life Assur-
ance Soc'y, 196 F.R.D. 254, 258-61 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (determining that Bogosian prevented
discovery of core attorney work product, despite 1993 amendments, but that party must
produce non-work product documents considered by experts, even if experts did not rely
upon them); Ambrose v. Southworth Prods. Corp., No. CIV.A.95-0048-H, 1997 WL
470359, at *1 (W.D. Va. June 24, 1997) (suggesting that attorney opinion work product may
not be discoverable).
Under both the language of the 1993 amendments to Rule 26, see supra notes 130-31 and
accompanying text, and the advisory committee notes accompanying these changes, see
infra note 136, these decisions are incorrect. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Zotos Int'l, Inc., No.
98-CV-838S(F), 2000 WL 1843258, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2000) ("[A]ny information,
including information from a party's attorney, provided to an expert for his consideration
in forming an opinion for trial is subject to disclosure."); Kiser v. Gen. Motors Corp., No.
CIV.A.98-3669, 2000 WL 1006239, at *3 (E.D. La. 2000); Furniture World, Inc. v. D.A.V.
Thrift Stores, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 61, 62 (D.N.M. 1996); Haworth, Inc., 162 F.R.D. at 296;
Vaughan Furniture Co. v. Featureline Mfg., Inc., 156 F.R.D. 123, 128 (M.D.N.C. 1994);
Karn v. Ingersol-Rand Co., 168 F.R.D. 633, 635-36 (N.D. Ind. 1996) ("'Considered,' which
simply means 'to take into account,' clearly invokes a broader spectrum of thought than
the phrase 'relied upon,' which requires dependence on the information."); ABA Formal
Op. 97-407, supra note 132, at 1001:134 n. 2 (citing 8 WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra
note 34, § 2031, at 439, for the proposition that "Bogosian was probably overruled by the
1993 amendments"); Lieberman, supra note 128, at 10; Duke T. Oishi, Note, A Piece of
Mind for Peace of Mind: Federal Discoverability of Opinion Work Product Provided to
Expert Witnesses and Its Implications in Hawai'i, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 859, 861 (2002).
134. Once a retaining attorney reveals part of her trial preparation or another confiden-
tial piece of information to a person who may testify at trial, the information is no longer
"confidential." At most, it is "formerly confidential information."
[Vol. 551456
SEND THAT EXPERT RIGHT OVER
sharing them with the expert. 135 An Advisory Committee comment ac-
companying the 1993 amendments rather explicitly states that the expert
witness report requirement compels the retaining attorney to divulge all
work product and other previously confidential items that she showed to
a disclosed expert, because all such matters were "considered by" the ex-
pert in forming her opinions. 136 The practical effect of the 1993 amend-
135. See In re Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 238 F.3d 1370, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 2001);
Kooima v. Zacklift Int'l, Inc. 209 F.R.D. 444, 447 (D.S.D. 2002) (including "correspon-
dence between counsel and the expert" within the items that must be disclosed due to the
expert's consideration of such correspondence in forming opinions); Herman v. Marine
Midland Bank, 207 F.R.D. 26, 28-29 (W.D.N.Y. 2002); Aniero Concrete Co. v. N.Y. City
Sch. Constr. Auth., No. 94C1V.9111CSHFM, 2002 WL 257685 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22. 2002);
Construction Indus. Servs. Corp. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 206 F.R.D. 43, 50-51 (E.D.N.Y.
2001); Weil v. Long Island Say. Bank, 206 F.R.D. 38 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); U.S. Fid. & Guar.
Co. v. Braspetro Oil Servs. Co., Nos. 97 CIV.6124JGKTHK, 98 CIV.3099JGKTHK, 2002
WL 15652 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2002); MIC Communications Corp. v. Dataline, Inc., No.
01CIV.3849LAPDFE, 2001 WL 1335291 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2001); In re Air Crash at Du-
brovnik, No. MDL 1180, CIV.398CV2464AVC, 2001 WL 777433, at *11 (D. Conn. June 4.
2001); Suskind v. Home Depot Corp., No. CIV.A.99-10575-NG, 2001 WL 92183 (D. Mass.
Jan. 2, 2001); W.R. Grace & Co., 2000 WL 1843258, at *3 (holding that even "comments
and questions from counsel to a testifying expert regarding development of the expert's
opinion and report must be disclosed regardless of whether such communications contain
attorney work product"); TV-3, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co., 193 F.R.D. 490 (S.D. Miss. 2000);
B.C.F. Oil Ref., Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co., 171 F.R.D. 57, 62-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Karn,
168 F.R.D. at 639 (Rule 26(a)(2)(B) "'trump[s]' any assertion of work product or privi-
lege" and "mandate[s] disclosure of all materials reviewed by an expert witness."); Furni-
ture World, Inc. v. D.A.V. Thrift Stores, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 61, 62 (D.N.M. 1996); Vaughan
Furniture Co., 156 F.R.D. at 128 ("Opinion documents which could have an influence on
the expert opinion could include ones discussing trial strategy, even if the opinions were
rejected as a basis for the expert opinion."); Gall v. Jamison, 44 P.3d 233 (Colo. 2002)
(applying state version of rule requiring disclosure of all data considered by an expert in
forming opinions); Easton, supra note 21, at 541-42; Easton, supra note 22, at 720, n.267;
Robert M. Lovein, Note, A Practitioner's Guide: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(a)-Automatic Disclosure, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 225, 263 (1996) (citing Work Product
Threatened by New Expert Disclosure Rule, FED. DISCOVERY NEWS, Feb. 12, 1996) (quot-
ing United States District Judge Sam Pointer, Jr.) (if work product "is given to the expert.
the privilege is waived to that information"). The recent trend in the cases requires disclo-
sure of all items considered by an expert, including attorney work product. Suskind, 2001
WL 92183, at *6; Oishi, supra note 133, at 884.
136. In explaining the effect of the reporting requirement, the Advisory Committee
stated:
The report is to disclose the data and other information considered by the
expert and any exhibits or charts that summarize or support the expert's
opinions. Given this obligation of disclosure, litigants should no longer be
able to argue that materials furnished to their experts to be used in forming
their opinions-whether or not ultimately relied upon by the expert-are
privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure when such persons are tes-
tifying or being deposed.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2) advisory committee's note (1993); see also W.R. Grace & Co. v.
Zotos Int'l, Inc., No. 98-CV-838S(F), 2000 WL 1843258, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2000) ("It
is illogical that such broad language [by the Advisory Committee], explicitly directed to
privileges and other sources of protection against disclosure, was intended to exclude any
form of attorney work product.").
One influential federal jurist, District Court Judge Sam C. Pointer, underscored the Ad-
visory Committee's comments:
The rules [as amended in 1993] make it clear that whatever you give to the
expert is subject to being disclosed . . . [The amended Rule says] whatever
the expert relies upon or considers. The lawyer's obligation, in order to pre-
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ments on claims of confidentiality for thoughts shared by an attorney with
a disclosed expert is substantial. When the latter of two events-sharing
of work product with the expert 137 and disclosure of the expert as a wit-
ness who may present testimony at trial138-occurs, the retaining attor-
ney waives any protection provided by the work product doctrine and
acquires an obligation to disclose the information to the opposing attor-
ney.' 39 At the same time, the opposing party secures the right to receive
disclosure of the work product and, by virtue of another provision that
was added to Rule 26 in 1993,140 the right to explore this previously confi-
dential matter through a deposition of the expert and other discovery
devices. 141
serve work product or attorney-client privilege, is to not give it to the expert.
If you give it to the expert you have waived the privilege.
Work Product Threatened by New Expert Disclosure Rule, FED. DISCOVERY NEWS, Feb. 12,
1996, quoted in Lovein, supra note 135, at 263 n.216.
137. If a previously disclosed expert has already prepared a report when she is exposed
to additional information, the party retaining her must supplement the report by disclosing
the newly considered information. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(c), 26(e)(1).
138. Cf. Shadow Traffic Network v. Super. Ct., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 693, 699 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994) (holding that documents prepared by expert consultant lose their work product pro-
tection when expert is listed as a witness).
139. If an attorney wishes to retain the protection of the work product doctrine, she
must refrain from disclosing her trial preparation or other work product to an expert who
is disclosed as a possible trial witness, because such disclosure will render it discoverable.
See supra note 136 (quoting Judge Pointer); Easton, supra note 22, at 722-24; Lieberman,
supra note 128, at 7 ("1 strongly suggest that you assume that whatever you give or disclose
to your expert is subject to pretrial discovery and disclosure at trial and, therefore, limit
any such communication to non-sensitive material, to the extent possible, and to communi-
cate orally, rather than in writing."); cf. Waits. supra note 128, at 445 ("I believe we should
follow the rule, often mentioned in other areas of legal ethics, that the lawyer should only
use expert witness preparation techniques that she is willing to see exposed on the front
page of the New York Times or revealed to her opponent.").
140. Under the pre-1993 version of Rule 26, expert witness discovery was supposedly
limited to an interrogatory asking an opposing party to identify each expert the party ex-
pected to call as trial witnesses and to state the subject matter and substance of the ex-
pected testimony, as well as the grounds for the expert's opinions. See Easton, supra note
22, at 687 (quoting pre-1993 version of Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i)). In most jurisdictions, how-
ever, expert discovery was almost never this limited, because it was commonplace for attor-
neys to stipulate to the exchange of expert witness reports or to depositions of experts. Id.
at 694. In addition, the pre-1993 version of Rule 26 allowed the court to "'order further[expert] discovery by other means." Id. at 688 (quoting pre-1993 version of Rule
26(b)(4)(A)(ii)). Therefore, the 1993 changes can be seen, at least to some extent, as a
codification of the actual relatively expansive expert informal discovery practices before
1993. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee's note (1993) (stating that the expert depo-
sition rule was designed to "conform[ ] the norm stated in the rule to the actual practice
followed in most courts, in which depositions of experts have become standard").
141. Subsection (a) of Rule 26, which was added in t993, is entitled "Required Disclo-
sures: Methods to Discover Additional Material." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a). The last subsec-
tion of subsection (a) states:
(5) METHODS TO DISCOVER ADDITIONAL MATI-ER. Parties may obtain dis-
covery by one or more of the following methods: depositions upon oral ex-
amination or written questions; written interrogatories; production of
documents or things or permission to enter upon land or other property
under Rule 34 or 45(a)(1)(C), for inspection and other purposes; physical
and mental examination; and requests for admission.
Id. Because this subsection is a portion of the rule outlining disclosure provisions, the
plain language of the rule states that all matters that must be disclosed by a party, including
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After the 1993 amendments to Rule 26, any court that refuses to re-
quire an expert to answer opposing counsel's deposition or trial questions
out of concern for an attorney's trial preparation or other work product is
protecting a right that no longer exists.142 With the 1993 changes, an at-
torney who wishes to prevent her opponent from acquiring her work
product must either refrain from revealing it to her expert 143 or refrain
from identifying that expert as a person who might present expert opin-
ion testimony at trial.144 Given the retaining attorney's ability to protect
work product fully by simply exercising one of these two options, courts
information considered by a disclosed expert witness, may be explored by the opposing
party on discovery. This expansive view of the scope of discovery is supported by Rule
26(b)'s statement that "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party," even after a 2000 amendment to Rule
26(b)'s scope of discovery language. See FEo. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also Krisa v. Equita-
ble Life Assurance Soc'y, 196 F.R.D. 254, 261 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (holding, in a case decided
before the 2000 amendment to Rule 26, that an opponent was entitled to discovery of non-
work product documents considered, but not relied upon, by an expert witness due to "the
broad ambit of discovery afforded by Rule 26(b)(1)").
142. See Lunghi v. Clark Equip. Co., 200 Cal. Rptr. 387, 389 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (hold-
ing, in a state case, that the work product "principle is simply not relevant to the testimony
of an expert, after one party has notified the other that the expert is likely to be called at
trial"); cf. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co. v. Grinnell Corp., Nos. Civ. A. 97-0775, 97-0803,
1999 WL 731410, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 20, 1999) ("Further, Shirmer had already submitted
his expert report, which would render the work product protection provided for in Rule
26(b)(4)(B) moot."); Agron v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 176 F.R.D. 445, 449 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) ("Plaintiff, by submitting the Deutsch Report to Defendant in discovery, voluntarily
waived the only relief that Rule 26(b)(4)(B) provides-the non-disclosure of expert discov-
ery for a non-testifying expert.").
143. See supra note 136; cf. Castellanos v. Littlejohn, 945 S.W.2d 236, 241 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 1997, orig. proceeding) ("A testifying expert could not review [materials] that
are not conveyed to him .... ).
An attorney exercising this option does not necessarily have to forego communicating an
important fact to the expert, if she can do so in a manner that does not disclose the work
product itself. See Easton, supra note 22, at 712 n.239, 724 (observing that underlying fact
often can be communicated to the expert by sharing a document that is not protected by
the work product doctrine); supra note 127. However, the fact that the attorney revealed
the fact to the expert and the form in which it was revealed would not be protected by the
work product doctrine.
144. See Herrick Co. v. Vetta Sports, Inc., 1998 WL 637468, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Dion
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. 288 (D. Mont. 1998); Jerold S. Solovy & Robert L.
Bynam, Discovery Designating Testifying Experts, NAT'i L. J., Mar. 15, 1999, at B20; cf.
Shadow Traffic Network v. Super. Ct., 29 Cal. Rptr. 693, 699 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (stating
that work product protection is lost for documents prepared by expert when the expert is
identified as a witness); Martin M. Lore & Marvin J. Garbis, Use of Affidavits Waived
Attorney-Client Privilege, J. TAX'N, Jan. 1990, at 55 (reporting on a decision holding that
submission of an attorney's affidavit constituted a waiver of work product protection).
In a similar context, several courts have ruled that the naming of an attorney for the
client as the client's expert witness in a patent dispute waives the protection of the attor-
ney-client privilege regarding communications between the attorney and the client related
to the attorney's opinions. Nat'l Steel Prods. Co. v. Super. Ct., 210 Cal. Rptr. 535 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1985): Squealer Feeds v. Pickering, 530 N.W.2d 678, 684-85 (Iowa 1995); Kammerer
v. W. Gear Corp., 618 P.2d 1330, 1334 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980), affd, 635 P.2d 708 (Wash.
1981); Brad Risinger, Comment, Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 125, 127-28 (1989). Therefore, a party who is considering disclosing either an attor-
ney or a non-attorney as an expert witness must consider whether naming the expert as a
witness is beneficial enough to outweigh the loss of confidentiality of matters the expert
considered. See Easton, supra note 21, at 596-97.
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should not go out of their way to protect the strategy, thoughts, and other
information revealed by an attorney who chose to share them with a per-
son who has been disclosed as a possible trial witness by that same attor-
ney. Once the expert becomes a person who might present opinion
testimony that could be affected by the information that was confidential
before the retaining attorney revealed it to her, the jurors and, therefore,
the opposing attorney, 145 are entitled to learn about all the information
the expert considered. 146
3. Failure to Appreciate the Significance of Disclosing an Expert as a
Possible Trial Witness
The courts that prevent opposing attorneys from acquiring or using the
testimony of Red Rover experts also fail to understand the full signifi-
cance of the retaining attorney's disclosure of the expert as a possible
trial witness. For these courts to be correct, there must be a means by
which an attorney can somehow reverse her earlier disclosure of the ex-
pert. The Rules of Civil Procedure do not, 147 and should not, permit this.
145. The jury will in all likelihood not learn about any information considered by the
expert unless the opposing attorney has the right to learn about it, because the attorney is
the vehicle through which the jury will receive the information. Cf. W.R. Grace & Co. v.
Zotos Int'l, Inc., No. 98-CV-838S(F), 2000 WL 1843258, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2000)(noting that discovery enables opposing counsel to learn information about the retaining
attorney's influence on expert testimony that counsel can communicate to the jury at trial);
Easton, supra note 21, at 504-05 (observing that keeping information about a retained ex-
pert from the retaining attorney's opponent effectively keeps the information from the
jury, because the jury relies upon the opposing attorney to bring forth information that the
retaining attorney would prefer to keep from the jury).
146. See W.R. Grace & Co., 2000 WL 1843258, at *4 (because the jury deserves to
know whether the expert or the attorney is really testifying, "there is no reason to exclude
from disclosure attorney communications submitted to testifying experts, who the jury may
believe carry a degree of independence"); Waits, supra note 128, at 440-41 ("The attorney's
opinions are irrelevant only as long as they remain in the attorney's head or files. Once
those thoughts are shared with an expert witness, they may well become part of the wit-
ness's thoughts about the case, a highly relevant subject.").
147. Courts that have discussed attempts to de-disclose experts in reported opinions
have not been able to cite any provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure that allow de-
disclosure. Instead, they have merely observed that parties somehow attempted to de-
disclose. See Peterson v. Willie, 81 F.3d 1033, 1036-37 (11 th Cir. 1996) ("Peterson's current
counsel subsequently withdrew the designation of Dr. Lichtblau as a trial expert and filed a
motion in limine seeking to preclude him from testifying on behalf of the appellees.");
Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 1984) ("Plaintiffs had originally retained
Dr. Dyck as a consultant, and designated him as a probable witness in presenting their
case. Subsequently, they decided not to use him as a witness, and so informed defend-
ants."); Lehan v. Ambassador Programs, Inc., t90 F.R.D. 670, 671 (E.D. Wash. 2000) ("De-
fendant has represented to the Court that it does not intend to call Dr. Klein as a witness at
trial even though he was named on Defendant's expert witness list."); House v. Combined
Ins. Co. of Am., 168 F.R.D. 236, 238 (N.D. Iowa 1996) ("Combined has never formally
withdrawn its designation of Dr. Taylor as an expert expected to be called at trial. How-
ever, Dr. Taylor has been dropped from defendant's witness list in the final pretrial or-
der . . . and Combined has represented to the court ... that it has no intention of calling
Dr. Taylor at trial."); cf Taylor v. Kohli, 642 N.E.2d 467, 468 (11. 1994) (noting, in a state
case, disagreement between plaintiff and defendant regarding whether plaintiff informed
defendant that he would not be calling a previously disclosed expert as a trial witness).
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Instead of requiring a reversible declaration by the attorney that she
will call an expert as a trial witness, Rule 26(A)(2)(A) provides for an
irretrievable disclosure of experts who might testify at trial. 148 Rule
26(A)(2)(A) dictates that "a party shall disclose to other parties the iden-
tity of any person who may be used at trial to present evidence under
Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, ' 149 which are the
evidentiary rules outlining the requirements for expert opinion testi-
mony. 150 In other words, from the outset, the Rule 26(A)(2)(A) disclo-
sure is not a statement that an attorney will call an expert as a witness at
trial. Instead, this disclosure is a required statement that the expert might
be called as a witness at trial.
When the attorney makes this disclosure, she changes the status of the
expert. 151 Before the disclosure, the expert ordinarily was a consultant 52
to the attorney who was, absent extraordinary circumstances, a person
about whom the other party had no right to demand information through
discovery. Absent extraordinary circumstances, the attorney can prevent
her opponent from acquiring information about the consultant expert
simply by refraining from disclosing her as a person who might testify at
trial.' 53 Once she discloses the expert as a possible trial witness, however,
she has declared that the expert is no longer merely an aide to one of the
148. A Rule 26(a)(2)(A) disclosure of the identity of a person who may present expert
opinion testimony does not require an attorney to use the witness at trial. As the discus-
sion throughout this article suggests, sometimes an attorney discloses an expert as a possi-
ble trial witness, but later decides not to introduce her testimony at trial. See, e.g., In re
Hidden Lake Ltd. P'ship, 247 B.R. 722, 724 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2000); Brooke Inns, Inc. v. S
& R Hi-Fi and TV, 618 N.E.2d 734, 740 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
Rule 26(a)(2)(A) requires disclosure of all persons who "may" present expert testimony
at trial, not all persons who "will" present expert testimony at trial. See FED. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(2)(A). Furthermore, a different provision of Rule 26, which outlines disclosures that
must be made shortly before trial, does require attorneys to separately list the witnesses
"whom the party expects to present and those whom the party may call if the need arises."
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(A). The existence of this separate provision of Rule 26 indicates
that a party is not required to ultimately call all experts it identified as possible trial wit-
nesses under Rule 26(a)(2)(A), because this separate pretrial witness list requirement
would be superfluous with regard to expert witnesses if a party was required to call all
previously disclosed expert witnesses.
149. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
150. See FED. R. EVID. 702, 703, 705.
151. See Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co. v. Grinnell Corp., Nos. CIV.A.97-0775, 97-0803,
1999 WL 731410, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 20, 1999) (distinguishing a prior case where the
parties had not exchanged witness lists, thereby suggesting that disclosure of an expert is a
critical event that changes the status of an expert); House, 168 F.R.D. at 246 n.7 (holding
that "whenever" an attorney designates an expert under the pre-1993 version of Rule 26,
the court should no longer treat the expert as an undisclosed consultant); cf. Williamson v.
Super. Ct., 582 P.2d 126, 130 (Cal. 1978) (observing that "the courts agree that the initial
status of the expert as a consultant changes once the expert becomes a designated prospec-
tive witness"); Lunghi v. Clark Equip. Co., 200 Cal. Rptr. 387, 389 (Ct. App. 1984) (in a
state case, "after one party has notified the other that the expert is likely to be called at
trial," work product is no longer applicable.); White v. Vanderbilt Univ., 21 S.W.3d 215,
224 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) ("The designation of these experts as testifying witnesses, even if
that designation is subsequently withdrawn, takes opposing party's demand to depose and
use the expert at trial out of the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 26.02(4)(B).").
152. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
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attorneys. By disclosing the expert as a possible trial witness under Rule
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the attorney is advising the other
parties that the expert "has scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge [that] will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue." 154 In other words, the attorney's disclosure
of the expert as a possible trial witness implicitly and inherently de-
clares155 that the expert is a person who can help the jury determine the
154. FEo. R. EviD. 702.
Before 2000, Rule 702 provided: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise .. " FED. R. Evil). 702, 28 U.S.C.
App.-Rules of Evid. (1994) (amended 2000); see also UNIF. R. Evil). 702; Easton, supra
note 22, at 661, n.49 (citing state law provisions).
In 2000, amendments to the federal rule added provisions stating that an expert's testi-
mony is admissible only "if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied
the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case." FED. R. Evil). 702; see H.R.
Doc. No. 106-225, at 20 (2000). These additions incorporated, to some extent, the Su-
preme Court's holdings regarding the parameters of acceptable expert testimony in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmi-
chael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). See FED. R. Evil). 702 advisory committee's note (2000); Cath-
erine E. Brixen & Christine E. Meis, Codifying tile "Daubert Trilogy": The Amendment to
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 527, 529 (2000).
155. Put still another way, when an attorney discloses a retained witness as one who
might present expert testimony at trial, she is divulging that, while acting on behalf of the
party she represents, she believes that the witness had the credentials to reach opinions
that might be helpful to the jury. If the attorney did not believe this when she first retained
the expert, she would not have retained her and, presumably, spent her client's funds to
educate her on the facts of the case, see infra notes 206-11, 213-14 328-29 and accompany-
ing text. If the attorney did not still believe this when she disclosed her as a potential trial
witness, she would not have identified her as a possible trial witness.
This admission is not "binding" in the sense of a binding judicial admission that a party
cannot withdraw. The attorney or the party she represents may later change their minds
about the expert's qualifications to render opinion testimony as an expert. If an opposing
party offers the opinions of the expert at trial, the attorney or party who originally retained
the expert may challenge the expert's qualifications. See infra notes 313-14 and accompa-
nying text. In considering such a challenge, however, the court should factor in the attor-
ney's previous implicit admission, in the form of the expert witness disclosure, that the
expert was qualified. In addition, if the court admits the expert's opinion, it should also
admit evidence indicating that the expert was initially retained by the party who now op-
poses her testimony. See infra note 311 and accompanying text. Although explaining away
the previous implicit admission of the expert's qualifications will be difficult for the origi-
nally retaining party, particularly when the expert was selected by the attorney (who, if still
representing the client at trial might be limited in her ability to present testimony, see
MODEL Rui 3.7), this is appropriate. See infra notes 365-68 and accompanying text.
Also, an attorney's disclosure of an expert as a possible trial witness should not be
enough, standing alone, to make that expert available as a witness to parties in other cases.
See Kirk v. Raymark Indus.. Inc., 61 F.3d 147, 163-64 (3d Cir. 1995). Under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, an admission is "a statement by a person authorized by the party to
make a statement concerning the subject or ... a statement by the party's agent or servant
concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the exis-
tence of the relationship." FED. R. Evio. 801(d)(2)(C) - (D). An attorney who represents
a party in a given case can presumably make statements that are binding against her client
in that case, including the implied statement that an expert is qualified to speak about the
issues in that case, because she is acting within her authority when dealing with that case.
Such a statement does not constitute an admission in a different case, because the attorney
is not authorized to speak on behalf of the client in the other case. Furthermore, an attor-
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truth at trial on one or more important factual issues, not just a consult-
ant to one of the attorneys. 156
Once the expert is declared to be a potentially valuable source of infor-
mation, the jury should be allowed to consider the potentially valuable
information she can provide, even if one of the attorneys decides that she
is no longer very enthralled with the tenor of that information. 157 At a
minimum, an attorney seeking to foreclose from the jury a source of in-
formation that she herself previously declared to be potentially valua-
ble' 58 should be compelled to point to some provision of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or other law that allows her to do so, as Rule
402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires. 59 There is no such provi-
sion. Instead, Rule 26 contains language that supports the conclusion
that a party's de-disclosure does not place an expert outside the scope of
discovery. Rule 26(b)(4)(a) provides, "A party may depose any person
who has been identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented at
trial."' 60 If the attorney who previously disclosed the expert as a possible
trial witness had the right under the Rules to negate that disclosure and
return the expert to the status of a consultant who cannot be deposed by
opposing counsel, this Rule should say something akin to "A party may
depose any person who is currently identified as an expert whose opinions
may be presented at trial." Under the language that was chosen, even
after the retaining attorney attempts to de-disclose the expert, the expert
ney's admission that a person was an expert about the issues in a given case does not
necessarily suggest that the expert will be qualified to discuss issues in a separate case. In
the first place, the technical issues may be different. In addition, the fact that an expert has
been retained and made aware of the facts in one case does not mean that she has been
made aware of the facts, and therefore is able to discuss the issues, in another case.
156. See House, 168 F.R.D. at 245 ("[O]nce an expert is designated, the expert is recog-
nized as presenting part of the common body of discoverable, and generally admissible,
information and testimony available to all parties."), cited in White, 21 S.W.3d at 225.
157. On a policy level, the same result should be reached even in those states that have
not adopted disclosure and discovery rules that track the 1993 changes to Rule 26 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See supra note 36. In many such jurisdictions, some
provision of law, be it the state discovery rules, local rules, or an order of the court, pro-
duces a process whereby an attorney discloses the identity of persons who may present
expert testimony at trial. See supra note 34. Once an attorney makes such an identifica-
tion, she is declaring that the person identified is a valuable source of information whose
testimony might help the jury reach the correct result on a disputed issue of fact. Once this
declaration is made, a system that values the search for truth should be open to the possi-
bility that the opposing party may wish to present this expert's testimony.
158. Of course, expert testimony must meet certain requirements to be admissible
under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 702. An attorney who is resisting
the admission of Red Rover expert testimony might be able to point to defects in that
testimony that have nothing to do with the expert's Red Rover status, such as an absence
of qualifications or improper methodology. In response, the opposing attorney would no
doubt remind the court that this attorney initially suggested that the expert and her meth-
odology were valid, by disclosing her as a possible trial witness. While this argument will
not necessarily carry the day, it will presumably be at least somewhat persuasive to a judge
who is faced with a difficult decision about whether to exclude expert testimony.
159. Rule 402 would permit exclusion of relevant evidence if mandated "by the Consti-
tution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed
by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority." FED. R. EvID. 402.
160. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A) (emphasis added).
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is still a "person who has been identified as an expert whose opinions may
be presented at trial.' 16'
I do not mean to suggest that those who drafted the current expert
witness provisions of Rule 26 explicitly considered the dynamics
presented by Red Rover experts. To the contrary, it seems reasonable to
assume that the expert provisions of Rule 26 were drafted and amended
to deal primarily 62 with the more typical circumstance of assisting an
opposing attorney who is preparing to cross-examine an expert who is
retained, disclosed, and then called as a trial witness by the same attor-
ney.' 63 Nonetheless, in the absence of a provision in Rule 26 or another
rule specifically outlining procedures for more unusual situations,164 the
text of the rule should control. 65 Attorneys and parties should be per-
mitted to rely upon the actual language in the Rules of Civil Procedure,
and courts should apply that language in resolving disputes among par-
161. Id. (emphasis added).
With regard to work product revealed by a retaining attorney to a disclosed expert, one
might, at first glance, think that the Rule 26(b)(4)(A) deposition of a disclosed expert
could not cover Rule 26(b)(3) work product. The provisions of Rule 26(b)(3) protecting
work product from discovery, however, are in the language of Rule 26(b)(3), "[s]ubject to
the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Therefore,
many, though not all, courts have correctly recognized that the deposition of a disclosed
expert can cover work product revealed by a retaining attorney to an expert. See supra
notes 135-46 and accompanying text.
162. One cannot say that the drafters of the rule thought only of experts who were
retained, disclosed, and then called as trial witnesses by the same parties, however, because
the text of Rule 26 includes provisions suggesting that its drafters considered other situa-
tions. For example, Rule 26(a)(2)(B)'s expert witness report requirement applies "to a
witness who is retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or
whose duties as an employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony." FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). This restriction suggests that its drafters intentionally excluded
some other experts, including experts who are neither retained nor employed by a party,
see supra note 22, and experts who are employed by a party, but whose duties do not
regularly involve giving expert testimony. Also, as outlined in more detail elsewhere, see
supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text, Rule 26(b)(4)(B) contains provisions applicable
to mere consultant experts. In addition, the Advisory Committee comments to the 1.993
version of Rule 26 adopting the expert report requirement contain a reference to treating
physicians who serve as expert witnesses, thereby documenting another category of experts
considered by the drafters. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2) advisory committee's note (1993).
163. The Advisory Committee notes accompanying the 1993 adoption of the current
expert witness report requirement state, "This paragraph imposes an additional duty to
disclose information regarding expert testimony sufficiently in advance of trial that oppos-
ing parties have a reasonable opportunity to prepare for effective cross examination and
perhaps arrange for expert testimony from other witnesses." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2) advi-
sory committee's note (1993).
Although there is no reference in the Advisory Committee notes that explicitly covers
experts retained by the opposing party, it is clear that the Advisory Committee was aware
of, and not opposed to, the possibility that a witness listed as a trial witness by one party
might be called by the other party. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3) advisory committee's note(1993) ("Listing a witness does not obligate the party to secure the attendance of the per-
son at trial, but should preclude the party from objecting if the person is called to testify by
another party who did not list the person as a witness.").
164. See supra note 162.
165. According to Rule 1, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "govern the procedure
in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil nature . with the exceptions
stated in Rule 81." FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
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ties.166 The text of Rule 26 gives parties the authority to depose "any
person who has been identified as an expert, '167 and nothing in the rule
provides for de-disclosure of an expert.
Furthermore, when opposing counsel seeks to either depose a Red
Rover expert or present her testimony at trial, the Red Rover is still "an
expert whose opinions may be presented at trial."1 68 While it is true that
in some cases the retaining attorney may wish to waive any opportunity
to present the expert's opinions at trial by de-disclosing, 169 the opposing
attorney's efforts to depose the expert or offer her testimony mean that
there is a very real possibility that the opinions will still be presented at
trial, albeit by an attorney other than the one who initially retained the
expert. In the instance of a previously undeposed expert who has been
de-disclosed by the retaining attorney, the opposing counsel ordinarily
would have no reason to depose the expert if she did not think that the
deposition might lead to opinion 170 testimony that she might want to in-
troduce at trial. Of course, if the expert has already been deposed and
the court is considering an effort by opposing counsel to introduce the
expert's testimony, either live or through use of the deposition transcript
166. Rule 1 provides that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall be construed and
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
FED. R. Civ. P. 1. As outlined elsewhere, I believe allowing parties to depose, and intro-
duce evidence from and about, experts designated by their opponents will lead to more just
results by giving jurors access to potentially valuable evidence, see infra part V.A, and will
shorten litigation and trials and lessen litigation expenses by eliminating the need for par-
ties to obtain their own experts when their opponents' experts have reached conclusions
consistent with their positions, see infra notes 238-49 and accompanying text. Red Rover
opponents would presumably argue that allowing a party to depose and introduce the testi-
mony of experts deposed by their opponents would lead to unjust results, by allowing that
party to benefit from its opponents' investment of an expert. See infra part III.B. Al-
though I would contest that a result dependent upon hiding a potentially valuable witness
from the jury is a more "just" result, I would concede that reasonable minds could differ
regarding what decision regarding Red Rover issues would "secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination" of actions involving these issues. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. Therefore,
as is commonly the case, Rule 1 does little to resolve these issues, because justice, speed,
and inexpensiveness, like beauty, are in the eye of the beholder. Therefore, one is again
left with the text of the Rule, even if that text was not written with the specific controversy
in mind.
167. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A) (emphasis added).
168. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A).
169. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
170. It is possible, of course, that there might be reasons why an opposing attorney
would seek to depose an expert other than exploring whether the expert held opinions that
the opposing attorney might want to introduce at trial. For example, the opposing attorney
might want to explore whether the expert made factual observations that could be intro-
duced at trial or otherwise used by the opposing attorney to build her case. See infra note
369. Even if some motivation other than exploring the possibility of potentially helpful
opinions was the primary motivation for taking a deposition, however, it seems likely that
the opposing attorney would also wish to inquire into the expert's opinions, in case some of
them might also be of assistance in building her case. Even in the unlikely event that
exploring the expert's opinions was not to any degree a reason for conducting the deposi-
tion, the deposition might lead to the discovery of opinions that the attorney might want to
use at trial. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine a situation where an opposing attorney
deposed a de-disclosed expert where there is not some possibility that the expert's opinions
might be presented at trial.
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or videotape,171 there is by definition a possibility that the expert's opin-
ions may be presented at trial.172 In either of these circumstances, the
fact that the attorney who originally retained and disclosed the expert no
longer will attempt to present that expert's opinions at trial does not ex-
tinguish the possibility that those opinions may nonetheless be presented
at trial. 173
De-disclosure is a futile gesture that should be given no effect under
the Rules. Because an attorney who initially discloses the expert is not
precluded by that disclosure from deciding not to use that expert at
trial,174 there is no need for the attorney to de-disclose. If she tries to do
so, however, the court should recognize that a de-disclosure is nothing
more than the attorney's declaration that she is no longer interested in
presenting the expert's opinions during the trial. The de-disclosing attor-
ney cannot declare that the expert's opinions will not be presented at
trial, because the other parties might want to present those opinions.
B. FEAR OF FREELOADING
Despite the absence of a provision allowing de-disclosure, several
courts have reached decisions that effectively give retaining attorneys the
power to prevent their opponents from acquiring or using Red Rover
testimony. 75 Often these courts point to a belief that it would be un-
fair176 to the party whose attorney originally retained the expert to lose
control over that expert and have her opinions on the merits used against
that party. 77 When they expound upon the alleged genesis of this unfair-
171. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(2), 32.
172. Of course, there is also a possibility that the expert's opinions will not "be
presented at trial," FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A) if one considers offered testimony that the
court rules inadmissible to be "not presented" at trial. If the expert's opinions do not meet
the requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence for expert testimony, those opinions
will not be presented at trial. See infra note 292.
173. The courts that prevent depositions of de-disclosed experts on the basis of Rule
26(b)(4)(B) ignore or downplay the opposing party's possible interest in presenting the
expert's opinions at trial and focus on the reality that the party who initially retained the
expert will not present the expert's opinions at trial. See Dayton-Phoenix Group, Inc. v.
Gen. Motors Corp., No. C-3-95-480, 1997 WL 1764760, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 19, 1997); In
re Vestavia Assocs., 105 B.R. 680, 682 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989); cf. Bailey v. Meister Brau,
Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11, 14 (N.D. I11. 1972) (in a case predating the 1993 amendments to Rule 26,
the court similarly focused on the fact that the original retaining party would not call the
expert as a trial witness).
174. See supra note 155.
175. See supra notes 60, 81-86 and accompanying text, infra notes 176-77.
176. See Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 1984) (warning of "the
prejudice Dr. Dyck's specially informed opinion might work on plaintiff's case"); House v.
Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 168 F.R.D. 236, 241 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (reviewing a prior
decision).
177. See Lehan v. Ambassador Programs, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 670, 672 (E.D. Wash. 2000)
(professing that "each party is free to choose its expert witnesses to consult with and to
exercise its judgment on whether or not to call the expert witness at trial"); Ross v. Bur-
lington N. R.R., 136 F.R.D. 638, 639 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (declaring that "plaintiff has the pre-
rogative of changing his mind" about whether to call the expert at trial); In re Vestavia, 105
B.R. at 681 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989); Williamson v. Super. Ct., 582 P.2d 126, 130 (Cal.
1978); Axelson, Inc. v. Mcllhany, 755 S.W.2d 170, 175 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, orig.
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ness, these courts often articulate a belief that a party should not be able
to take advantage of the investments of money, time, and other resources
made by the retaining attorney and her client. 178 These decisions fail to
recognize the critical distinction between experts who are consultants to
one party and experts who may be trial witnesses, overvalue the invest-
ment made by the expert's original employer, and undervalue fairness to
the opposing party.
1. Blurring the Distinction Between Consultants and Disclosed
Witnesses
An expert who is retained by an attorney and at some point disclosed
as a possible trial witness serves two conflicting roles.179 On the one
hand, she works closely with the attorney who retains her as member of
her trial team.' 80 Indeed, at the outset of her work with an attorney who
initially retains her as a consultant, she serves only this role. 181 However,
if at some point (either immediately upon the attorney's retention of
her' 82 or, more commonly, after the passage of some time following her
initial retention as a consultant' 83) the attorney who retained her dis-
closes her as a possible trial witness, she assumes a second role. As a
possible witness, she has the obligation, if called upon, to tell the truth,' 84
even if the truth on a particular matter, including one of her opinions,
conflicts with the position taken by the attorney who retained her.185
proceeding) ("[I]t was within Apache's domain to aver that [the experts] would be used
solely for consultation"), rev'd, Tom L. Scott, Inc. v. Mcllhany, 798 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. 1990),
Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 552 n.3 (Tex. 1990) (noting that the Scott deci-
sion rendered the same day dealt with expert discovery issues).
178. See Durflinger, 727 F.2d at 891 (emphasizing that expert "was paid by plaintiffs for
his services"); Ferguson v. Michael Foods, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 408, 409 (D. Minn. 1999); Day-
ton-Phoenix Group, Inc., 1997 WL 1764760, at *1 (asserting that "the purpose of Rule
26(b)(4)(B) is to promote fairness by preventing one party from obtaining access to the
other party's trial preparation"); House, 168 F.R.D. at 241 (reviewing a prior decision that
referenced the "unfairness of allowing an opposing party to benefit from a party's effort
and expense incurred in preparing its case"); In re Vestavia, 105 B.R. at 684 ("Here there is
something more fundamental. A debtor unwilling to expend available funds to obtain its
own expert witness seeks to use the expert of an opposing party."); Williamson, 582 P.2d at
132 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
179. Applegate, supra note 99, at 295 ("The function of the expert witness is both the
most neutral and the most partisan."); Easton, supra note 22, at 656-57.
180. See infra notes 323-29 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 25.
183. See supra notes 21-34 and accompanying text.
184. In a well-known phrase, witnesses swear to tell "the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth." See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-25 (West 1988); IDAHO CODE
§ 9-1402 (Michie 1998); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 906.03(2), (3) (West 2000); Gary L. McDowell,
"High Crimes and Misdemeanors": Recovering the Intentions of the Founders, 67 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 626, 644 (1999); Francis J. Colella & Thomas R. Ireland, Neutrality and
Advocacy: A Challenge for Forensic Economics, J. LEGAL ECON., Spring/Summer 1998, at
71, 79.
185. See Kirk v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 61 F.3d 147, 164 (3d Cir. 1995) ("In theory, de-
spite the fact that one party retained and paid for the services of an expert witness, expert
witnesses are supposed to testify impartially in the sphere of their expertise."), quoted in In
re Hidden Lake Ltd. P'ship, 247 B.R. 722, 724 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2000); Great Lakes
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A court that must decide whether to require or allow an expert to tes-
tify at a deposition or trial against the wishes of the attorney who initially
retained her must determine which of these two roles is paramount. 186
The courts that give the original retaining attorney the power to prevent a
disclosed expert from being deposed or from testifying at trial often
ground their decisions in a stated belief that a party should be able to
control the expert that she originally retained. By basing their decisions
on Red Rover controversies upon an alleged right of a party to control
forever whether an expert will testify, these courts have determined that
the expert's role as a member of a trial team is more important than her
role as a witness who can help the jury resolve disputed issues of fact with
truthful testimony based on her expertise.
In my opinion, this is the wrong resolution of the competing interests
between the jury and the party who retained the expert, for disclosed
witnesses. At the same time, it is often the correct resolution of these
interests for experts who have not been disclosed as potential trial wit-
nesses.' 87 The same competing interests are at stake when the expert is
Dredge & Dock Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp., 734 F. Supp. 334, 338 (N.D. 111. 1990) ("Ex-
perts are not advocates in the litigation sense but sources of information and opinions.
Their role is to assist parties, and if they testify, to help the trier of fact understand the
relevant evidence."); Taylor v. Kohli, 642 N.E.2d 467, 469 (Ill. 1994) ("Excepting for fraud,
the employer can influence but cannot control the expert's thought processes."); LUBET,
supra note 46, at 177 ("An expert is not the client's 'champion,' pledged faithfully to seek
the client's goals. Indeed, in many ways the expert's role is precisely the opposite. She
must remain independent of the client and detached, if not wholly aloof, from the client's
goals.") (citing ABA Comm. On Prof'l Conduct, Formal Op. 97-407 (1997)).
An expert witness's obligation to testify only to opinions that she truly believes distin-
guishes the expert witness from an attorney, who is allowed to take positions in court that
she personally does not believe, as long as there is a good faith basis for taking those
positions and as long as the attorney does not knowingly make a false statement of fact or
knowingly offer false evidence. See Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 734 F. Supp. at 338
(citing Paul v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., 123 F.R.D. 271, 281 (S.D. Ohio 1988)) ("The
attorney stands in a higher position of trust with its related fiduciary duties to the client
than does an expert."); Id. ("Experts perform very different functions in litigation than do
attorneys."); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1, 3.3 (2002); ABA Formal Op. 97-
407, supra note 132, quoted in LUBET, supra note 46, at 177 n.8 ("'A duty to advance a
client's objectives diligently through all lawful measures, which is inherent in a client-law-
yer relationship, is inconsistent with the duty of a testifying expert."'); Easton, supra note
21, at 598-601 (discussing differences between an attorney's and an expert witness's duties
regarding the truth); Stephen D. Easton, The Truth About Ethics and Ethics About the
Truth: An Open Letter to Trial Attorneys, 33 GONz. L. REv. 463, 465-66 (1997-98) (discuss-
ing the rather low truth standard for attorneys).
186. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Zotos Int'l, Inc., No. 98-CV-838S(F), 2000 WL 1843258,
at *4-5 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2000).
187. Cf. White v. Vanderbilt Univ., 21 S.W.3d 215, 224-25 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (listing
"several ... legitimate" policy reasons for "[s]hielding consulting experts from discovery").
Courts explaining the policy reasons for placing undisclosed consultants outside the
scope of discovery have noted one or more of the following benefits: relieving attorneys of
the concern that they will create discoverable evidence by using consultants; preventing
other parties from benefitting from a party's expenditure of resources on consultants; and
expanding the pool of available consultants to include those who do not wish to testify at
trial. Id.; see Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co. v. Grinnell Corp., Nos. CIV.A.97-0775, 97-0803,
1999 WL 731410, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 20, 1999); Agron v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 176
F.R.D. 445,449 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); County of L.A. v. Super. Ct., 271 Cal. Rptr. 698, 702 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1990). Courts that have allowed parties to return experts to consultant status by
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serving only as a consultant to the attorney who retained her, because this
undisclosed expert is nonetheless a potential source of valuable informa-
tion for the jurors. 188 We could adopt civil procedure rules that required
an attorney to disclose and allow discovery of all persons she consulted, if
we believed that the jury's interest in receiving the expert's knowledge
exceeded the party's interest in being able to consult an expert without
creating discoverable evidence for the opponent. We have not done so,
though. Instead, Rule 26 allows an attorney to keep the fact that she
consulted with an expert a secret from her opponent and therefore from
the jury, absent exceptional circumstances. 189 This is entirely reasonable
because an attorney should have the opportunity to consult experts with-
out automatically creating disclosable and discoverable evidence that
could be used by the opposing attorney. 190 As long as the expert remains
only a consultant, her loyalty to the attorney employing and paying her
should trump her potential value as a witness, absent unusual circum-
stances. 191 Under this well-entrenched system, all that the retaining at-
torney ordinarily has to do to prevent the expert from testifying at a
deposition or trial is simply to retain her as a consultant and refrain from
disclosing her as a potential trial witness. 92
As soon as the attorney changes the expert's status from consultant to
potential trial witness by disclosing her identity, however, there is a dif-
de-disclosing them have typically cited one or more of these three justifications, plus one
other, preventing prejudice to the party who originally retained the expert. Lehan v. Am-
bassador Programs, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 670, 672 (E.D. Wash. 2000); Dayton-Phoenix Group,
Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C-3-95-480, 1997 WL 1764760, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 19,
1997) (discussing "fairness"); In re Vestavia, 105 B.R. 680, 682 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989); cf.
Agron, 176 F.R.D. at 453 (recognizing the concern that experts may be reluctant to consult
if opposing counsel can force them to testify); House v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 168
F.R.D. 236, 241 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (reviewing earlier decisions).
Each of the first three purposes can be accomplished by a system that allows Red Rover
testimony by disclosed experts, because a party ordinarily can prevent Red Rover discov-
ery and testimony simply by not disclosing a consultant as a testifying expert. See supra
notes 26-31 and accompanying text. The final purpose, preventing prejudice, does not jus-
tify excluding Red Rover testimony or evidence about the expert's original retention. See
infra Part III.C.2.
188. Cf. White, 21 S.W.3d at 224-25 (observing that insulating undisclosed consultants
from discovery "runs contrary to the broad policy favoring the discovery of non-privileged
information").
189. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B); supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
190. See House, 168 F.R.D. at 245 ("Parties should be encouraged to consult experts to
formulate their own cases, to discard those experts for any reason, and to place them be-
yond the reach of an opposing party, if they have never indicated an intention to use the
expert at trial."); White, 21 S.W.3d at 225 ("Without this protection, parties would be reluc-
tant to consult experts because they would be forced to live or die based on the unknown
opinion of the expert consulted."); Tom L. Scott, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 556, 559
(Tex. 1990) ("The policy behind the consulting expert privilege is to encourage parties to
seek expert advice in evaluating their case and to prevent a party from receiving undue
benefit from an adversary's efforts and diligence.") (citing Werner v. Miller, 579 S.W.2d
455, 454 (Tex. 1979)).
191. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
192. Absent extraordinary circumstances, because the opposing party will not even
learn the identity of an unidentified consultant, that party will be in no realistic position to
even try to seek out the expert's opinions. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
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ferent resolution of the conflict between the interests of the jury and the
interests of the retaining attorney, 193 as there should be. Under the pro-
visions of Rule 26, once a party discloses the expert as a person who may
be used to present expert opinion testimony at trial, 194 the other party
and, therefore, ultimately the jury,' 95 is entitled to receive information
about her through mandatory disclosures,' 96 depositions, 97 and other1 98
discovery devices.
Fortunately, Rule 26's resolution of the conflict between an expert's
loyalty to her original employer and her value to the jury is the correct
one, for disclosed experts,' 99 just as Rule 26's different resolution of this
conflict for undisclosed consultants is the correct one for that different set
of circumstances.200 Once the attorney discloses an expert as a possible
trial witness, there is a shift in the relative weights of the interest of the
retaining attorney and the interest of the jury.201 If the system aspires to
find the truth at trial, the jury must be allowed to hear from all persons
who have valuable information to present,20 2 absent a narrowly tailored
193. See House, 168 F.R.D. at 246 n.7 (determining that "whenever" an attorney
designates an expert under the pre-1993 version of Rule 26, the court should no longer
treat the expert as an undisclosed expert, but should consider whether to allow deposition
and trial testimony from the expert); cf. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Zotos Int'l, Inc., No. 98-CV-
838S(F), 2000 WL 1843258, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2000) (rejecting the argument that an
expert witness should be treated as "part of the defense 'team"').
194. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A).
195. See supra note 145.
196. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2).
197. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A); House, 168 F.R.D. at 247 (although a party gener-
ally does not have the right to depose another party's "never-designated" consultants, it
can depose disclosed experts); supra note 39 and accompanying text.
198. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(5); supra note 40.
199. Because an expert who has been identified by one of the parties is a potentially
valuable source of information for jurors who must resolve factual issues, courts should
allow Red Rover depositions and trial testimony even in jurisdictions that do not have
disclosure and discovery procedures tracking the post-1993 version of Rule 26, see supra
note 36, unless these jurisdictions have discovery rules or other provisions of law that ex-
plicitly prevent Red Rover depositions or trial testimony, see supra notes 101, 159 and
accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
201. See White v. Vanderbilt Univ., 21 S.W.3d 215, 2255 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) ("Most
of the reasons in favor of shielding a consulting expert from discovery become attenuated
once a party identifies or designates an expert as a witness expected to testify at trial.").
202. Dean Wigmore outlined the classic view:
For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a fundamental
maxim that the public (in the words sanctioned by Lord Hardwicke) has a
right to every man's evidence. When we come to examine the various claims
of exemption, we start with the primary assumption that there is a general
duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving and that any exemptions
which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being many derogations from a
positive general rule ....
JOHN H. WIOMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2192, at 70 (John T. McNaughton rev.
1961); see also JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARETr A. BERGER, 3 WEINSTEIN's FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 501.03[2][a] (Joseph M. McClaughlin, 2d ed., 2000) ("[T]here is a general duty
to give testimony, because the public has a right to everyone's evidence.").
In the context of expert witnesses, one court observed:
As a general proposition, . . . no party to litigation has anything resembling a
proprietary right to any witness's evidence. Absent a privilege no party is
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and strictly construed20 3 privilege. 20 4 The Federal Rules of Evidence de-
mand no less.20 5 Therefore, it is not surprising that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure contain no provision allowing a party to render a previ-
ously disclosed expert ineligible to testify by de-disclosing.
entitled to restrict an opponent's access to a witness, however partial or im-
portant to him, by insisting upon some notion of allegiance. [Citations omit-
ted.] Even an expert whose knowledge has been purchased cannot be
silenced by the party who is paying him on that ground alone. Unless im-
peded by privilege an adversary may inquire, in advance of trial, by any law-
ful manner to learn what any witness knows ....
Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., Inc. 99 F.R.D. 126, 128 (D.D.C. 1983), cited in Donako v. Rowe, 475
N.W.2d 30, 36 (Mich. 1991).
203. Courts and commentators alike have emphasized that privileges and other doc-
trines that permit a party to suppress evidence must be narrowly tailored and strictly con-
strued. See, e.g., NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 907 (4th Cir. 1965) ("'The [attorney-
client] privilege remains an exception to the general duty to disclose. Its benefits are all
indirect and speculative; its obstruction is plain and concrete .... It is worth preserving for
the sake of a general policy, but it is nonetheless an obstacle to the investigation of the
truth. It ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with
the logic of its principle."'), quoting WIGMORE, supra note 202, § 2292; Edward J. Im-
winkelried, The Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Non-Testifying Experts:
Reestablishing the Boundaries Between the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product
Protection, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 19, 20 (1990); Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege:
Waiver and the Litigator, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1605, 1605 (1986) ("Because the 'sacred' privi-
leges contravene the maxim that the law has a right to every person's evidence, American
law has set its head against them since the mid-nineteenth century."); cf. United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (privileges are "exceptions to the demand for every man's
evidence [that] are not lightly created nor expansively construed").
204. At least in the majority of jurisdictions, there is no privilege protecting retained
experts from being called as witnesses. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Jackson, 636 So. 2d 310,
314 (Miss. 1992) ("[N]o privilege exists to bar Marcosky's testimony. Except in those in-
stances where an expert was originally retained in another capacity, a majority of jurisdic-
tions have held that the rules of privilege do not preclude calling an expert witness
originally retained by the adverse party.")
Those who value the relationship between an expert and the attorney and party retain-
ing her more than I, see infra notes 407-08 and accompanying text, might suggest that the
courts should establish an expert-attorney or expert-party privilege. Such a proposal is not
likely to be implemented, because the courts resist new privileges, which inherently inter-
fere with the ascertainment of truth at trial. See 3 WEINSTEIN, supra note 201,
§ 501.03[2][a] ("Courts are constrained not to recognize any privilege unless the need for it
is clear and convincing."); 8 WIGMORE, supra note 201, § 2192, at 73 ("[A]ll privileges of
exemption from this duty [of all persons to give testimony] are exceptional, and are there-
fore to be discountenanced."). Although there may be some value in the relationship be-
tween a disclosed expert and her employer, this relationship does not have the same type
of intrinsic societal value as the relationships that are covered by the traditional common
law privileges, such as that between doctor and patient, see id., ch. 86, wife and husband,
see id., ch.83, attorney and client, see id., ch. 82, and priest and penitent, see id., ch. 87.
Even if the courts or other authorities established a privilege for communications between
an expert and the attorney and party who retained her, that privilege would be trumped by
the duty to disclose all matters considered by the expert, once the attorney disclosed the
expert as a possible trial witness. Perhaps this is why the law has developed in its current
fashion, giving work product protection to communications between undisclosed consul-
tants and attorneys, see supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text, but ending this protec-
tion when the expert is disclosed as a possible trial witness, see supra notes 126-41 and
accompanying text.
205. See supra note 101.
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2. Elevating Protection of a Party's Investment over the Search for the
Truth
Nonetheless, several courts have allowed parties to do just that, by
holding that a party's investment in retaining, paying, and working with
an expert2 06 justifies allowing that party to unilaterally decide that the
expert will not testify.2 0 7 Although these courts have, in my view, over-
emphasized the importance of the initially retaining party's financial in-
vestment in an expert witness, this investment is often substantial. Unlike
a fact witness, a retained expert ordinarily does not become familiar with
the facts of a particular case unless the party that retained her pays her to
review those facts, which are usually provided by the retaining attor-
ney.2 0 8 Therefore, by the time that the retaining attorney discloses the
expert as a possible trial witness, the retaining party ordinarily has a sub-
stantial investment in that expert.
At the even later date when the opposing party seeks to use that expert
as a Red Rover, the court must resolve the conflict between protecting
the initial retaining party's investment in the expert and the jury's interest
in receiving potentially valuable testimony from the Red Rover expert.
Although it is not surprising that some courts instinctively attempt to pre-
vent the opposing party from benefiting from this investment,20 9 this in-
206. See FMC Corp. v. Vendo Co., 196 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1048 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (refer-
ring to the "strong policy against permitting a non-diligent party from free-riding off the
opponent's industry and diligence"); Lehan v. Ambassador Programs, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 670,
672 (E.D. Wash. 2000) (asserting that "expert witnesses once retained remain the witness
of the retaining party"); In re Vestavia Assocs., 105 B.R. 680 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) ("It is
within Centrust's preogative to withdraw the witness .... "); White v. Vanderbilt Univ., 21
S.W.3d 215, 222 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting the trial court's view that the original
retaining party "has the right" to render the expert ineligible to testify by de-disclosing);
Axelson, Inc. v. Mcllhany, 755 S.W.2d 170, 176 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, orig. proceed-
ing) ("Acting in the best interest of his client, the attorney must be free to make whatever
use of an expert's opinion that will be most likely to produce good results for his client."),
rev'd, Tom L. Scott, Inc. v. Mcllhany, 798 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. 1990), Axelson, Inc. v.
Mcllhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 552 n.3 (Tex. 1990) (noting that the Scott decision rendered the
same day dealt with issues regarding discovery of redesignated experts); cf. Erickson v.
Newmar Corp., 87 F.3d 298, 303 (9th Cir. 1996) (making reference to the retaining party as
the "master[ ]" of the expert ).
207. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
208. See infra notes 322-28 and accompanying text.
209. A similar instinctive effort to thwart an attorney from taking advantage of her
opponent's efforts is suggested in the U.S. Supreme Court's classic attorney work product
case, Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). In Hickman, the Supreme Court refused to
require an attorney to provide written or oral statements outlining the attorney's inter-
views with fact witnesses, though it suggested that written statements provided by wit-
nesses might be discoverable in some cases. The Court noted that the attorney seeking the
statements "frankly admit[tedj that he want[ed] the oral statements only to help prepare
himself to examine witnesses and to make sure that he has overlooked nothing." Id. at
513. In holding that this was an "insufficient" justification for requiring disclosure of state-
ments, id., the Court implied that, at least in some circumstances, one attorney should not
be permitted to profit from her opponent's efforts.
In application, this concern apparently has little power, at least when the opposing con-
cern involves the jury's right to receive potentially valuable evidence. Courts readily allow
parties to profit from the efforts of their opponents who acquire information through dis-
covery and investigation. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
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stinct should not overrule the more fundamental value of making a trial
an effective mechanism for discovering the truth.210 In other contexts,
courts do not permit a party's investment in potential evidence to trump
the systemic interest in presenting evidence to the jury. For example, an
attorney who asks a question at a deposition that results in an answer that
is favorable to her opponent cannot validly object to a reiteration of that
testimony at trial by saying "my opponent never would have thought of
that question if I had not asked it," even if this is true. Similarly, assum-
ing the standard interrogatory asking for the identity of each potential
fact witness, a party who has conducted a substantial and costly factual
investigation must disclose the name of a potential fact witness unbe-
known to that party's opponent because the courts will not tolerate a
claim that the investigating party "owns" the fact witness 21' due to his
investment in an investigation that identified a person who, absent that
investigation, would not have been available as a witness for either
party.212 In contrast, the decisions that allow a party to prevent the testi-
mony of an expert due to that party's investment in that expert inappro-
priately allow a party to "own" a witness.213
Even Hickman does not allow one party to keep a potential witness off the stand. In-
stead, the witnesses interviewed by the attorney in Hickman were apparently identified
and available to be called to testify. Id. at 498. In fact, the Hickman Court indicated that
production of statements "might be justified where the witnesses are no longer available or
can be reached only with difficulty." Id. at 511. Therefore, while Hickman stands for the
proposition that one attorney is not necessarily entitled to inquire into an opposing attor-
ney's thought processes in discovery, it does not elevate concerns for protection of one
party's investment over all other concerns. To the contrary, it seems to suggest that
presenting available information to the jury would trump even attorney work product
concerns.
210. See supra notes 99-100, 155-56, 202-03, infra notes 219-21, 310 and accompanying
text.
211. Cogdell v. Brown, 531 A.2d 1379, 1381 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) ("No party
to litigation has anything resembling a proprietary right to any witness's evidence.").
212. Under Rule 26(b)(1), "Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party, including ... the identity
and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter." FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1). Courts regularly require parties answering interrogatories to identify potential
fact witnesses located in their fact investigations. See, e.g., Schneck v. Int'l Bus. Machs.
Corp., CIV.A.92-4370(GEB), 1993 WL 735638, at *6 (D.N.J. July 27, 1993); Foster v. Ber-
wind Corp., CIV.A.90-0857, 1990 WL 59332, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 2, 1990); Grossman v.
Arbor House Prop., Ltd., Civ. A. No. 87-0656, 1987 WL 14517, at *3 (E.D. Penn. July 23,
1987); In re Dayco Corp. Derivative Secs. Litig., 99 F.R.D. 616, 624 (S.D. Ohio 1983);
Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 434 F. Supp. 4, 8 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
213. See United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 76 (9th Cir. 1968) ("It would be intolera-
ble to allow a party to suppress unfavorable evidence by deciding not to use a retained
expert at trial."); Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., Inc. 99 F.R.D. 126, 128 (D.D.C. 1983) (absent a
privilege, a party should not be permitted to prohibit testimony from its expert solely be-
cause it originally purchased the expert's knowledge); Norfin, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Machs.
Corp., 74 F.R.D. 529, 533 (D. Colo. 1977), quoting Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. United States,
39 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D. Colo. 1966) ("It would . . . appear that the underlying factor which
causes the courts to treat expert testimony somewhat differently from testimony of other
witnesses is that the party has an investment in the witness. Somehow it is believed that he
has bought and paid for the witness and the other party should not share in his property.
We cannot accept this 'oath helper' approach to discovery. It is inconsistent with our basic
assumption that the trial is a search for truth and not a tactical contest which goes to either
the richest or to the most resourceful litigant.").
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After all, one should not lose sight of the reason why a party would de-
disclose an expert. Assuming that courts are correct in themselves as-
suming that a party often has a substantial investment of time, money,
and other resources in a retained expert at the time the party attempts to
de-disclose, 214 that party presumably would not wish to abandon this in-
vestment without some powerful countervailing consideration. Often215
that countervailing consideration is the retaining attorney's belief that the
expert's opinions will do more harm than good to the attorney's case. In
other words, the retaining attorney will not ordinarily 216 even try to de-
214. See supra note 206.
215. Of course, there are other reasons why an attorney might decide not to call a
previously disclosed expert at trial, including the attorney's judgment that the expert will
make a poor trial witness, a decision to discontinue paying fees to that witness, or a deter-
mination that another expert can handle areas previously assigned to the de-disclosed ex-
pert. Regardless of the retaining attorney's motivation for de-disclosure, the opposing
attorney might be interested in presenting testimony from that expert, and that testimony
might be helpful to the jury in resolving factual disputes.
216. This article concerns cases where one or more of the opinions of an expert re-
tained by one party are in agreement with the positions taken by the opposing party. A
slightly different scenario could arise in a smaller number of cases, because sometimes
there will be more than two possible answers to a question addressed by experts, even
when there is only one correct answer, see infra notes 346-49 and accompanying text.
For example, assume that a homeowner has sued her insurer for failing to reimburse the
homeowner for her losses after a fire. Assume further that the insurer has refused to pay
because its expert regarding the cause and origin of fires concluded, after her investigation,
that the homeowner committed arson by starting a fire in the garage that is attached to the
home. In such a case, the critical issue probably will be how and where the fire started.
Assume that the plaintiff's first expert on the fire's cause and origin opined in her report
and her deposition testimony that the fire started in the master bedroom. Finally, assume
further that, for some reason, the plaintiff (or, more likely, the plaintiff's attorney) lost
confidence in this expert and hired a second cause and origin investigator, who ultimately
concluded that the fire started in the kitchen. At the time of trial, then, the insurer is
asserting that the fire started in the garage and the homeowner is asserting that the fire
started in the kitchen. Both parties call their current experts to support their positions.
In this scenario, should the insurer be allowed to present the testimony (probably
through the deposition transcript) of the plaintiff's first expert, who concluded that the fire
started in the master bedroom? Unlike the classic Red Rover testimony that is the subject
of this article, this Red Rover opinion is not entirely in agreement with the position of the
insurer. In addition to the restrictions that some courts have placed on the use of classic
Red Rover testimony, see supra Part II.C, some might suggest that Model Rule 3.3(a)(3)
constrains an attorney who would consider making such an offer. Under Model Rule
3.3(a)(3), an attorney may not "offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false." MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 3.4(a)(3) (2002). Some might suggest that an attorney who
believes that a fire started in the garage cannot also believe that the fire started in the
master bedroom. On the other hand, one could argue that this is not the type of offer that
Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) is designed to address, because the attorney offering the testimony is
not attempting to convince the jury that the fire started in the master bedroom, but is
instead simply trying to establish that even the homeowner's first expert concluded that it
did not start in the kitchen. Such an offer seems analogous to the use of a prior inconsis-
tent statement of a witness during cross-examination, see FED. R. Evil. 613, 801(d)(1)(A);
accord UNIF. R. EviD. 613, 801(d)(1)(i), because the attorney conducting the cross-exami-
nation is not always contending that the prior statement is entirely correct, but may instead
be contending only that the witness's current testimony is incorrect. Also, if the insurer's
attorney had been thorough in her deposition of the homeowner's first expert, her deposi-
tion questions would have required the expert to testify about why she eliminated every
other possible location as the origin of the fire, including the kitchen. To the extent that
the first expert opined that the fire did not start in the kitchen, that opinion is consistent
with the position taken by the insurer on the issue of whether the fire started in the
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disclose her expert witness unless she agrees with the opposing party on
one or more important issues. 217
As discussed more fully below, the fact that an expert has reached
opinions contrary to the ones desired by the attorney who retained her is
potentially powerful evidence that the opposing party is correct on these
issues.218 If we truly are interested in a system where the jury is given
access to evidence that will assist it in correctly resolving factual disputes,
it is difficult to defend the exclusion of powerful evidence, 219 solely be-
kitchen, even though the initial expert's opinion about where the fire did start is not consis-
tent with the position taken by the insurer.
Beyond this brief and admittedly incomplete discussion, the interesting issues created by
the use of Red Rover testimony that is not consistent with the positions taken by the
offering party at trial are beyond the reach of this article, though some of this article's
analysis may be applicable in this situation.
217. See Collins v. Wayne Corp., 621 F.2d 777, 781 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting plaintiffs'
assertion that defendant's de-disclosed expert's deposition "testimony on the speed of the
bus and the tractor trailer impact was fairly close to the estimates of the plaintiff's expert");
House v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 168 F.R.D. 236, 239 n.3 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (finding
that the magistrate was probably correct in concluding that the defendants' expert's
"'opinions must not be favorable to the defendants' position'"); Bailey v. Meister Brau,
Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11, 14 (N.D. I11. 1972) (noting defendant's claim that plaintiff's expert's
opinion "was allegedly adverse to plaintiff"); Lunghi v. Clark Equip. Co., 200 Cal. Rptr.
387, 389 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (cataloguing defense design expert's areas of agreement with
plaintiff's theories in products liability case); Broward County v. Cento, 611 So. 2d 1339,
1339 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993) ("The [defendant's] doctor gave his opinion that [plaintiff] had
suffered a permanent injury as a result of the auto accident."); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Jack-
son, 636 So. 2d 310, 313 (Miss. 1992) (noting that the retaining attorneys' de-disclosure
came after the expert "presented an opinion similar to that espoused by [the opposing
party's] experts"); White v. Vanderbilt Univ., 21 S.W.3d 215, 221 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)
(delineating area where defendants' expert agreed with plaintiffs' theories in a medical
malpractice case).
In another case, one must read between the lines a bit to determine the reason for the
de-disclosure, but the reported facts suggest that the retaining attorney concluded that the
expert had agreed or would agree with the opposing party on one or more critical issues.
See Peterson v. Willie, 81 F.3d 1033, 1036 (11th Cir. 1996) ("Shortly before his scheduled
deposition noticed by defendants and not objected to by Peterson, Dr. Lichtblau reexam-
ined Peterson, without Peterson's attorneys' instructions or knowledge. Dr. Lichtblau then
testified at the deposition that, as a result of his second examination, his opinion concern-
ing Peterson's future placement had changed.").
On some occasions, retaining attorneys have claimed that they were de-disclosing for
reasons other than their experts' agreement with the opposition. See Lehan v. Ambassa-
dor Programs, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 670, 670 (E.D. Wash. 2000) ("Since emotional distress dam-
ages are not recoverable under the claims brought by Mr. Lehan, Defendant has
represented to the Court that it does not intend to call Dr. Klein as a witness at trial .... ");
House, 168 F.R.D. at 238-39 & n.3 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (noting, but discrediting, defendant's
claim that it de-disclosed because it had moved to disqualify the plaintiff's expert and be-
cause it initially listed an expert as a witness only to preserve the option of rebutting the
testimony of the plaintiff's expert, because the plaintiff's outline of her expert witness's
testimony was vague). Because the opposing parties in these cases were interested in ob-
taining or using these witness's testimony, there is at least some suggestion that these op-
posing parties believed that the experts in question might provide testimony that would be
helpful to them.
218. See infra Part V.A.
219. See Agron v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 176 F.R.D. 445, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("One
of the primary concerns of any trial court is the desire for probative information and the
search for truth. Naturally, such a truth-finding mission favors the admission of testimony
by an expert who could assist the trier of fact in determining complex issues."); House, 168
F.R.D. at 246 (recognizing "the court's interest in the proper resolution of issues"); cf.
2002] 1475
SMU LAW REVIEW
cause one party with ties to the witness does not care for 220 the testimony
that witness will present.221
Indeed, our justice system generally starts by giving quite short shrift222
to a party's attempt to object to the testimony of a witness based on the
party's ties to a witness, 223 but it does not stop there. It also prohibits or
at least discourages efforts by a party to keep a potential witness from
testifying with criminal statutes,224 professional responsibility rules,2 2 5
and court decisions226 outlawing payments to a potential witness to keep
Lehan, 190 F.R.D. at 672 (reviewing decisions that have reasoned that if an expert "will
advance the examined party's advocacy of the truth of the issue, then pursuit of the truth
requires that he be allowed to call that witness"); White, 21 S.W.3d at 221 n.6 (noting that
the Red Rover expert in question was the lead authority on the subject matter in the case).
220. The fact that the retaining party does not care for the opinions reached by her
expert does not, by itself, render those opinions unfairly prejudicial to that party. See
Agron, 176 F.R.D. at 453; White, 21 S.W.3d at 228.
221. It is no secret that the general public holds the judicial system and the attorneys
who inhabit it in fairly low esteem, see Susan Daicoff, Asking Leopards To Change Their
Spots: Should Lawyers Change? A Critique of Solutions to Problems with Professionalism
by Reference to Empirically-Derived Attorney Personality Attributes, 11 GEo. J. LEGAL
Er'tics 547, 547 (1998), in part because non-lawyers believe that lawyers are too willing to
win at all costs, even if it requires playing games that hide the truth from jurors. See Albert
W. Alschuler, Explaining the Public Wariness of Juries, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 407, 410 (1998)
(observing the public perception of "lawyers' adversarial game-playing"); John A.
Humbach, The National Association of Honest Lawyers: An Essay on Honesty, 'Lawyer
Honesty' and Public Trust in the Legal System, 20 PACE L. REv. 93, 93 (1999) ("[A] kind of
partial-truth advocacy [has emerged,] in which the lawyer knowingly distracts attention
from the truth and fosters miconceptions in the minds of jurors and others. In the end,
lawyers frequently succeed in creating false impressions or discrediting the truth and, as a
result, people feel they cannot trust lawyers to be straight."); Janeen Kerper & Gary L.
Stuart, Rambo Bites the Dust. Current Trends in Deposition Ethics, 22 J. LEGAL PROF. 103,
109 (1998) ("In the legal arena, zealous advocacy has produced verdicts which appear to
the public as aberrant or excessive."); Ralph A. Fine, Object at Your Ow, Risk, OR. ST.
BAR BULL., Apr. 1998, at 19, 19 ("Jurors not only believe that the lawyers know the 'truth,'
but they also recognize that the jury will never hear much of what is critical to their
decision.").
Allowing attorneys to render experts ineligible to testify at trial by the simple expedient
of de-disclosing them provides fuel for this criticism. The end result of this maneuver is the
hiding of a portion of the available data, i.e., the expert's testimony, from the jurors. Fur-
thermore, the attorney's motivation for engaging in the maneuver is winning. Cf. William-
son v. Super. Ct., 582 P.2d 126, 131 (Cal. 1978) (warning against "the 'gamesmanship'
involved in the suppression of evidence" through a settlement agreement that sought to
convert disclosed experts to consultants); Tom L. Scott, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 556,
560 (Tex. 1990) (referring to attempts to "redesignat[e]" experts as non-testifying consul-
tants as "offensive"); White, 21 S.W.3d at 223 ("The first, and perhaps more important,
policy [behind the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure] is that discovery should enable the
parties and the courts to seek the truth so that disputes will be decided by facts rather than
by legal maneuvering.").
222. See United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 76 (9th Cir. 1968).
223. The only common exceptions are situations where a party can point to a privilege
that allows it to object to the testimony of other specified persons, such as attorneys,
spouses, and priests. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
224. See Williamson, 582 P.2d at 131; Smith v. Super. Ct., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20, 26 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1996); 8 WIGMORE, supra note 202, § 2194b, at 78 ("[I]n every criminal code
penalizing the obstruction of justice, that offense is deemed to include agreements or at-
tempts to suppress testimony."); infra notes 227, 229-30.
225. See infra note 230.
226. See Smith, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 26.
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her from testifying,2 27 hiding of potential witnesses, 228 persuading poten-
tial witnesses to avoid the subpoena power of a particular court or to fail
to testify when subpoenaed, 229 and threatening or discouraging potential
witnesses from testifying. 230 A system that goes to such great lengths to
give the jury the evidence it needs from potential witnesses 231 should not
sanction the unilateral attempt of a party to silence an expert witness that
the same party previously identified as a potentially valuable source of
In a California case, one defendant agreed to indemnify another defendant in exchange
for the second defendant's de-disclosure of an expert. See Williamson, 582 P.2d at 128-29.
Over the objections of the defendant, the court allowed discovery regarding the de-dis-
closed expert, saying, "Agreements to suppress evidence have long been held void as
against public policy, both in California and in most common law jurisdictions." Id. at 131.
In another case involving an attempt to silence expert witnesses through partial settlement
and attempted reclassification of the dismissed parties' experts as consultants, the Texas
Supreme Court agreed. See Tom L. Scott, Inc., 798 S.W.2d at 560. According to the Texas
Supreme Court, "The redesignation of the experts in this case was an offensive and unac-
ceptable use of discovery mechanisms intended to defeat the salutary objectives of discov-
ery." Id. Although at least one court disagrees, see County of L.A. v. Super. Ct., 271 Cal.
Rptr. 698, 703 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (distinguishing Williamson because the case at hand
involves "one party who, for tactical reasons and in its own interest, has chosen not to call
one of its witnesses"), if two parties cannot agree to silence an already disclosed expert,
one party acting alone should also not be able to silence an already disclosed expert.
227. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 268, § 13B (Law. Co-op. 2000); United States v. Boka,
No. 98-50687, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 2426, at *6 (9th Cir. Feb. 15, 2000); Smith, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 26; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 202, § 2194(b), at 77 ("[A] contract to suppress
testimony is not binding and cannot be sued upon by the obligee party."); Kelly McDonald,
Gimme Shelter? Not if You Are a Non-Witness Expert Under Rule 26(b)(4)(B), 56 U. CINN.
L. REV. 1027, 1044 (1988) ("[T]he retention of an expert for the purpose of preventing his
testimony resembles a bribe to prevent the expert's participation in a judicial
proceeding.").
228. See United States v. Tackett, 113 F.3d 603, 607 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Lester, 749 F.2d 1288, 1294, 1299 (9th Cir. 1984).
229. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-10-121(a), 13A-10-124(a)(2) (2000); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 575.270 (1999); United States v. Schaffner, 715 F.2d 1099, 1101 (6th Cir. 1983).
230. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 136.1(a)(1) (Deering 2001); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/32-
4a (West 2000); United States v. Brown, 273 F.3d 625, 627 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Hayden, 85 F.3d 153, 159-60 (4th Cir. 1996) Boka, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 2426, at *7 n.4;
United States v. Johns, No. 96-6355, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 3952, at *15-16 (6th Cir. Mar.
4, 1998).
Model Rule 3.4(a) prohibits an attorney from unlawfully obstructing another party's ac-
cess to evidence. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 3.4(a) (2002).
This Model Rule provision incorporates and expands the predecessor Model Code provi-
sion stating that an attorney "shall not advise or cause a person to secrete himself ... for
the purpose of making him unavailable as a witness...." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY Disciplinary Rule 7-109(B) (1989). Pursuant to these provisions, ethics
authorities have determined that attorneys cannot attempt to persuade witnesses not to
testify. See Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 1992-1.32, at 6-7 (1992); Stand-
ing Comm. on Legal Ethics of the Va. State Bar, Op. 1678, at 2 (1996) ("The committee
believes . . . that it is not ethically permissible for a lawyer directly to advise the other
party's expert witness not to testify, or indirectly through another acting at the lawyer's
request to cause the other party's expert witness not to testify."); ABA/BNA MANUAL,
supra note 132, at 61:701 (1995) ("With respect to witnesses, Model Rule 3.4(a)'s prohibi-
tion against obstructing access to evidence bars a lawyer from procuring the absence of a
witness. More subtle efforts to dissuade a witness from testifying may also violate Rule
3.4(a), as well as other professional conduct rules.").
231. See supra note 202.
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information for the jury.232 While ordinarily it may be acceptable for a
party to own a consultant, 233 no party should be entitled to own and uni-
laterally control a witness.
3. Discounting Fairness to the Opposing Party
Although the courts reaching anti-Red Rover decisions have, in my
view, miscalculated concerns for fairness to the parties who initially re-
tained Red Rover experts, these courts' interest in fairness is laudable.
Unfortunately, however, these courts tend to have an overly narrow view
of fairness concerns because they focus only on fairness to the party that
initially retained the expert. Although these are the most obvious fair-
ness concerns, courts should also realize that the opposing party may also
have fairness claims. Anti-Red Rover decisions ignore or discount the
burdens that their decisions place upon the opposing party.
After an expert has been disclosed by the retaining attorney, muzzling
that witness may be unfair to the opposing party for several reasons. In
the first place, a party ordinarily should be able to count on the availabil-
ity of the testimony of a person who has been declared to be a potential
witness at trial. Because Rule 26 rather explicitly tells the opposing party
to expect both automatic disclosures about a disclosed expert 234 and a
deposition of a disclosed expert,235 the opposing party should be able to
rely on receiving information that can be introduced at trial.236 The op-
posing party who reads Rule 26 should not have to speculate that a court
might read into it non-existent provisions that will prevent that party
from gathering or using the expert's opinions at trial.237
In addition, a system that values efficiency should not require a party
to hire and pay fees to its own expert when the expert witness disclosed
by its opponent has taken a position that agrees with its position on a
critical issue. 238 According to Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
232. See United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 72 n.6 (9th Cir. 1968) ("Professor Louisell
has said, 'the notion that expert knowledge relevant to adjudication is but a species of
private property, within the owner's exclusive domain * * * seems to strain the adversary
system to the breaking point, and to become morally intolerable.") (quoting DAVID W.
LouISELL, MODERN CALIFORNIA DISCOVERY § 11.04, at 332 (1963)).
233. See supra notes 188-92 and accompanying text.
234. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
235. See FEr. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A).
236. See Agron v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 176 F.R.D. 445, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("De-
fendant may have relied on Plaintiff's designation of Deutsch as sufficient for its purpose at
trial."); House v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 168 F.R.D. 236, 246 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (refer-
ring to "reliance on the availability of the expert").
237. Cf. Easton, supra note 22, at 699-700 (contending that attorneys should be able to
rely upon the language in rules without having to anticipate court decisions stretching the
rules beyond recognition).
238. Several reported cases contain language suggesting that Red Rover testimony is
unnecessary, because the party offering it could simply retain and pay its own expert wit-
nesses. See Koch Ref. Co. v. Jennifer L. Beaudreaux MV, 85 F.3d 1178, 1183 (5th Cir.
1996) ("[C]ourts have considered whether another expert is available and whether the op-
posing party had time to hire him before trial."); Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 891
(10th Cir. 1984); Agron, 176 F.R.D. at 453; Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11, 14
(N.D. I11. 1972); In re Vestavia Assocs., 105 B.R. 680, 682 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989).
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dure, the Rules "shall be construed and administered to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. '2 39 Requiring a
party to hire, pay, and enlighten an expert240 when that party has no disa-
greement with the expert disclosed by its opponent will waste the time
and money of both parties.241 In addition, there are circumstances when
no new expert that the party could retain will be able to reach opinions as
reliable as those already reached by the opposing party's expert because
the original expert is uniquely qualified 242 or because she had access to
evidence that is no longer available. 243
Finally, allowing a party to suppress the opinion testimony of an expert
it retained and disclosed will unfairly punish those attorneys who do a
good job of deposing experts. The deposition of an expert witness may
be the event that exposes the issues on which the expert agrees with the
opposing party.244 If the retaining attorney is allowed to prevent the in-
troduction of the expert's opinions on these issues by simply de-disclosing
the expert after the deposition, the opposing attorney will be punished 245
for exposing these issues at the deposition. 246 In a system that values the
239. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. The Federal Rules of Evidence contain a similar provision.
FED. R. EVlD. 102; see also UNIF. R. EvID. 102(c).
240. See Agron, 176 F.R.D. at 453.
241. Requiring an unnecessary expert will force unnecessary expenses not only on the
party that would otherwise not need to retain and pay an expert, but also on that party's
opponent, who will ordinarily undergo the expense of deposing the unnecessary expert.
See supra note 39, infra note 310.
242. See Moore v. Kantha, 711 A.2d 967, 972 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).
243. See Agron, 176 F.R.D. at 453 ("Although Defendant could have retained an expert
after Plaintiff withdrew Deutsch, the passage of time makes any evaluation of Plaintiff to
determine her condition at the time of the alleged discrimination inherently less reliable.
In that respect, Deutsch possesses knowledge that cannot be replicated by a new expert.");
cf. FMC Corp. v. Vendo Co., 196 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1048 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (recognizing the
possibility of instances where Red Rover experts' "studies are incapable of being
reproduced").
244. See Peterson v. Willie, 81 F.3d 1033, 1036 (11th Cir. 1996) ( "Dr. Lichtblau then
testified at the deposition that, as a result of his second examination, his opinion concern-
ing Peterson's future placement had changed.").
245. Again, the contrast with fact witnesses is striking. When an attorney conducts a
deposition of a fact witness disclosed by her opponent, she can do so with confidence that
she ordinarily will be able to present her testimony at trial, including testimony that is
favorable to the attorney conducting the deposition.
246. Perhaps an already deposed expert presents the strongest case for admission of
Red Rover testimony. Some may believe that an opposing party's fairness argument based
upon its reliance on the opportunity to use the deposition transcript at trial is stronger than
an argument based upon a perceived right to depose a previously undeposed witness or to
present an undeposed witnesses' testimony at trial. An opposing party that has secured
deposition testimony supporting that party's position on a necessary element of the case
might have the best argument of all, because prohibiting it from using that deposition testi-
mony might prevent it from making its case at trial, particularly if the de-disclosure oc-
curred during, or shortly before, trial. In addition, the introduction of a deposition at trial
presents no risk of disclosure of previously confidential information, and even live trial
testimony from a previously deposed witness often presents little such risk. See supra note
123. Therefore, some who are more concerned than I about a party's investment in a
witness, but at least somewhat persuaded by concerns for fairness to the opposing party,
might propose allowing de-disclosure up until the deposition of an expert, as some courts
have suggested. See White v. Vanderbilt Univ., 21 S.W.3d 215, 224 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)
(citing other courts that have allowed de-disclosure "prior to the witness's deposition");
2002] 1479
SMU LAW REVIEW
"speedy" and "inexpensive '2 47 resolution of civil disputes, including ap-
propriate settlement of cases that should be settled,2 48 it is rather disin-
genuous to punish an attorney for doing a good job of exposing
undisputed issues that might lead to settlement or to a proper resolution
of these issues at trial.249
Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 755 S.W.2d 170, 174 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, orig. proceed-
ing) (involving settlement by party that had previously disclosed expert) (affirming a trial
court's decision "permitt[ing] Apache and El Paso to change the designation of these wit-
nesses on the morning their depositions were scheduled"), rev'd, Tom L. Scott, Inc. v.
Mcllhany, 798 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. 1990) (allowing depositions), Axelson, Inc. v. Mcllhany,
798 S.W.2d 550, 552 n.3 (Tex. 1990) (noting that the Scott decision rendered the same day
dealt with the deposition issue).
Although prohibiting de-disclosure after a deposition would be a step in the right direc-
tion for courts that currently allow de-disclosure at any time, it does not go far enough.
There are significant problems with such an approach, including its creation of an incentive
to delay the information-gathering that occurs in a deposition. Under Rule 26(b)(4)(A),
"If a report from the expert is required under subdivision (a)(2)(B), the deposition shall
not be conducted until after the report is provided." Therefore, if a court allowed a party
to de-disclose until the expert's deposition is taken, the party could extend the time during
which it held this right by simply delaying the creation of the expert report. Even after the
expert report is produced, a party could extend its right to de-disclose by delaying the
expert's deposition. A system that values the timely exchange of information should be
leery of creating incentives to delay such exchanges. Also, allowing a party to de-disclose
up until the taking of the deposition would create an incentive for game playing, such as
de-disclosure on the eve of an expert's deposition, after the opposing attorney has invested
the time to prepare for the deposition. See Axelson, Inc., 755 S.W.2d at 174 More funda-
mentally, any system that permits de-disclosure ignores the absence of authority for de-
disclosure in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See supra notes 147, 160-61 and accom-
panying text.
The final argument is equally applicable to any other proposed deadline for de-disclo-
sure, such as the start of trial or the filing of the Rule 26(a)(3) pretrial list of anticipated
trial witnesses. In the absence of a provision in Rule 26 providing for de-disclosure, any
court that allows de-disclosure is arguably violating Rule l's requirement that the Federal
Rules govern procedural issues in federal cases and is adding uncertainty that can be
avoided by following the text of the Rules. See supra note 165. The possibility that a court
will allow de-disclosure up until a deadline not specified in the Rules has passed might lead
an opposing party to incur the otherwise unnecessary expense of retaining its own expert,
even though the other side's expert agrees with this party's position. See supra notes 238-
41 and accompanying text. After all, as long as there is the possibility that the court will
allow de-disclosure, the opposing party cannot be certain that it will be allowed to present
the testimony of the Red Rover expert.
Of course, these problems could be avoided by amending Rule 26 to provide textual
authorization for de-disclosure and to state a deadline for de-disclosure. In the absence of
such provisions, however, those who are troubled by fairness concerns claimed by the op-
posing party can find little or no support in the Rules for allowing de-disclosure up until
any deadline they propose. Without a Rule providing for it, de-disclosure should not be
allowed, and a disclosed witness should ordinarily be subject to being deposed and called
as a witness at trial. See supra part III.A.3.
247. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
248. The acquisition of information can lead to settlement. See Franks v. Nat'l Diary
Prods. Corp., 4.1 F.R.D. 234, 237 (W.D. Tex. 1966) ("[U]nless the position of each party is
known along with the basis for taking such position, no intelligent evaluation can be made
for settlement purposes."); Trans-World Invs. v. Drobny, 554 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Alaska 1976)
(informal methods of acquiring information "are to be encouraged, for they facilitate early
evaluation and settlement of cases, with a resulting decrease in litigation costs, and re-
present further the wise application of judicial resources."); Donako v. Rowe, 475 N.W.2d
30, 36 (Mich. 1991).
249. See infra Part V.A.
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C. APPREHENSION ABOUT PREJUDICE EMANATING FROM EVIDENCE
OF AN EXPERT'S INITIAL RETENTION
Although some courts do not accept the argument that admitting a Red
Rover's opinions unfairly prejudices the party who originally retained the
expert,250 even these courts generally exclude evidence about the original
retention of the expert. 251 These courts believe that evidence regarding
the original retention would be unfairly or even "explosively" prejudicial
to the party who originally retained the expert.252 Therefore, they ex-
clude this evidence under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which states that a court "may" exclude relevant evidence "if its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. ' 253
While the desire of these courts to prevent prejudice is understandable,
these decisions suffer from several flaws. First, these courts ignore and
therefore fail to distinguish the rather well-established admissibility of ev-
idence proving the relationship between a witness and one of the par-
ties,254 which is frequently referred to as "bias" evidence. Also, they
incorrectly assume that the prejudice a party would suffer from admission
of this bias evidence is unfair prejudice and incorrectly and often implic-
itly believe that this prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value
of the bias evidence. Finally, they forget or downplay the jury's need to
receive relevant evidence that will help it resolve factual disputes, includ-
ing bias evidence.
250. See supra notes 74-45, 77-80 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 87, 89-90 and accompanying text; Peterson v. Willie, 81 F.3d 1033,
1037 (11th Cir. 1996) (reviewing prior cases); White v. Vanderbilt Univ., 21 S.W.3d 215,229
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
252. See Peterson, 81 F.3d at 1037 (allegedly "'explosive"' prejudice); Ferguson v.
Michael Foods, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 408, 410 (D. Minn. 1999); House v. Combined Ins. Co. of
Am., 168 F.R.D. 236, 243 (N.D. Iowa 1996); cf. Agron v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 176
F.R.D. 445, 450-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("potentially substantial prejudice"); Gen. Motors
Corp. v. Jackson, 636 So. 2d 310, 315 (Miss. 1992) (excluding Red Rover testimony, but
stating that allowing such testimony along with evidence of expert's original retention
would have been "highly prejudicial").
253. FED. R. EVID. 403; accord UNIF. R. EVID. 403.
254. In the common circumstance of an attorney retaining the expert on behalf of the
party, see supra note 21, the direct relationship is between the expert and the attorney.
Nonetheless, a relationship between a witness and an attorney is an admissible form of
bias. See Flores v. Miami-Dade County, 787 So.2d 955, 957-59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001);
Gold, Vann & White, P.A. v. DeBerry, 639 So.2d 47, 55-56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); State
v. Solven, 371 S.W.2d 328 (Mo. 1963); Watson v. Isern, 782 S.W.2d 546, 549-50 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont, 1999, writ denied); cf. Butler v. Rigsby, No. CIV.A.96-2453, 1998 WL
164857, at *3 (E.D. La. April 7, 1998) (observing, in the context of a discovery dispute, that
"[e]vidence of a special relationship between an expert witness and legal counsel is rele-
vant to demonstrate the possible bias of the expert witness"). Furthermore, in the case of
an expert retained by an attorney on behalf of a party, the attorney's relationship with the
witness is rather closely tied to her duties on behalf of her client, so there is at least an
indirect relationship between the party and the witness.
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1. Disregarding the Admissibility of Bias Evidence
There is little doubt about why an attorney offering Red Rover testi-
mony would want to introduce evidence establishing that her opponent
originally retained the expert or, for that matter, why the attorney who
originally retained the expert would vigorously object to such evidence.
Both parties, as well as the courts that have reached this issue, recognize
that this evidence tends to establish that the expert was at least somewhat
predisposed to reach opinions that favored her original employer.2 55 In
other words, both parties recognize that evidence establishing the ties be-
tween a witness and one of the parties is evidence of bias.2 56
Bias evidence is almost always relevant and admissible. 257 While such
evidence is often introduced on cross-examination,2 58 it is not unusual for
an attorney conducting a direct examination to establish the biases of a
255. See Collins v. Wayne Corp., 621 F.2d 777, 781 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Plaintiff's counsel
thought that this [expert] testimony would not help the plaintiffs' case if it could not be
attributed to Wayne."); Lunghi v. Clark Equip. Co., 200 Cal. Rptr. 387, 388-899 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1984) ("Appellants ... contend that they 'could have made much' of [a Red Rover
expert's] testimony because he had originally been retained by respondent."); Bd. of Educ.
of S. Sanpete Sch. Dist. v. Barton, 617 P.2d 347, 350 (Utah 1980) (involving consultant)
("Ogden's appraisal was made under the direction of the party adverse to the party who
sought to adduce Ogden's testimony and thus carried a mark of objectivity that may not
have been commanded by the other experts."). Benny Agosto, Jr., Should Clinical Medical
Testimony Be Subject to Daubert Analysis?, TEX. B.J., Jan. 1999, at 30, 34 (noting "the
unfortunate fact that experts are nearly always biased toward those who pay their fees");
cf. Peterson, 81 F.3d at 1038 n.6 (noting that the attorney presenting Red Rover testimony
"purposefully elicited the fact that [the expert] had been originally retained by [opposing
counsel]"); Ferguson, 189 F.R.D. at 410 (noting the court's concern about the allegedly
"'explosive' unfair prejudice that would likely result if the jury were to discover that the
expert called by one party had originally been hired by the other"); Agron, 176 F.R.D. at
450 ("Plaintiff argues that she will suffer irreparable prejudice if Deutsch takes the stand
and reveals that he was previously retained by Plaintiff in this litigation."); House, 168
F.R.D. at 248 ("[T]he court sees a tremendous potential for prejudice to Combined simply
in the revelation to the jury that Combined originally hired, designated, then dropped Dr.
Taylor as an expert after his examination of the plaintiff once Dr. Taylor's opinions were
actually known.").
256. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984) ("Bias is a term used in the
'common law of evidence' to describe the relationship between a party and a witness which
might lead the witness to slant, unconsciously or otherwise, his testimony in favor of or
against a party. Bias may be induced by a witness' like, dislike, or fear of a party, or by the
witness's self-interest."); Butler v. Rigsby, No. 96-2453 § R (5), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4618, at *7 (E.D. La. Apr. 7, 1998) ("Evidence of a special relationship between an expert
witness and legal counsel is relevant to demonstrate the possible bias of the expert
witness ....").
257. See Abel, 469 U.S. at 52; United States v. Powell, 124 F.3d 655, 66t (5th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Landerman, 109 F.3d 1053, 1062 (5th Cir. 1997); Wealot v. Armontrout,
948 F.2d 497, 500 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Lynn, 856 F.2d 430, 432 n.3 (1st Cir.
1988); State v. Buckner, 929 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
Indeed, bias evidence is considered valuable enough that it is preferred over other evi-
dence regarding the believability of witnesses. See Abel, 469 U.S. at 52 ("The 'common law
of evidence' allowed the showing of bias by extrinsic evidence, while requiring the cross-
examiner to 'take the answer of the witness' with respect to less favored forms of impeach-
ment."); Wealot, 948 F.2d at 500 ("Potential bias is not a collateral issue."); United States v.
Fusco, 748 F.2d 996, 998 (5th Cir. 1984) ("Bias, as opposed to general veracity, is not a
collateral issue .... Evidence of past behavior that proves or disproves bias is therefore
admissible notwithstanding Rule 608(b).").
258. See, e.g., Lynn, 856 F.2d at 432 n.3.
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witness during that direct examination.2 59
In considering the admissibility of evidence regarding the retention and payment of Red
Rover experts on direct examination by the party offering Red Rover opinion testimony, it
is important to remember that it is basically beyond dispute that an attorney conducting
the cross-examination of a non-Red Rover expert is entitled to question the expert about
her relationship with the attorney who is employing and paying her and the extent of the
fees she has received and will receive. See, e.g., Butler, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4618, at *7-
8; Navarro de Cosme v. Hosp. Pivia, 922 F.2d 926, 932-33 (1st Cir. 1991); D.B. v. Ocean
Township Bd. of Educ., 985 F. Supp. 457, 479 (D.N.J. 1997); infra note 314. We allow such
questions during cross-examination of an expert for the same reason that we admit other
evidence establishing the biases of witnesses, i.e., because we believe that jurors can more
properly evaluate a witness's testimony when they are given full information about her
biases. If evidence regarding an expert's biases is admissible during cross-examination, it is
difficult to see why the very same type of evidence regarding the expert's biases-evidence
regarding the relationship between the expert and the retaining attorney-should not be
admissible during direct examination.
259. See, e.g., Powell, 124 F.3d. at 661; United States v. Hawkins, No. 93-5543, 1994 WL
486551, at *1 (4th Cir. July 26, 1994); United States v. Zoeller, No. 84-5847, 1985 WL
13444, at *5 (6th Cir. June 25, 1985); Fusco, 748 F.2d at 998.
At common law, courts often prohibited a party from presenting evidence bolstering a
witness's credibility before an opposing party attacked that witness's credibility. See
Mayor of Baltimore v. Zell, 367 A.2d 14, 27 (Md. Ct. App. 1977); JOHN H. WIGMORE, 4
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1124 (Chadbourn ed. 1972). Courts that still
apply this guideline strictly might disallow evidence of a Red Rover's retention during
direct examination.
It is not clear that this guideline is applicable under modern evidence rules and codes,
however. For example, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide:
The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of inter-
rogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interroga-
tion and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid
needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or
undue embarrassment.
FED. R. EviD. 611(a). Neither subsection (1) nor subsection (3) should lead to the exclu-
sion of evidence of the Red Rover's initial retention. As discussed elsewhere, evidence of
the initial retention is information that the jury can use in determining whether to believe
an expert. Furthermore, though many Red Rovers are reluctant witnesses, it would be an
exaggeration to suggest that evidence of their initial retention would be harassing or em-
barrassing. Therefore, the best arguable basis for prohibiting initial retention evidence
during direct examination of a Red Rover expert would be that this evidence could need-
lessly waste time.
In fact, concerns over time appear to be the basis of the common law rule prohibiting
pre-attack bolstering. H. WIGMORE, supra, at § 1124. In the event that a witness's credibil-
ity was never attacked, any evidence bolstering the witness's credibility could be consid-
ered unnecessary and irrelevant. See Mayor of Baltimore, 367 A.2d at 17; H. WIGMORE,
supra, at § 1124.
This concern is generally not applicable to expert testimony because an expert's credibil-
ity is almost always in issue when that expert testifies in a manner inconsistent with the
testimony of another expert on a critical issue. In these circumstances, the jury will be
asked to determine which of the experts is more believable. Therefore, when an expert
testifies on a hotly disputed issue, evidence regarding her credibility is relevant. See Fenlon
v. Thayer, 506 A.2d 319, 323 (N.H. 1986) ("In this case, as in all cases which depend on
expert testimony, the credibility of the experts is a paramount issue."); Cogdell v. Brown,
531 A.2d 1379, 1382 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) ("Whether an expert is a 'hired gun'
or one whose opinions have greater foundations of objectivity is an issue to be litigated by
counsel and considered by the jury."); Bd. of Educ. of S. Sanpete Sch. Dist. v. Barton, 617
P.2d 347, 350 (Utah 1980) (concluding that an expert's initial "employment bore directly
on the all-important issue of his objectivity or bias").
Perhaps as a result of the inherent relevance of issues regarding the credibility of an
expert witness, courts routinely allow parties presenting such testimony to bolster that
credibility before it is attacked by presenting the expert's testimony about her education,
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It is important to remember why our system is so adamant about the
admissibility of bias evidence. We admit evidence about a witness's rela-
tionship with one of the parties because we believe that such evidence
might help the jurors determine whether the witness's testimony is credi-
ble.260 We expect jurors to at least consider discounting any testimony
by the witness in favor of the party she favors and to give credence to
testimony by the witness that goes against that party.261 In other words,
we believe that bias evidence, like other relevant2 62 evidence, "make[s]
the existence of [a] fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evi-
dence" 263 because it might help jurors evaluate the testimony of biased
witnesses on those factual issues. Certainly it is not always true that a
biased witness's testimony is incorrectly shaded in favor of the preferred
party, so the admission of bias evidence in a particular instance could
possibly lead to an incorrect decision by the jury in a particular instance,
just as the admission of any other form of relevant evidence may on occa-
experience, knowledge, and work on the case. Mayor of Baltimore, 367 A.2d at 17-18. A
brief mention of the circumstances of the expert's initial retention, which is often a part of
this pre-attack bolstering for traditional (i.e., non-Red Rover) experts, requires little time,
but provides the jurors with a potential valuable piece of information.
As a result, some, though not all, see supra note 91, of the courts that have permitted
evidence that an expert was initially retained or consulted by the opposing party have held
or suggested that this evidence could be introduced during direct examination of the ex-
pert. Miller v. Marymount Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 2000-CA-000827-MR, 2001 WL 726798, at
*6-8 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (review granted and opinion subject to revision or withdrawal)
(Ky. June 5, 2002); Mayor of Baltimore, 367 A.2d at 16-17; Fenlon, 506 A.2d at 323;
Cogdell, 531 A.2d at 1382; Sanpete Sch. Dist., 617 P.2d at 350-51.
260. See Abel, 469 U.S. at 52 ("Proof of bias is almost always relevant because the jury,
as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has historically been entitled to assess all evi-
dence which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a witness' testimony."); Mo. At,-
PROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.01(10) (6th ed. 2002) (instructing jurors that "[i]n
considering the weight and value of the testimony of any witness, you may take into con-
sideration ... the relation of the witness to any of the parties").
261. See Abel, 469 U.S. at 51 ("A successful showing of bias on the part of a witness
would have a tendency to make the facts to which he testified less probable in the eyes of
the jury than it would be without such testimony."); Lynn, 856 F.2d at 432; Sanpete Sch.
Dist., 617 P.2d at 350 (Utah 1980) (noting, in a case involving a consultant, that "the jury
could not.., determine the appropriate weight to be afforded the testimony of" an expert
without evidence of the initial retention).
At least one of the courts that rejected evidence of a Red Rover expert's original reten-
tion apparently agrees that this type of bias evidence can cause jurors to put more faith in
the witness's testimony. See White v. Vanderbilt Univ., 21 S.W.3d 215, 229 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1999) ("[I]t could induce the jury to believe that the expert is somehow more credible than
the other experts."). While the court's assumption about the jury's possible use of expert
bias evidence is almost certainly correct, its conclusion that this evidence should not be
admitted is incorrect. The very purpose of bias evidence is to cause the jurors to put more
or less faith in the testimony of the witness that is the subject of the evidence. If the
possibility that the jurors will use bias evidence in the very manner for which it is offered
renders that evidence inadmissible, all bias evidence should be inadmissible, not just cer-
tain kinds of expert witness bias evidence.
262. Because bias evidence regarding the relationship between an expert and her origi-
nal employer is relevant, courts are wrong when they suggest or hold that this evidence is
irrelevant, see House, 168 F.R.D. at 248 (suggesting that evidence about retention of the
expert is not a "proper evidentiary issue"); White, 21 S.W.3d at 229.
263. FED. R. EvID. 401 (defining relevant evidence); accord UNIF. R. EviD. 401.
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sion lead to an incorrect decision. 264 Nonetheless, we believe that evi-
dence of bias will help the jury correctly resolve factual issues often
enough to be rather unyielding in our view that bias evidence is
admissible.265
All of these policy considerations that have led to the admissibility of
other bias evidence are equally applicable to evidence about the initial
retention of a Red Rover expert by the party who later opposes introduc-
tion of her testimony. As discussed more fully below, the fact that such
an expert has overcome the strong forces that usually lead to an expert
reaching opinions that favor her employer is a significant indicator of the
reliability of these opinions,2 66 even though there certainly will be some
cases where an expert's opinions counter to those sought by her original
employer are incorrect opinions. Evidence of an expert's biases is at least
as relevant as evidence of a fact witness's biases. 267
2. Inflating Prejudice into Unfair Prejudice
Evidence of the original retention of a Red Rover expert who has testi-
fied or will testify to opinions favoring the opposing party is prejudicial to
the party originally retaining her, because it decreases that party's
chances of convincing a jury that it is correct on issues where its original
expert agrees with the other party.2 68 Under Rule 403, however, a court
cannot exclude evidence merely because it is prejudicial. Most, if not all,
relevant evidence is presumably somewhat prejudicial, because the party
offering it would not bother doing so unless it decreased its opponent's
264. See Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Rethinking the Right to Due Process in Connection
with Pretrial Identification Procedures: An Analysis and a Proposal, 79 Ky. L.J. 259, 311
(1990-1991) (contending that "juries tend to overvalue the reliability of eyewitness testi-
mony"); cf. Gregory-Bey v. Hanks, No. IP 94-903-C H/G, 2000 WL 1909642, at * 20 (S.D.
Ind. Nov. 29, 2000) (discussing problems with witness identifications).
265. See Abel, 469 U.S. at 51-52 (1984); Wealot v. Armontrout, 948 F.2d 497, 500 (8th
Cir. 1991); Clark v. O'Leary, 852 F.2d 999, 1004 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing Abel) ("The Su-
preme Court ruled that bias is always relevant .... "); Ellis v. Capps, 500 F.2d 225, 227 (5th
Cir. 1974).
266. See infra notes 318-37 and accompanying text.
267. The Fifth Circuit's pattern jury instruction explicitly tells jurors they may consider
bias evidence in evaluating the testimony of an expert witness:
In deciding whether to accept or rely upon the opinion of an expert witness,
you may consider any bias of the witness, including any bias you may infer
from evidence that the expert witness has been or will be paid for reviewing
the case and testifying, or from evidence that he testifies regularly as an ex-
pert witness and his income from such testimony represents a significant por-
tion of his income.
5A MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: Fi~rH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
§ 3.1 (2000).
268. See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
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chances of success. 269 Instead, Rule 403270 allows the exclusion of rele-
vant evidence only when "its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice. '271 Evidence of a Red Rover expert's
initial retention does not meet this standard.
The courts that have excluded this evidence have often asserted that it
would be "explosively prejudicial" to the party who originally retained
the expert. 272 Curiously, this conclusion seems to flow not from a belief
that evidence of the initial retention has little probative value, but that it
has too much potential probative value in the eyes of the jurors, because
jurors might tend to give too much credence to the opinions of an expert
who was originally retained by the party who now opposes those
opinions.273
269. See Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d 143, 151 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v.
Gelzer, 50 F.3d 1133, 1139 (2d Cir. 1995); Davidson Oil Country Supply Co. v. Klockner,
Inc., 908 F.2d 1238, 1245 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Merely because the testimony is adverse to the
opposing party does not mean it is unfairly prejudicial. Frequently relevant testimony
hurts as the opposing party hopes.") (citations omitted); United States v. Fahey, 769 F.2d
829, 841 (1st Cir. 1985) ("This evidence may have been prejudicial in the sense that it was
damaging to the defense, but it was not unfairly prejudicial ...."); Dollar v. Long Mfg.,
N.C., Inc., 561 F.2d 613, 618 (5th Cir. 1977) ("Of course, 'unfair prejudice' as used in Rule
403 is not to be equated with testimony simply adverse to the opposing party. Virtually all
evidence is prejudicial or it isn't material. The prejudice must be 'unfair.'"); In re Davis,
246 B.R. 646, 654 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Dollar).
270. Rule 403 also permits the exclusion of relevant evidence when "its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of ... confusion of the issues, or misleading of
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence." FU. R. EvID. 403; accord UNIF. R. EVID. 403. With rare excep-
tions, such as Ferguson v. Michael Foods, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 408, 410 (D. Minn., 1999) and
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Jackson, 636 So. 2d 310, 314 (Miss. 1992) (applying a state's version
of Rule 403, which mirrored the federal rule), courts usually do not rely upon these por-
tions of Rule 403 when excluding evidence regarding the original retention of a Red Rover
expert, though some courts have suggested that there may be little to be gained by admit-
ting such evidence if it is cumulative of other expert testimony. See Peterson v. Willie, 81
F.3d 1033, 1038 n.4 (11th Cir. 1996) ("While it may generally be possible to permit a party
to call a witness without disclosing the fact of his or her prior engagement by the opposing
party, there may be little reason to require this effort if other expert witnesses are readily
available."); Agron v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 176 F.R.D. 445, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (Red
Rover testimony admissible because it was not cumulative of other expert testimony); cf.
Lunghi v. Clark Equip. Co., 200 Cal. Rptr. 387, 389 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) ("[T]he substance
of the deposition testimony was cumulative. We cannot say that its inclusion would proba-
bly have resulted in a decision more favorable to appellants.").
271. FE. R. EvtD. 403 (emphasis added); accord UNIF. R. EviD. 403; see also Robinson
v. Runyon, 149 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir. 1998) ("Federal Rule of Evidence 403 prohibits the
admission of evidence if there is a danger of unfair prejudice, not mere prejudice."); Perry,
115 F.3d at 151; United States v. Morales, 815 F.2d 725, 740 (1st Cir. 1987) ("The question
is one of 'unfair' prejudice-not of prejudice alone."); Fahey, 769 F.2d at 841; Dollar, 561
F.2d at 618; Lanni v. New Jersey, 177 F.R.D. 295, 302 (D.N.J. 1998) ("For testimony to be
excluded, it must be prejudicial as well as unfair.").
272. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
273. In similar contexts, courts have thwarted efforts by parties to keep evidence from
the jury on the basis that it was inflammatory. See Robinson, 149 F.3d at 515 ("[T]he[defendant] seems to argue that the evidence is unfairly prejudicial simply because it is
racially inflammatory. Such an argument is clearly insufficient to exclude evidence under
Rule 403."); Gelzer, 50 F.3d at 1140 (2d Cir. 1995) (rejecting defendant's request for exclu-
sion of evidence because of "its highly inflammatory and prejudicial nature"); Trevino v.
Texas Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 893 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995,
orig. proceeding) ("It is true that the confession and the facts surrounding the death of
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There are several problems with this analysis. First, the same reasoning
could apply to almost any bias evidence establishing a relationship be-
tween a witness and a party, and the courts have routinely allowed this
evidence because it has significant probative value,2 74 even though all
such evidence might have some danger of unfair prejudice. 275 Second, if
a particular piece of evidence has considerable, as opposed to minimal,
probative value, it should generally be admitted under Rule 403 because
evidence with considerable probative value is less likely to be "substan-
tially outweighed ' '276 by the danger of unfair prejudice. 277 Finally, re-
Leon constitute evidence that is inherently inflammatory and prejudicial; however, Texas
Rule of Civil Evidence 403 requires that relevant evidence must be substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to be excluded.").
274. The authors of Rule 403 and the courts applying it have noted that the type of
unfair prejudice that it is designed to prevent generally consists of the potential use by the
jury of a particular piece of evidence to influence its determination on an issue other than
the issue on which the evidence is probative and, therefore, properly considered by the
jury. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note (1972) ('Unfair prejudice' within its
context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly,
though not necessarily, an emotional one."); Robinson, 149 F.3d at 515 (stating that unfair
prejudice involves evidence that could lead to a decision on an improper basis); Perry, 115
F.3d at 151 (similar); Gelzer, 50 F.3d at 1139 (explaining that "[t]he prejudice that Rule 403
is concerned with" concerns a detrimental influence beyond proof of the proposition that
validates the evidence's admission); Fahey, 769 F.2d at 841 (remarking that Rule 403 exclu-
sion is proper only when controversial evidence would lead to irrational behavior by ju-
rors); Lanni, 177 F.R.D. at 302 (quoting Advisory Committee notes). In the typical Red
Rover case, this is not a concern, because the jury would be expected to use the evidence
of the Red Rover's initial retention for the exact purpose on which it is probative, i.e., to
lend a certain amount (to be determined by the jury) of believability to the expert's opin-
ions that are contrary to the ones desired by her original employer.
In a similar context, the Supreme Court approved the use of evidence regarding the
relationship between a witness and a party who were members of the same criminal group:
[T]he type of organization in which a witness and a party share membership
may be relevant to show bias. If the organization is a loosely knit group
having nothing to do with the subject matter of the litigation, the inference of
bias arising from common membership may be small or nonexistent. If the
prosecutor had elicited that both [the defendant] and [witness] Mills be-
longed to the Book of the Month Club, the jury probably would not have
inferred bias even if the District Court had admitted the testimony. The at-
tributes of the Aryan Brotherhood-a secret prison sect sworn to perjury
and self-protection-bore directly not only on the fact of bias but also on the
source and strength of Mills' bias. The tenets of this group showed that Mills
had a powerful motive to slant his testimony towards respondent, or even
commit perjury outright.
United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984). In a similar manner, evidence of the initial
retention of the Red Rover expert establishes the point for which this evidence is offered,
i.e., the possibility that the expert was biased toward reaching an opinion favorable to her
employer. In other words, the probative value of the evidence of the relationship between
the expert and her initial employer stems from the very inference that the original em-
ployer suggests is prejudicial-the witness's "powerful motive to slant [her] testimony to-
wards" her original employer. Id. As the Advisory Committee, the Supreme Court, and
other courts have emphasized, this is not the type of prejudice that Rule 403 prevents.
275. See supra notes 261-67 and accompanying text.
276. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (emphasis added); accord UNIF. R. EvID. 403; see also
Perry, 115 F.3d at 151 ("As the terms of the Rule indicate, for relevant evidence to be
excluded on this basis, the imbalance must be substantial, and the prejudice must be un-
fair."); Fahey, 769 F.2d at 841 (similar).
277. In a recent decision based upon one state's version of Rule 403, the court stressed:
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jecting this evidence may be more unfair to the party offering the Red
Rover testimony than admitting it would be to the party that originally
retained the expert. Without the evidence of the initial retention, the ex-
pert's opinions are often cumulative of the testimony of other experts2 78
retained by the party who is offering the Red Rover testimony. 279 In
other words, the primary28 0 purpose of introducing the Red Rover testi-
mony may be to establish not the opinions themselves, because these
opinions can be offered by other experts, but to establish that an expert
During the first phase of the analysis, the court must determine whether the
countervailing factors in Tenn. R. Evid. 403 "substantially outweigh" the pro-
bative value of the evidence. The trial court has no discretion to exclude
evidence under Tenn. R. Evid. 403 unless it concludes that the probative
worth of the evidence is substantially outweighed by one or more of the
countervailing factors. Thus, a trial court should not exclude evidence under
Tenn. R. Evid. 403 when the balance between the probative worth of the
evidence and the countervailing factors is fairly debatable.
White v. Vanderbilt Univ., 21 S.W.3d 215, 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
278. At least in some cases, an attorney who seeks the admission of Red Rover testi-
mony has more confidence in the credentials, analysis, and persuasiveness of her own ex-
pert, because she chose that expert. In such cases, the attorney's primary goal in
presenting Red Rover testimony is not presenting an opinion from an expert, because the
attorney's own expert can accomplish this without help from the Red Rover expert.
Of course, there are also cases where the attorney believes that the Red Rover expert is,
for some reason, a more persuasive witness than the expert she retained. See White, 21
S.W.2d at 221 n.6 (noting that the Red Rover doctor was preeminent in the field at issue in
the case); House v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 168 F.R.D. 236, 243 n.5 (N.D. Iowa 1996)
("House's own expert is a social worker, not a psychiatrist"), discussed in Lehan v. Ambas-
sador Programs, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 670, 673-74 (E.D. Wash. 2000). In other cases, there are
different primary reasons for calling the expert. See Lehan, 190 F.R.D. at 671, 673 (noting,
but discrediting, attorney's claim that he sought to introduce one doctor's testimony to
thereby introduce other doctors' medical records allegedly relied upon by the first doctor).
Even in these cases, however, admission of evidence about the original retention of the
expert could enhance her credibility in the eyes of the jurors. See supra notes 261-67 and
accompanying text.
279. See Peterson, 81 F.3d at 1037 (documenting original retaining party's argument
that Red Rover testimony was cumulative of testimony by other experts and therefore
inadmissible); Collins v. Wayne Corp., 621 F.2d 777, 781 (5th Cir. 1980); Campbell Indus. v.
M/V Gemini, 619 F.2d 24, 27 (9th Cir. 1980) (affirming exclusion of Red Rover testimony
where party presented testimony from its own expert "on precisely the issues that [the Red
Rover expert] would have covered"); Callaway Golf Co. v. Dunlop Slazenger Group Ams.,
Inc., No. CIV.A.01-669 (MPT), 2002 WL 1906628, at *4 (D. Del. Aug. 14, 2002) (predicting
exclusion of Red Rover testimony "if cumulative, especially of evidence provided by [the
adverse party's] experts"); Lunghi, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 389; cf. Mantolete v. Bolger, 96 F.R.D.
179, 182 (D. Ariz. 1982) (prohibiting plaintiff from deposing defendant's de-disclosed ex-
pert in pre-1993 case, because the plaintiff "has retained her own rehabilitation engineer");
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Jackson, 636 So. 2d 310, 314 (Miss. 1992) (holding that Red Rover
testimony was inadmissible under a state's evidence rules because it was cumulative of the
testimony presented by witnesses retained by the party offering the Red Rover testimony).
280. Of course, there can be related reasons for offering Red Rover testimony in some
cases, but sometimes these reasons also will go unfulfilled if evidence of the Red Rover's
initial retention is not admitted. See Colins, 621 F.2d at 781 ("Second, plaintiffs' counsel
wanted to use [defendant's de-disclosed expert] Greene's deposition as an admission be-
cause Greene acknowledged that Derwyn Severy, the plaintiff' expert, was perhaps the
foremost authority in the country in the field of bus design. Plaintiff's counsel thought that
this testimony would not help the plaintiff's case if it could not be attributed to [the
defendant].").
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hired by the opposing party has reached these opinions.28t Depriving the
party offering the Red Rover evidence of the probative value of evidence
of the initial retention may deprive that party of the real value of intro-
ducing the testimony. 282
Given all of these considerations, while evidence of a Red Rover ex-
pert's initial retention is "prejudicial," it is not "unfairly prejudicial" to a
degree that permits its routine exclusion. As many have noted, courts
should be leery of using Rule 403 to exclude relevant evidence because
such decisions by definition deprive jurors of relevant evidence. 283 Evi-
dence of Red Rover retention is not an appropriate place for the exercise
of Rule 403 discretion to exclude relevant evidence.284
281. See Peterson, 81 F.3d at 1037; Collins, 621 F.2d at 781 (after court ruled that Red
Rover opinions were admissible, but evidence about the initial retention of the Red Rover
expert was not, the party offering the opinions "decided not to offer [the expert's] deposi-
tion into evidence"); In re Vestavia Assocs., 105 B.R. 680, 681 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989)
("[T]he Debtor intended Centrust to be hoisted on its own petard."); Bd. of Educ. of S.
Sanpete Sch. Dist. v. Barton, 617 P.2d 347, 351 (Utah 1980) (involving consultant) ("Hav-
ing been denied the right to examine the witness properly and to adduce evidence of em-
ployment, the defendant cannot be faulted for not having called the witness to testify solely
to the amount of his appraisal.").
282. Some might argue that offering the testimony of a Red Rover expert primarily to
establish that the expert agrees with the opinions offered by an expert who was initially
retained by the party offering both experts' testimony is cumulative. Rule 403 does allow
courts to exclude evidence when "its probative value is substantially outweighed by...
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence." FED. R. EvID. 403. There may be limited cases where admitting testimony from
two experts would be cumulative, particularly when the party that initially retained the
Red Rover expert is not contesting the issues on which the two expert's opine. However, if
the party that initially retained the Red Rover expert has or will present a differing opinion
from a new expert, see infra notes 343-44, it is difficult to see how the Red Rover expert's
testimony would constitute a "needless presentation of cumulative evidence." The fact
that an expert initially retained by the opposing party reached the same opinion as the
expert retained by the party now offering the Red Rover testimony is a significant factor
that the jury may use to resolve a disputed issue. See infra notes 358-60 and accompanying
text. If such an occurrence did not have substantial probative value, it is unlikely that
parties or courts would argue that evidence of this occurrence was explosive. See supra
notes 97, 252, 255 and accompanying text.
283. See United States v. Rodriguez, 192 F.3d 946, 949 (10th Cir. 1999) ("Rule 403 is an
extraordinary remedy and should be used sparingly."); Westcott v. Crinklaw, 68 F.3d 1073,
1077-78 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Fahey, 769 F.2d 829, 841 (1st Cir. 1985) ("the
standard [for excluding evidence under Rule 403] is a high one"); In re Davis, 246 B.R. 646,
654 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2000); cf. Trevino v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs.,
893 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, orig. proceeding) (similar reasoning under Texas
equivalent of Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence); White, 21 S.W.2d at 227 (empha-
sizing that Tennessee Rule 403 balancing "begins by recognizing that the rules of evidence
favor the admissibility of relevant evidence," that "relevant evidence is admissible unless
otherwise provided," that "excluding relevant evidence under Tenn. R. Evid. 403 is an
extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly," and that "persons seeking to exclude
otherwise admissible and relevant evidence have a significant burden of persuasion").
284. Because exclusion is an extreme remedy reserved for drastically unfairly prejudi-
cial proof, the courts have noted that the better course, in many cases, is to admit contro-
versial evidence and then to allow the opposing party to lessen its potential impact, if
possible, by conducting a vigorous cross-examination, offering contrary evidence, and re-
questing appropriate jury instructions. See Abel, 469 U.S. at 54 (approving of the district
court's offer of a limiting instruction); Robinson v. Runyon, 149 F.3d 507, 515 (6th Cir.
1998); United States v. Gelzer, 50 F.3d 1133, 1139-40 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming a district
court decision to admit controversial evidence and instruct the jury about the proper use of
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3. Depriving Jurors of Valuable Evidence
It is not the party offering Red Rover testimony that who suffers the
most from exclusion of evidence regarding the expert's original retention.
Instead, the jurors suffer from the exclusion of relevant information that
could help them make difficult factual determinations about disputed
issues.
Consider the state of the evidence available to jurors if a court admits
Red Rover testimony, but excludes testimony establishing that the other
party originally retained the expert. The jurors have now seen an attor-
ney introduce an expert's opinions, but have heard nothing about who
retained that expert. In the absence of this evidence, they might rather
reasonably, but incorrectly, conclude that the attorney who offered the
expert's testimony originally retained this expert.
Surprisingly, several courts have suggested that such an incorrect con-
clusion is desirable because it lessens the impact of the Red Rover testi-
mony and therefore reduces the prejudice that the originally retaining
party would otherwise experience.2 85 Similarly, other courts have ex-
pressed the fear that jurors might correctly conclude that the initially re-
taining party was indeed the initially retaining party286 and correctly
surmise that the initially retaining attorney was hoping to hide the ex-
pert's opinion from the jury. 287 In a system that is designed to be a search
for the truth, it is rather remarkable, and quite discomforting, for a court
this evidence). When evidence regarding a Red Rover's retention is admitted, some or all
of these steps may be entirely appropriate. See supra note 183, infra notes 287, 313-14 and
accompanying text.
285. See Agron v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 176 F.R.D. 445, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("In the
absence of any reference to who retained Deutsch, the jury is more likely to [incorrectly]
conclude that Defendant, rather than Plaintiff, retained the expert that it called to testify at
trial."); House v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 168 F.R.D. 236, 248 (N.D. Iowa 1996)
("House's own emotional distress expert, Ms. Burrows, is a 'treating' professional, and thejury is likely to [incorrectly] assume unless told otherwise, on the basis of Dr. Taylor's
examination of House, that he too became involved in this case to treat or evaluate
House.").
286. See Ferguson v. Michael Foods, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 408, 410 (D. Minn. 1999) ("[E]ven
if the court were to order plaintiff not to mention who hired [the expert] originally, there is
a substantial risk that the jury would be able to figure out how the expert became involved
in the case."); Dayton-Phoenix Group, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. CIV.A.C.-3-95-480,
1997 WL 1764760, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 19, 1997) ("[T]here is a significant risk of unfair
prejudice to the Defendant in any trial testimony of Walters, to wit: The danger that the
jury might learn that it initially retained him.").
287. Courts sometimes express concern that introduction of evidence about the Red
Rover's original retention will prejudice the originally retaining attorney's client because
the jury might conclude that the attorney was not bringing forth evidence she was required
to provide. See Peterson, 81 F.3d at 1037; Ferguson, 189 F.R.D. at 410; House, 168 F.R.D.
at 243 (citing Peterson); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Jackson, 636 So. 2d 310, 315 (Miss. 1992);
White, 21 S.W.3d at 228-29. While it would be incorrect for jurors to conclude that a party
retaining an expert was required to introduce her conclusions at trial, a court could remedy
this misconception with a jury instruction advising the jurors that no such obligation exists.
Because an instruction would be sufficient to cure this problem, the courts should not let it
prevent admission of Red Rover bias evidence. See FED. R. EviD. 403 advisory commit-
tee's note (1972) ("In reaching a decision whether to exclude on grounds of unfair
prejudice, consideration should be given to the probable effectiveness or lack of effective-
ness of a limiting instruction."); supra note 284.
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to suggest that it hopes that the finder of fact will reach incorrect factual
findings or that it fears that the finder of fact will reach correct factual
findings. Instead, the court should seek to admit evidence that will lead
to correct factual findings.288 As the courts that have excluded evidence
of the initial retention of the expert have acknowledged, Red Rover bias
evidence is the type of evidence that can lead to correct factual findings
because exclusion of this evidence may lead the jurors to incorrect
conclusions.289
The inherent value of this evidence is also established by the musings
of some courts about its potential admissibility on redirect examination.
Two of the courts that have held that a party offering Red Rover opinion
testimony cannot establish the initial retention of the expert by opposing
counsel during direct examination have suggested that this evidence may
be admissible on redirect examination, if the cross-examination by the
attorney who originally retained the expert questions the expert's qualifi-
One suspects that these courts instead may have been concerned, as some courts admit-
tedly were, that jurors would conclude not that attorneys must bring forth the opinions of
experts they retained, but that a failure to do so suggests that the attorneys would prefer
that the jurors not hear from these experts. See Peterson, 81 F.3d at 1037 ("agree[ing]"
with the original retaining party's contention that evidence of the original retention "gave
the jury the . . . inference . . . that something was being hidden from them by [original
retaining party's] counsel"); Agron, 176 F.R.D. at 451 ("If the fact of the prior retention is
revealed, jurors may assume that Plaintiff's counsel tried to suppress or hide evidence
which it considered unfavorable."); In re Vestavia Assocs., 105 B.R. 680, 682 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1989) ("A jury might think evidence is being hidden .... "). That conclusion, unlike
the somewhat different one outlined in the previous paragraph, is correct. Cf. White, 21
S.W.3d at 224 n.9 (noting that some courts have concluded that parties attempting to de-
disclose "are undertaking to suppress evidence"). Indeed, it is precisely the type of conclu-
sion that juries are given the right to make under some standard jury instructions. See, e.g.,
JOHN M. DINSE ET AL., CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: BOOK OF APPROVED JURY IN-
STRUCrIONS §§ 2.12, 2.03 (8th ed. 2000); VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUcTIONS § 2.080 (1998)
("If you believe that a party, without explanation, failed to call an available witness who
has knowledge of necessary and material facts, you may presume that witness's testimony
would have been unfavorable to the party who failed to call the witness."); Taylor v. Kohli,
625 N.E.2d 64, 68 (11. Ct. App. 1993), affd, 642 N.E.2d 467 (I11. 1994) (reversing trial
court's giving of standard jury instruction in the case at hand, without holding that this
instruction was per se invalid) ("The plaintiff has failed to produce an expert witness Dr. L.
Andrew Koman, who is within the plaintiff's power to produce; you may infer that the
testimony of Dr. Koman would be adverse to the plaintiff."); see also Williamson v. Super.
Ct., 582 P.2d 126, 130 n.2 (Cal. 1978) (quoting Breland v. Traylor Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 126
P.2d 455, 461 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942)) ("'A defendant is not under a duty to produce testi-
mony adverse to himself, but if he fails to produce evidence that would naturally have been
produced he must take the risk that the trier of fact will infer, and properly so, that the
evidence, had it been produced, would have been adverse."). If such conclusions are al-
lowed for other types of evidence, it is difficult to see why a court would exclude bias
evidence to prevent such conclusions with regard to expert testimony.
288. See Miller v. Marymount Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 2000-CA-000827-MR, 2001 WL
726798, at *8 (Ky. Ct. App. June 29, 2001) (review granted and opinion subject to revision
or withdrawal) (Ky. June 5, 2002) (admitting evidence of Red Rover's initial retention
because "we are persuaded by the simple, almost universally-venerated principle that 'a
trial is essentially a search for the truth"') (quoting Cogdell v. Brown, 531 A.2d 1379, 1381
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987)). Because the Kentucky Supreme Court has granted re-
view of the Kentucky Court of Appeals' decision in Miller, this decision might be reversed,
if the Kentucky Supreme Court fails to recognize the importance of Red Rover and bias
evidence.
289. See supra note 285.
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cations.2 90 Presumably these courts believe that such evidence is relevant
during redirect examination because it establishes that the expert is a reli-
able source of information for the jurors. If this is the case, and it no
doubt is, such evidence is also relevant during direct examination to es-
tablish the very same thing.291
Jurors who face the daunting task of resolving disputed issues of fact
deserve all relevant, reasonable evidence that can help them make these
determinations. Because evidence of the relationship between an expert
and the party who initially retained her, like other bias evidence, can as-
sist the jurors in making these difficult determinations, courts should ad-
mit it.
IV. PROPOSAL: ADMISSION OF RED ROVER TESTIMONY
AND EVIDENCE OF INITIAL RETENTION
Both Red Rover opinion testimony and proof of the original retention
of the expert constitute relevant and potentially valuable evidence.
Therefore, courts should remove the barriers that exclude this evidence
and facilitate its introduction at trial.2 92
Amendment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not necessary
because proper implementation of the current Rules will lead to these
results. 293 Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of
290. See Peterson, 81 F.3d at 1038 n.5; Granger v. Wisner, 656 P.2d 1238, 1243 & n.2
(Ariz. 1982). But see Agron, 176 F.R.D. at 451 (refusing to allow inquiry into Red Rover's
original retention on redirect examination).
291. Though initial retention evidence is relevant, some courts might not allow it during
direct examination. See supra note 259.
292. Courts should enforce all requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence that con-
trol the admission of all evidence, such as relevance and hearsay restrictions. See White, 21
S.W.2d at 226 ("[W]e must decide whether the portions of Dr. Kostuik's testimony that the
Whites' [sic] desired to use were relevant."). Relevance will not ordinarily be a problem,
because both Red Rover opinions, see Lunghi, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 389; White, 21 S.W.3d at
227, and evidence about the relationship between the expert and her original employer, see
supra Part III.C.1, are probative. When the expert's testimony is presented live or through
a valid offer of a deposition, see supra note 64, hearsay restrictions often will not prevent
admission of the testimony. See Collins v. Wayne Corp., 621 F.2d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir.
1980). In some circumstances, even an offer of the expert witness's report may suffice,
because it may constitute an admission by a party opponent under Rule 801(d)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence or similar state evidence law provisions. Some, but not all,
courts have held that an expert's statements are admissible as non-hearsay admissions by a
party, because an expert is an agent of the party that retained her. Id. at 782 ("In this case,
Greene was [defendant] Wayne's agent as Wayne employed Greene to investigate and
analyze the bus accident. Greene's report on his investigation and his deposition testimony
in which he explained his analysis and investigation was an admission of Wayne."); Onti,
Inc. v. Integra Bank, No. CIV.A.14514, 1.998 WL 671263, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 1998).
But see Kirk v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 61 F.3d 147, 163-64 (3d Cir. 1995) (excluding testi-
mony from a previous trial by an expert retained by the party in that case, because the
expert witness was not controlled by the party and was therefore not the party's agent); In
re Hidden Lake Ltd. P'ship, 247 B.R. 722, 724 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2000) (following Kirk in
rejecting deposition testimony of an expert witness taken in the same case); Taylor, 642
N.E.2d at 468-69 (similar reasoning and result, under state law).
293. To prevent potential unfairness to parties responding to claims made by other par-
ties, courts adopting disclosure and discovery schedules should heed the Advisory Commit-
tee's admonition that "in most cases the party with the burden of proof on an issue should
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Civil Procedure, courts should require reports294 from, and allow deposi-
tions295of, all disclosed experts.296 Because there is no provision in Rule
26 allowing de-disclosure of expert witnesses,297 courts should make it
clear that a party's de-disclosure will have no effect. 298
In the same vein, courts should admit Red Rover opinions at trial when
offered via deposition,299 live testimony, or other 300 acceptable means. 30 1
An attorney who desires to present Red Rover testimony live should be
allowed, but not required,30 2 to use a subpoena to secure the expert's
presence at trial.303 To facilitate voluntary trial testimony, an attorney
disclose its expert testimony on that issue before other parties are required to make their
disclosures with respect to that issue." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2) advisory committee's note
(1993). As the Advisory Committee noted, "[b]road, vague, and conclusory allegations
[are] sometimes tolerated in notice pleading-for example, the assertion that a product
with many component parts is defective in some unspecified manner .. " FED. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(1) advisory committee's note (1993). A party responding to such a claim should not
be required to disclose its possible expert witnesses until the party pursuing the claim has
first disclosed its experts, because a deadline in advance of the pursuing party's expert
witness disclosure deadline could force a responding party to decide whether to convert a
consulting expert into a possible trial witness (and therefore a possible Red Rover expert)
before that party is reasonably aware of the allegations against it.
294. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
295. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(b)(4)(A); supra note 39. Courts should also allow oppos-
ing parties to use other discovery devices to secure information about disclosed expert
witnesses. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(5); supra note 40 and accompanying text.
296. Cf. House v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 168 F.R.D. 236, 248 (N.D. Iowa 1996)
("Because the court concludes that House is entitled to call Dr. Taylor as a witness at
trial ..., the court will allow the pretrial deposition of Dr. Taylor by House ... .
297. See supra notes 147, 160-61 and accompanying text.
298. A state court suggested that de-disclosure must have effect, because "[o]therwise,
a party could never redesignate an expert witness who was or became adverse to the
party's position." Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 755 S.W.2d 170, 176 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1988, orig. proceeding). That statement rather precisely outlines the current version of
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, correctly interpreted. Based upon a later
decision of the Texas Supreme Court, it appears that this statement also outlines Texas law,
at least under the circumstances presented in Axelson. See Tom L. Scott, Inc. v. McIlhany,
798 S.W.2d 556, 557 (Tex. 1990) (allowing depositions of an expert that had been desig-
nated as a testifying expert and later "redesignat[ed]" as a "consultant-only" expert after a
partial settlement); Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 552 n.3 (Tex. 1990) (noting
that the Scott decision rendered the same day dealt with issues regarding discovery of
redesignated experts).
299. Of course, courts should demand compliance with all requirements for the use of
deposition testimony at trial, unless these requirements are waived. See FED. R. Civ. P. 32;
supra note 64.
300. In some circumstances, some courts might admit the report of a Red Rover expert.
See supra note 292.
301. Absent unusual circumstances, see infra note 312, Rule 403 balancing should not
be undertaken by courts faced with offers of Red Rover opinion testimony. Concerns
about previously confidential information shared with experts should not thwart admission
of this testimony. See supra Part III.A.
302. Courts have suggested that experts can voluntarily testify at trial for a party other
than the one who initially retained them. Cf. Kirk v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 61 F.3d 147,165
(3d Cir. 1995) (when a party wished to call an expert retained by the party's opponent in a
previous case, the party may be required to contact the expert and "request his attendance
at trial"); Taylor v. Kohli, 642 N.E.2d 467, 469 (I1. 1994) (stating that, under Illinois law,
once a party abandoned a witness, the party no longer controlled that witness); Cogdell v.
Brown, 531 A.2d 1379, 1382 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (noting that an expert initially
consulted by a defendant voluntarily testified for the plaintiff).
303. See supra note 66.
2002] 1493
SMU LAW REVIEW
also should be allowed 304 to contact the expert directly, 30 5 unless 30 6 the
expert is represented by her opponent 30 7 or other counsel in the mat-
ter.30 8 If the expert is not willing to form additional opinions or do addi-
304. An attorney's contact with an expert originally retained by her opponent will, of
course, not always lead to voluntary testimony or even to any discussion between the attor-
ney and the expert, because contractual obligations to the initially retaining attorney or
party, agency law, or the standards of the expert's profession may prevent such a discus-
sion, or the expert might simply chose not to assist the attorney voluntarily. See Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp., 734 F. Supp. 334, 339 (N.D. I11. 1990)
(discussing confidential duties of experts); Johnston v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 356 F. Supp. 904,
910 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (noting that "any witness has the right to refuse to be interviewed if
he so desires"); LUBET, supra note 46, at 177; Easton, supra note 22, at 741, n.352; Lubet,
supra note 42, at 471-74; cf. Kaveney v. Murphy, 97 F. Supp. 2d 88, 89-90 (D. Mass. 2000)
(requiring attorney conducting ex parte interviews to remind witnesses that they have the
right to refuse to participate). Under the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility as
currently constituted and construed, the attorney retaining the expert may even ask the
expert not to participate in ex parte communications, as long as the expert is an agent of
the attorney's client. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY R. 3.4(f) (2002); Eas-
ton, supra note 22, at 724-25, 738-40. The attorney could also ask such an expert not to
discuss any previously confidential materials with the opposing attorney, but could not ask
the expert to destroy these materials. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Zotos Int'l, Inc., No. 98-
CV-838S(F), 2000 WL 1843258, at *8-12 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2000) (holding that retaining
attorney's instructions to expert to destroy drafts of the expert's report were improper,
despite attorney's claim that work product doctrine protected drafts and conversations be-
tween attorney and expert regarding changes in report); Easton, supra note 22, at 725-26 &
n. 285.
305. See Phila. Bar Assn. Prof. Guidance Comm., Guidance Op. 94-22, at *1 (1995)
(concluding that the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct do not preclude ex parte
contact with opposing expert); cf. Kirk, 61 F.3d at 165 (suggesting, in a case where a party
wished to present the testimony of an expert retained by the party's opponent in a previous
case, that the attorney for that party had an obligation to make an "independent attempt to
contact" the expert).
In a previous article, I argued that attorneys are and should be allowed to engage in ex
parte communications with retained experts who have been disclosed by their opponents
as possible trial witnesses. See generally Easton, supra note 22. As discussed at length in
that article, despite some decisions by courts and opinions by other ethics authorities to the
contrary, id. at 680-82; see also Tidemann v. Nadler Golf Car Sales, Inc., 224 F.3d 719, 724
(7th Cir. 2000); Sewell v. Maryland Dep't of Transp., 206 F.R.D. 311 (D. Md. 2002), no
provision of either the Model Rules of Professional Conduct or the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure prohibits an attorney from contacting an expert retained by her opponent with-
out notifying that opponent. Easton, supra note 22, at 676-704. Although that article's
discussion focused upon efforts by an attorney to gather information about the expert that
would help the attorney effectively cross-examine the expert, id. at 674-76, it is equally
applicable to experts who have reached or may reach opinions helpful to the contacting
attorney. In either instance, the attorney making the ex parte contact is attempting to
gather information that will advance her case, and therefore harm the opponent's case, at
trial. In either case, there is no provision of law that prohibits ex parte contact, id. at 676-
704, except in the states of Idaho, id. at 698-700, and Texas, see Cramer v. Sabine Transp.
Co., t41 F. Supp. 727, 730 n.5 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
306. In making ex parte contact with an expert, an attorney must avoid improper con-
duct, including hiding the attorney's role, making false statements, implying that the expert
must participate in ex parte communications, harassing the expert, and falsifying evidence.
Easton, supra note 22, at 735-36.
307. Unless the expert is herself a party or is an employee or, in the view of some ethics
authorities, a former employee of a party, see Easton, supra note 22, at 678, n.116, she will
not ordinarily be represented by the contacting attorney's opponent. See Lubet, supra
note 42, at 485 ("Retaining counsel is not the [expert] witness's lawyer .... Since the
expert is not a party to the case, the expert is not represented by either of the attorneys.")
308. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT R. 4.2 (1999) (prohibiting ex parte con-
tact with persons who are represented by counsel in the matter at hand); RESTATEMENT
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tional work on the case, neither the court nor the opposing party can
force her to do so, though the expect may be forced via subpoena to at-
tend the trial and testify about factual observations and opinions she has
already formed.309 In addition, neither the court nor the initially oppos-
ing party can require the expert to do additional work without additional
compensation. Therefore, if acquiring or presenting Red Rover opinions
will require the expert to spend additional time on the matter, the party
calling the expert should be permitted and required to pay reasonable
fees to the expert.310
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 99(1) (2000) ("A lawyer representing a cli-
ent in a matter may not communicate about the subject of the representation with a non-
client whom the lawyer knows to be represented in the matter by another lawyer or with a
representative of an organizational nonclient so represented as defined in § 100 .... ");
Easton, supra note 22, at 676, n.110 (citing the Model Code predecessor to Model Rule 4.2
and the state professional responsibility rules based upon Model Rule 4.2 or its Model
Code predecessor).
309. Several courts have held that an expert who is unwilling to form new opinions
cannot be forced to do so, even with a subpoena, but a subpoena can be used to require an
expert to testify about factual observations and opinions she has already formed. See supra
note 66.
310. Under Rule 26, a party seeking discovery from an expert is required to pay the
expert a reasonable fee for time spent responding to discovery, absent manifest injustice.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C). Therefore, if a party has not yet deposed an expert, it
should expect to pay expert witness fees for the deposition. Cf. Quarantillo v. Consol. Rail
Corp., 106 F.R.D. 435, 437 (W.D.N.Y. 1985) (approving of defendant's offer to pay plain-
tiff's expert witness "a reasonable fee for the time he spends during the deposition"). If a
party will call the expert as a live witness at trial, it cannot expect the other party to con-
tinue to pay the expert's fees. House v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 168 F.R.D. 236, 249
(N.D. Iowa 1996).("[I]n the interest of fairness, if House calls Dr. Taylor, House will be
required to pay his expert witness fee."); cf. Kirk, 61 F.3d at 165 (where a party wished to
call an expert retained by his opponent in another case, the party wishing to call the wit-
ness should "offer him his usual expert witness fee").
Some courts have indicated rather grave concern about the possibility that an expert
might receive fees from a party other than the one who originally retained her. Even when
an attorney did not pay any fees to an expert retained by the opposing party, but did
suggest the possibility of retaining him to do an inspection in an unrelated matter, the
Ninth Circuit stated:
In layman's terms, [the pro se plaintiff] labeled the employment offer [by
defense counsel] to Dr. Grimm as a bribe. This may not be a fair characteri-
zation. However, attorneys must use their common sense to avoid conduct
which could appear to be an improper attempt to influence a witness who is
about to testify. We will never know Combs' actual motivation in making an
offer of employment to Dr. Grimm. Regardless of Combs' motive, at a mini-
mum, the offer of employment put Dr. Grimm in the position of having di-
vided loyalties. Quite simply, this court chooses to abide by the ageless
wisdom that a person cannot serve two masters.
Erickson v. Newmar Corp., 87 F.3d 298, 303 (9th Cir. 1996); see also County of L.A. v.
Super. Ct., 271 Cal. Rptr. 698, 705 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
These concerns seem rather inconsistent with viewing the trial as a search for truth. If
the Ninth Circuit is correct, even the possibility of payment of fees to an expert, and cer-
tainly the actual payment of fees, might reduce the expert's bias in favor of the party who
initially retained her. Although the suggestion that payments affect biases is certainly cor-
rect, this concern is at least equally applicable to the payment of fees by the party who
initially retained the expert. See supra notes 255-67 and accompanying text. A court sys-
tem that is concerned about the possible effect of bias on a witness's testimony, see supra
notes 255-67 and accompanying text, should be pleased by the negation of this initial bias
through the payment of fees by the other party. Only a system that has more concern for
the protection of a party's investment in an expert witness than in the potential truth-
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The party offering Red Rover testimony should be allowed to intro-
duce evidence establishing that the other party originally retained her.
As a general rule, courts should not entertain arguments that typical evi-
dence of the relationship between the expert and the party who initially
retained her should be excluded under Rule 403. 3 1 However, a court
faced with unusual circumstances may have to consider whether to ex-
clude this evidence or the opinion testimony itself.3t 2 Of course, the orig-
inally retaining party should be allowed to attack this testimony with all
traditional means used to discredit experts,3t 3 including introduction of
bias evidence about the relationship between her opponent and the ex-
pert and any fees paid by her opponent to the expert. 314
enabling effects of countering this investment could suggest that the payment of witness
fees by the initially opposing party constitutes "witness tampering." Erickson, 87 F.3d at
303. If the system seeks the truth, it should tolerate some risk to a party's investment in a
particular expert. See Norfin, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 74 F.R.D. 529, 533 (D. Colo.
1977) (quoting Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. United States, 39 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D. Colo. 1966));
Easton, supra note 22, at 742, n.358.
311. See supra Part lIl.C.
312. In some unusual cases, a party might be able to establish that introduction of this
evidence would result in particular and uncommon prejudice. For example, if one party
established a relationship with an expert who was then sent to the opposing party as a spy
without in the role of a consultant and, later, a disclosed expert, the court could find that
presentation of her opinions would unfairly prejudice the party who hired her without
knowing that she was a spy. See LUBET, supra note 46, at 179 (noting that a court might
bar the use of an expert who "deliberately sets out to switch sides"); cf. Miles v. Farrell, 549
F. Supp. 82, 83 (N.D. 11. 1982) (barring the testimony of a doctor "who treated the plain-
tiff, a blind child, both before and after he was retained as an expert by one of the defend-
ants, without disclosing his relationship with the defendant"). Other egregious
circumstances, such as an expert initiating contact with opposing counsel in an effort to
auction her services to the highest bidder among the parties, might result in exclusion of
the expert's testimony. A court might also provide relief to a party who could establish
that the original disclosure of the expert as a possible trial witness resulted from a clerical
or other error. See Castellanos v. Littlejohn, 945 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1997, orig. proceeding).
In ordinary circumstances where the only claims of prejudice are the typical ones associ-
ated with the retention of an expert who later reaches opinions helpful to the opposing
party, the court should reject arguments based on Rule 403.
313. See Collins v. Wayne Corp., 621 F.2d 777, 782 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[Defense expert]
Greene's deposition testimony was not, of course, a binding judicial admission, and had the
district court admitted Greene's deposition as an admission Wayne would have had an
opportunity to explain why some of Greene's conclusions were not consistent with
Wayne's position at trial."); cf. Fenlon v. Thayer, 506 A.2d 319, 323 (N.H. 1986) (noting
that the party that initially consulted an expert whose testimony would be offered by the
opposing party on remand "will have the opportunity to counter the weight of such
testimony").
314. See TV-3, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 193 F.R.D. 490, 492 (S.D. Miss. 2000)
("[B]oth the expert's compensation and his 'marching orders' can be discovered and the
expert cross-examined thereon."); Emergency Care Dynamics, Ltd. v. Super. Ct., 932 P.2d
297, 300 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) ("Just as an expert witness's sources remain a proper subject
of cross examination, so do the expert's relations with the hiring party and its counsel.")
(citations omitted); Stearrett v. Newcomb, 521 A.2d 636, 638 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986) ("It is
inherent in the testimony of the expert that he would be called upon to divulge all facts and
information upon which he bases his opinion, and any limitations placed upon his retention
as an expert."); supra note 258.
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V. ADVANTAGES OF ADMISSION OF RED
ROVER EVIDENCE
As the discussion outlining the problems with decisions excluding Red
Rover opinions and bias evidence has demonstrated, the primary advan-
tage of admitting both of these types of Red Rover evidence is providing
the jury with information that will be valuable in its resolution of dis-
puted factual issues. Regular admission of both types of Red Rover evi-
dence will also have other315 advantages over the current inconsistent
court rulings.
A. RED ROVER EVIDENCE WILL HELP JURIES RESOLVE
FACTUAL DISPUTES
Perhaps the most important reason to admit both Red Rover opinions
and testimony about the initial retention of Red Rover experts is the
value of this evidence to the jury in its often difficult task of resolving
contested factual issues.316 Although all relevant evidence has this bene-
fit,3 17 the special circumstances of cases involving Red Rovers make Red
Rover evidence particularly helpful to jurors.
To understand the potential value of Red Rover evidence, one must
first appreciate the circumstances in which it comes into existence. Red
Rover experts, after all, start out as experts retained by one of the attor-
neys.318 In the usual pattern of attorney retention of experts who are
ultimately disclosed as possible trial witnesses, there are many realities
that tend to lead to the expert reaching opinions that are helpful to the
attorney who hired her.319
These realities start before the expert herself has anything to do with
the case. When an attorney searches for an expert witness, she may try
to locate a person who is likely to reach opinions that will help her cli-
315. One court noted what was, in its view, an advantage of allowing Red Rover testi-
mony other than the ones outlined in this section. According to this court, one of the
policy objectives advanced by allowing Red Rover testimony was "allowing experts to pur-
sue their professional calling." Koch Ref. Co. v. Jennifer L. Beaudreaux MV, 85 F.3d 1178,
1183 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting English Feedlot, Inc. v. Norden Lab., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1498,
1504-05 (D. Col. 1993)). Given the rather substantial marketplace for experts, see, e.g.,
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Should the Courts Incorporate a Best Evidence Rule into the Stan-
dard Determining the Admissibility of Scientific Testimony?: Enough Is Enough Even When
It Is Not the Best, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 19, 49 (1999), this may not be a very important
policy concern.
316. If courts allow parties to render disclosed experts ineligible to testify by de-disclos-
ing them, there will be instances when juries are deprived of the testimony of experts
whose special expertise cannot be matched by any of the experts the juries will hear at
trial. See White v. Vanderbilt Univ., 21 S.W.3d 215, 221 n.6 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (noting
that the Red Rover expert in question allegedly had written "the 'preeminent medical
article"' on the primary contested issue in the case).
317. See supra notes 262-64 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 21-34 and accompanying text.
319. See LUBET, supra note 46, at 171 (1998) ("After all, advocates typically retain ex-
perts with one purpose in mind: to win the case.").
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ent.32 0 Although trial attorneys presumably vary in the extent to which
they seek an expert who is prone to reach certain opinions, many, if not
most, have at least some desire to find an expert who is at least somewhat
likely to reach the opinions desired by the attorney. 321
The conditions that tend to lead to expert opinions consistent with the
positions taken by the attorney retaining the expert continue during the
relationship between the retaining attorney and the expert. First, the at-
torney hires the expert witness and thereby enters into an employer-em-
ployee relationship with her.322 As noted above, the expert becomes, at
least to some extent, a member of the trial team headed by the attorney,
thereby becoming a member of a group whose goal is success in the litiga-
tion at hand.323 The attorney also directs the flow of information to the
expert, by deciding which data to share with her.324 In the interaction
320. Attorneys who are looking for expert witnesses often ask other attorneys to rec-
ommend potential experts. See Christine D. Bakeis, Selecting and Handling Expert Wit-
nesses in Litigation, FOR THE DEF., Jan. 1997, at 15; Tim Hallahan, Everything You Need to
Know About Expert Witnesses, PRAC. LITIGATOR, Sept. 1997, at 41, 43. The contacted
attorney is more likely to recommend an expert who reached an opinion favorable to that
attorney than one who reached an opinion that hurt that attorney. See Lee Mickus, Discov-
ery of Work Product Disclosed to a Testifying Expert Under the 1993 Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 27 CREIGHTrON L. REV. 773, 774 (1993-94). Therefore, to
the extent that an expert hopes to earn fees from regularly being retained by attorneys,
there will be significant incentives for her to regularly reach opinions helpful to the attor-
neys who retain her. Id. at 774 n.6. Because an attorney is likely to recommend an expert
who helped her achieve a favorable result in previous litigation, which generally presumes
the expert testified to an opinion that favored the recommending attorney's client, the
possibility that a current attorney may someday become a recommending attorney creates
incentives for experts to favor their employers when reaching their opinions. See Wrob-
leski v. de Lara, 727 A.2d 930, 934 (Md. 1999); Easton, supra note 21, at 493 n.84; Mickus,
supra, at 774, 790 n.69.
321. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 12.4.6, at 652 (1986); Ellen
E. Deason, Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses: Scientific Positivism Meets Bias and Defer-
ence, 77 OR. L. REV. 59, 93 (1998); Easton, supra note 21, at 492-94; John H. Langbein, The
German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHi. L. REV. 823, 835 (1985) ("The more
measured and impartial an expert is, the less likely he is to be used by either side."); cf.
Onti, Inc. v. Integra Bank, No. CIV.A.14514, 1.998 WL 671263, at *2 (Del. Ch. 1998) (con-
cluding that "the fact that the party has the right to choose the expert in the first place"
supports the conclusion that the expert is an agent of the party).
322. See Marcus, supra note 203, at 1644-45; Mickus, supra note 320, at 789-90;
Plunkett, supra note 125, at 482. While the association between the attorney and the ex-
pert is often an independent contractor relationship, this is a form of employment relation-
ship. See Easton, supra note 21, at 494 n.87; cf. Taylor v. Kohli, 642 N.E.2d 467, 468 (Il1.
1994) (noting that relationships can include "employer/employee, principal/agent, or
owner/independent contractor").
323. See Easton, supra note 21, at 497; Langbein, supra note 321, at 835 (documenting
the "subtle pressure" on an expert witness "to join the team"); Mickus, supra note 320, at
779 (noting the fundamental issue of whether experts should "be allowed to play a role on
the litigation team and participate as advocates").
324. An attorney's ability to influence a retained expert's opinions by determining
which information will be forwarded to the expert should not be underestimated. In the
typical case, the expert relies upon the attorney to provide most or all of the information
she will consider in forming her opinions, because the attorney acquires this information
through discovery, disclosures, and investigation. See In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton
Int'l Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1442, 1444 (D. Colo. 1988); Applegate, supra note 99, at 295-96;
Easton, supra note 21, at 495. Although a retained expert may engage in some of her own
research and investigation, she usually will do so only after obtaining the approval of the
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between the attorney and the retained expert, the attorney may direct
and even alter the expert's views, by subtly 325 or not so subtly32 6 advising
the expert about the opinions the attorney wishes to present at trial.327
Perhaps most significantly, the attorney decides whether the expert will
continue to earn fees from the case. 328 An experienced or otherwise
aware expert who is initially retained by an attorney as a consultant will
usually realize that her continued ability to earn fees from a case may
depend upon her willingness to reach opinions helpful to her
attorney who is employing her, because a failure to receive this approval may lead to the
attorneys' refusal to pay for this work. Id. As a result, the attorney controls the flow of
information to the expert both by providing certain information and by effectively fore-
closing access to other information. See Mickus, supra note 320, at 788-89 (noting that
"counsel controls the expert's access to information about the case"). Because the expert
is allowed to rely upon inadmissible information in forming her opinions, see FED. R. EVID.
703, infra note 379, the attorney can affect the expert's opinions by carefully selecting the
information she forwards to the expert. See Applegate, supra note 99, at 296; Waits, supra
note 128, at 441 ("It can hardly be said that documents reviewed by the expert prior to his
testimony are irrelevant, particularly when they were produced by someone so keenly in-
terested in moving the witness's testimony toward a particular conclusion.").
325. See Applegate, supra note 99, at 297 ("Practical guides for litigators emphasize
that lawyers must ... carefully prepare experts . . . to minimize any doubts, uncertainties,
or unfavorable views."); Easton, supra note 21, at 497-99; Mickus, supra note 320, at 790
(noting attorneys' "overt or covert suggestions about how the expert should structure his
opinion"); Plunkett, supra note 125, at 482 ("Attorneys may seek to ... redirect[ ] the
expert's emphasis .... ").
326. See Oneida, Ltd. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 611, 619 (1999) ("Opinions or in-
structions made by an attorney to his expert may include ... suggestions-perhaps strong
suggestions-on what conclusions should be drawn and in what terms."); W.R. Grace &
Co. v. Zotos Int'l, Inc., No. 98-CV-838S(F), 2000 WL 1843258, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 2,
2000) ("[A]lthough consultation with counsel may assist an expert in achieving 'clarity in
the preparation of the required written report,' such communications, including the attor-
ney's mental impressions and legal theories, may nevertheless influence the expert's con-
sideration of the issues in matters of substance as well as form.").
For examples of rather brazen efforts by attorneys to lead experts to desired opinions,
see A. Terzi Prods., Inc. v. Theatrical Protective Union, Local No. One, No. 97 CIV.3615
RCC DFE, 1999 WL 33296 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 1999) (noting that the retaining attor-
ney "apparently then wrote the report and the expert signed it"); Kennedy v. Baptist
Mem'l Hosp.-Booneville, Inc., 179 F.R.D. 520, 521-22 (N.D. Miss. 1998) (reviewing an ex-
pert's significant changes to an opinion letter, after apparently extensive communications
between the retaining attorney and the expert), and Musselman v. Phillips, 176 F.R.D. 194,
201 (D. Md. 1997) (observing that a retaining attorney "provided detailed instructions to
the experts about how to present their opinions and supporting bases, in order to comply
with the disclosure requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(B)-going as far as to outline the spe-
cific facts to be included in the opinions"). In another case, the brazenness of the attor-
ney's influence was unclear, but "[t]he court's [in camera] review of the documents shows
that ... some of the revisions [were] plainly directed to matters of substance." W.R. Grace
& Co., 2000 WL 1843258, at *5.
327. An attorney's efforts to direct a witness's testimony are sometimes referred to as
preparing, coaching, or even "horseshedding" the witness. See Hodes, supra note 99, at
1349 (1999). These efforts are not considered unethical, when conducted properly. See
Musselman, 176 F.R.D. at 201 ("[I1t is not improper for an attorney to assist a retained
expert in developing opinion testimony for trial."); LUBET, supra note 46, at 173-74; Eas-
ton, supra note 21, at 502; Marcus, supra note 203, at 1645. Instead, some argue that trial
attorneys must coach their witnesses. See Hodes, supra note 99, at 1350; Marcus, supra
note 203, at 1645; Richard H. Underwood, The Professional and the Liar, 87 Ky. L.J. 919,
954 & n.122 (1998-1999).




Finally, the attorney decides whether to disclose the expert as a possi-
ble trial witness 330 under Rule 26(b)(a)(2)(A). 331 Usually332 the attorney
will reach this decision only after she has had the opportunity to assert
some or all of the opinion-shaping influences outlined in the previous
paragraph. Of course, the attorney may continue to assert most of these
influences after she discloses the expert as a possible trial witness. 333
Although the extent to which attorneys use these means to influence
the opinions of experts varies,334 almost all use them to some extent, 335
sometimes without even realizing that they are doing so. 336 The relation-
ship between an attorney who chooses, hires, befriends, informs, coaches,
pays, and considers censoring an expert is inherently a coercive one. 337
329. See Hodes, supra note 99, at 1346-47; Langbein, supra note 321, at 835 ("Money
changes hands upon the rendering of expertise, but the expert can run his meter only so
long as his patron litigator likes the tune."); Mickus, supra note 320, at 789-90; Plunkett,
supra note 125, at 482; John M. Curtis, Expert Witnesses Can Never Truly Be "Disinter-
ested," Los ANGELES DAILY J., Dec. 12, 1997, at 6, 6 ("[W]hen services are purchased, the
service-provider will feel pressure to deliver only results-no matter how scientific or ob-
jective they appear-that satisfy the buyer.").
The potential for an attorney to influence an opinion through her ability to control the
flow of fees and future recommendations, see supra note 320, is perhaps increased when
the expert is among the many whose careers are dedicated largely or exclusively to serving
as experts in litigation. See Easton, supra note 22, at 665, n.61. Many courts have observed
that there is a ready supply of "hired-gun" expert witnesses, see, e.g., WOLFRAM, supra
note 321, at 652; Curtis, supra, at 6, who are willing to reach the opinions their employers
need, even if there is little basis for these opinions. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at
New Orleans, La., 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[Tjhe professional expert is now
commonplace. That a person spends substantially all of his time consulting with attorneys
and testifying is not a disqualification. But experts whose opinions are available to the
highest bidder have no place testifying in a court of law, before a jury .... "); Hall v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1407 (D. Or. 1996) (concluding that an expert's
"well-traveled opinions are no more than educated guesses dressed up in evening
clothes"); In re Aluminum Phosphide Antitrust Litig., 893 F. Supp. 1497, 1506-07 (D. Kan.
1995) (decrying an expert's ignoring "of well-accepted scientific principles and methodol-
ogy"); Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 740 F. Supp. 921, 924 (D.P.R. 1990) (quoting Air Crash
Disaster regarding experts who were "available to the highest bidder").
330. In deciding whether to identify an expert as a possible trial witness, perhaps the
single most important factor for the attorney to consider is whether the expert's opinions
are likely to help the attorney at trial. Trial attorneys are well aware of the problems that
can be caused by an expert who reaches opinions helpful to opposing counsel. See Easton,
supra note 21, at 499; Mickus, supra note 320, at 784 ("Unless counsel thought that the
expert's testimony supported her position, she would not call that expert as a witness at
trial."); Gerard Mantese et al., The Effective Use of Experts During Discovery and Trial, 75
MICH. B.J. 832, 832 (1996) ("There is almost nothing worse than having your own expert
take a damaging position contrary to your client's interests."); W. Brent Wilcox, Plaintiffs
Experts: Finding, Preparing and Presenting an Expert Witness, UTAH B.J., Nov. 1995, at 38,
38 ("Don't be afraid to discard an expert if he can't help you.").
331. FEo. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A).
332. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
333. See Easton, supra note 21, at 497.
334. Id. at 499-501.
335. Id. at 501.
336. Id. at 502.
337. See Taylor v. Kohli, 642 N.E.2d 467, 469 (II. 1994) (observing that "experts are not
neutral, independent or disinterested people in relation to the cases in which they testify");
Easton, supra note 21, at 499.
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Given the conditions of the attorney-expert relationship, it is a rather
remarkable event when a retained expert reaches an opinion that harms
the retaining attorney's case. 338 It is even more amazing when the expert
who reaches such a conclusion has not only been retained, but also dis-
closed, by that attorney.339 When this occurs, an expert who has been
carefully selected, at least somewhat influenced, and evaluated by the re-
taining attorney has overcome all of these influences to reach an opinion
disliked by her employer. This turn of events suggests rather strongly
that the disliked opinion is correct.340
Such an opinion is worthy of careful consideration by the body as-
signed the responsibility of deciding factual disputes related to the opin-
ion. In a civil trial, that body is the jury.341 If the jury is asked to resolve
a factual dispute where such an opinion is germane, it will presumably be
faced with the differing opinion of another expert retained by the party
who originally retained the Red Rover expert. If the party who originally
retained the Red Rover expert did not now contest her opinion on one or
more factual issues, there would be no reason for the jury to have to
evaluate the Red Rover's opinions. If there was no contest on the issue
on which the expert opines, the party opposing the one who initially re-
tained the expert would be entitled to a stipulation or jury instruction
resolving the issue in its favor or, if the issue was fundamental to the case,
to summary judgment.342 Therefore, if the party originally opposing the
338. See Karn v. Ingersol-Rand Co., 168 F.R.D. 633, 639 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (opining that
expert witnesses "are nothing more than willing musical instruments upon which manipula-
tive counsel can play whatever tune is desired"); WOLFRAM, supra note 321, at § 12.4.6, at
652 ("The tarnished ideal of expert testimony is testimony based entirely on the witness'
honest scientific data and opinion. In truth, however, many expert witnesses are as much
hired-gun advocates as are the lawyers for whom they work."); Applegate, supra note 99,
at 348 n.368 (commenting that "it is generally recognized that the lawyer explains to the
expert more less exactly what needs to be said"); Langbein, supra note 321, at 835 (observ-
ing that many refer to experts as "'saxophones,"' because "the lawyer plays the tune,
manipulating the expert as though the expert were a musical instrument on which the law-
yer sounds the desired notes").
339. See Easton, supra note 21, at 493 n.83; cf. Onti, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 1998 WL
671263, at *2 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 1998) (noting that "a party has control over whether or not
to introduce the expert and testimony supported by him").
340. Even a court that disallowed evidence regarding the initial retention of the expert
seemed to recognize the significance of an opinion by such an expert that was consistent
with the position taking by the party opposing the one who hired him. See White v. Van-
derbilt Univ., 21 S.W.3d 215, 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) ("The probative value of [defend-
ants' expert] Dr. Kosutik's opinions regarding the actions of [the defendants] is significant
because it is consistent with the expert opinion of the only neurosurgeon testifying for [the
plaintiffs]."),
341. Of course, it also possible that the trier of fact in a given civil case is the judge, but
this article assumes a jury, rather than a bench, trial. See supra note 98.
342. If the party who originally retained the expert who has become a Red Rover with
regard to one or more issues is unable to find another expert who reaches a different
opinion on these issues, the originally retaining party ordinarily will be unable to contest
these issues at trial. If "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and the party who
is now calling the Red Rover expert "is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law," the
party who originally retained the expert may suffer an adverse summary judgment. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). This, of course, is exactly the result that a system designed to be a
search for truth should desire. If all of the experts that have been retained on a critical
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Red Rover expert is now offering her testimony at trial on a disputed
issue of fact, it is safe to assume that the opposing party will be offering a
competing opinion from a new, 343 or at least a different,344 expert. 345
When a jury is faced with such a dispute among experts, Red Rover
evidence can be particularly valuable. As I have outlined in a previous
article, a case where opposing experts testify to diametrically opposed
opinions often involves a critical question with only one correct an-
swer,346 like whether a plaintiff was wearing a seat belt when the relevant
automobile accident occurred.347 In these cases, when the expert or ex-
perts for one party answer the question "yes" and the expert or experts
for the other party answer the question "no," only one set of experts is
correct and the other is, by definition, wrong.348 In such a case, the jury's
resolution of the dispute among the experts may be crucial because the
jury is likely to return an incorrect verdict if it believes the wrong
experts.349
There are two types of "one-correct-answer" cases. The first category
of these cases are those that involve, in my prior nomenclature, a precise
question with one clear answer. 350 In such a case, an exacting review of
issue in a case have reached the same opinion, even when some of those experts have been
operating under the pressures of an attorney-expert relationship that tends to lead to a
contrary opinion, the case is probably a one clear answer case, see infra notes 350-51, 375
and accompanying text, that should be resolved without a trial.
343. Unfortunately, an attorney who is forced to find a new expert after her original
expert reached opinions contrary to the attorney's needs will often be able to accomplish
this feat, even when the desired opinion has little basis in reality. See, e.g., Chaulk by
Murphy v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 808 F.2d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., dissent-
ing) ("'There is hardly anything not palpably absurd on its face, that cannot now be proved
by some so-called "experts.'"") (quoting Keegan v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R., 78 N.W.
965, 966 (Minn. 1899)); TV-3, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 193 F.R.D. 490, 492 (S.D. Miss.
2000) ("[O]nly the most naive of experienced lawyers or judges could fail to realize that in
our present legal culture money plus the proper 'marching orders' will get an 'expert' wit-
ness who will undertake to prove almost anything."); Margaret A. Berger, A Relevancy
Approach to Novel Scientific Evidence, 115 F.R.D. 89, 91 (1987) ("It is quite apparent that
experts are readily available to present essentially frivolous theories .... "); Mickus, supra
note 320, at 792 n.87 ("Certain experts are willing to advocate, in court, scientific conclu-
sions that fly in the face of an entire body of scientific literature."); Jack B. Weinstein,
Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 473, 482 (1986) ("An expert can be
found to testify to the truth of almost any factual theory, no matter how frivolous .... ).
344. When the party who initially retained the expert is forced to retain another expert
after it becomes clear that the original expert's opinion will favor the other party, the
expert will be a new one. If that party initially retained more than one expert to opine
about a particular matter, the expert who will offer an opinion opposing the one reached
by the Red Rover expert may not be a "new" expert, but simply another expert from the
party's existing stable of experts.
345. See Agron v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 176 F.R.D. 445, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
346. See Easton, supra note 21, at 510-24.
347. Id. at 510-13. Other examples of cases with only one correct answer are a dispute
about whether an automobile axle fractured during regular use and caused an accident or
whether the axle fractured when a tire and wheel collided with an unmoving object during
an accident that was in progress before the axle fracture, id. at 513 n.156, and a dispute
about whether a drug or other substance causes symptoms similar to those suffered by a
plaintiff. Id. at 521-22.
348. Id. at 510, 521.
349. Id. at 515-17, 521-23.
350. Id. at 510.
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the evidence would lead the vast majority of qualified experts to the same
answer if the experts reviewed the evidence outside the context of litiga-
tion.351 The second category of cases involve a precise question that does
not have a certain answer. 352 In this second category, the available evi-
dence or scientific knowledge is sketchy enough that careful, qualified
experts could reach different conclusions, even outside the litigation
context. 353
The problem for the civil justice system, of course, is that it can be
rather difficult to tell whether a particular case is a "one clear answer"
case or a "one uncertain answer case."'354 In either circumstance, the
party opposing the correct answer will claim that its position is justified,
and it will point to its expert's testimony to support this claim.355 Al-
though it is of course not a perfect indicator, Red Rover opinion testi-
mony strongly suggests that the case at hand is a "one clear answer" case
that should be resolved in favor of the party offering the Red Rover opin-
ion at trial.356
Put another way, if the question confronting the jurors is one that can
have only one correct answer, Red Rover evidence can be tremendously
helpful to them. After all, the jurors are asked in such a case to decide
whether the experts telling them that "yes" is the answer are correct or
experts telling them that "no" is the answer are correct. First, simply by
receiving a Red Rover's testimony that her opinion is, for the sake of
analysis, "yes," the jury acquires relevant information that can help it de-
cide whether the answer is indeed "yes," even if the attorney offering the
Red Rover's opinion is also offering the testimony of other experts, be-
cause the opinion is one more piece of relevant information. 357 Perhaps
more importantly, by learning the fact that one of the experts (or the only
expert) who now says "yes" was originally hired and influenced by the
party who is arguing "no," 358 the jury obtains information that may lead
it to conclude that the answer is, more likely than not, "yes. '359 In many
351. Id.
352. Id. at 521.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 514. In reality, cases with one answer occupy a spectrum, with one clear
answer cases at one end of the spectrum and one uncertain answer cases at the other end.
With enough information, one could place a particular dispute at the correct place on this
spectrum. Often the factors that would be critical to correctly placing the dispute at its
proper place on the spectrum would be the quantity and quality of available evidence and
the extent to which experts agree about proper analysis of this evidence. Id. at 523-24.
355. See Easton, supra note 21, at 514-15, 521.
356. To state the point a bit more precisely, the presence of an opinion by an expert
contrary to the one desired by her original employer suggests that the case is closer to the
one clear answer end of the spectrum between one clear answer cases and one unclear
answer cases. See supra note 354.
357. As outlined above, however, when the Red Rover's opinion is cumulative of the
opinion of another expert, the opinion itself has substantially less value than evidence of
both the opinion and the fact that the person reaching that opinion was originally hired by
the offering party's opponent. See supra notes 278-79 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 318-37 and accompanying text.
359. See supra Part III.C.
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such cases, this conclusion will be correct, because the fact that an expert
reached an opinion contrary to that desired by her original employer sug-
gests that the relevant question had one certain answer. Thus, the admis-
sion of both the Red Rover opinion itself and evidence about the Red
Rover's relationship with her original employer will, in many cases, lead
to a correct verdict.360
There certainly will be "one uncertain answer" cases where the Red
Rover's opinions are incorrect. In other words, when an expert over-
comes the inherent coercion of the expert-attorney relationship and
reaches an opinion contrary to that desired by her original employer, that
opinion might still be incorrect. Thus, in some cases, admission of the
Red Rover's testimony and of evidence regarding her bias toward her
original employer may lead jurors to an incorrect resolution of the dis-
puted issue. However, presumably every conceivable category of rele-
vant evidence might in an individual case lead a jury to reach an incorrect
resolution of a disputed issue. This is certainly true of all bias evidence
because a biased witness is not necessarily wrong in her testimony.36'
Nonetheless, as discussed above, we believe that bias evidence ordinarily
will help the jurors who must evaluate a witness's testimony,362 so we
have a strong presumption in favor of admitting this evidence. 363 Both
Red Rover opinion testimony and evidence about the Red Rover's biases
are worthy of the jury's consideration as it resolves factual issues because
they will often lead to correct results. 364
360. Admission of Red Rover evidence may be needed in some one clear answer cases,
because juries do not always reach the correct answer in these cases. A review of appellate
decisions reveals several where the appellate court negated jury verdicts based upon expert
opinions that were so deficient that the appellate court ruled that the opinions should not
have been admitted at trial. See, e.g., Weisgram v. Marley Co., 169 F.3d 514, 521-22 (8th
Cir. 1999), affd, 528 U.S. 440 (2000); Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549,
567-70 (D.C. Cir. 1993): Andrews v. Metro N. Commuter R.R., 882 F.2d 705, 708-10 (2d
Cir. 1989); In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 795 F.2d 1230, 1233-24, 1237 (5th Cir.
1986); cf. Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 829-33 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(affirming a trial court's granting of judgment notwithstanding a verdict that was based on
improper expert testimony). Such cases suggest that juries can reach incorrect decisions
even in one clear answer cases, by relying upon faulty expert testimony that contradicts the
one clear answer. See Easton, supra note 21, at 516-17 & n.160. Admission of Red Rover
evidence may lessen the probability of these incorrect verdicts.
361. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
362. See Onti, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 1998 WL 671263, at *2 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 1998)
(noting that the trier of fact must "evaluat[e] the credibility of an expert").
363. See supra notes 257-65 and accompanying text.
364. In addition to the two types of one clear answer cases discussed in the text, there is
a third category of cases where experts reach diametrically opposed opinions. In my previ-
ous categorization, such a case was identified as one involving an imprecise question with
possibly disputable answers. See Easton, supra note 21, at 524. In some, but not all, of
these cases, both of the answers given by the experts are reasonable, because the question
the experts are asked to address is malleable enough to allow different experts to reach
different answers, even if they agree on the underlying evidence. Id. at 524-25. For exam-
ple, design experts in a product liability case might disagree about whether a certain risk of
injury renders the product "unreasonably dangerous," or doctors in a medical malpractice
case might disagree about whether a procedure with certain benefits and risks met the
appropriate standard of care. Id. at 524-25 n.177.
1504 [Vol. 55
SEND THAT EXPERT RIGHT OVER
Admission of Red Rover opinions and bias evidence will not always
lead to a loss by the party who originally retained the Red Rover expert.
As noted above, if the party is able to retain another expert to testify to
opinions that dispute the Red Rover's opinions, neither summary judg-
ment nor a stipulation conceding an issue to the other party would be
appropriate. 365 Instead, jurors in such cases will be asked to resolve the
factual disputes raised by the contradictory expert opinions. The party
opposing the Red Rover's opinions will certainly face a tougher battle in
the face of Red Rover opinions and related bias testimony, but this is
appropriate and desirable when an expert that it declared competent 366
and influenced 367 has reached an opinion other than the desired one.368
When the original retaining party is able to present another expert's opin-
ion, admitting Red Rover evidence will not foreclose the possibility that
the original retaining party will win, but it will suitably make winning
more difficult.
B. EXPERTS WILL BE TREATED LIKE OTHER WITNESSES
Admission of Red Rover evidence will eliminate the unnecessary dis-
tinctions between expert and fact witnesses that are inherent in the deci-
sions that exclude Red Rover opinions or Red Rover bias evidence. 369
Even in such a case, jurors can benefit from receiving Red Rover evidence. In the first
place, some of these cases do not involve legitimate disputes among experts, because even
flexible concepts like "unreasonably dangerous" can only be stretched so far. Id. at 525-26.
When the experts for one party have used the cover of an imprecise question to proffer
unjustifiable opinions, the contrary justified opinion of an expert hired and later replaced
by the same attorney may lead jurors to correctly dismiss the unjustified opinions. Even
when this is not the case, the jurors will still have to determine which expert or experts are
correct. The fact that an expert hired by an attorney reached an opinion contrary to the
one desired by her employer, despite the significant influence of the attorney over the
expert, see supra notes 318-37 and accompanying text, may appropriately lead the jurors to
conclude that this opinion is correct.
365. See supra notes 342-45 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 33-34 and accompany text.
367. See supra notes 318-37 and accompany text.
368. The jury may need Red Rover testimony in a one uncertain answer case even
more that it needs it in a one clear answer case. In a one clear answer case, the attorney
who is on the correct side of the dispute may be able to establish the correct answer for the
jury through a presentation of her own expert's testimony and an effective cross-examina-
tion of the expert who is pushing the incorrect answer. See Easton, supra note 21, at 522.
In a one uncertain answer case, these techniques may not be as effective, because well-
qualified experts might disagree about the proper answer. Id. at 522-23. In such a case, a
Red Rover's correct opinion could be a crucial factor in the jury's resolution of the dispute
among the experts.
369. The Federal Rules of Evidence have separate provisions governing opinion testi-
mony based on a witness's own observation and opinion testimony based in whole or in
part on sources outside the witness's personal observations. Those who are not qualified to
serve as expert witnesses can testify only to "opinions or inferences which are.., rationally
based on the perception of the witness." See FED. R. EVID. 701; see also UNIF. R. EVID.
701; Easton, supra note 22, at 658, n.44 (cataloguing state law). This restriction does not
apply to experts who are qualified "by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education"
to offer "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge [that] will assist the trier of
fact . . . to determine a fact in issue." FED. R. EvID. 702; see also UNIF. R. EVID. 701;
Easton, supra note 22, at 661, n.49 (outlining state law). Experts are allowed to base their
opinions not only on their own observations, but also upon information "made known to
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Admitting the opinions of a competent 370 expert witness will honor the
tradition that the court and the jury are entitled to every person's evi-
dence, absent an applicable privilege. 371 Allowing bias evidence will
place the expert on par with fact witnesses, because evidence regarding
the biases of fact witnesses is routinely admitted.372
In addition, allowing depositions of de-disclosed experts will treat these
witnesses in a manner similar to fact witnesses. Although attorneys
sometimes reveal work product and other previously confidential infor-
mation to persons that they later disclose as fact witnesses, 373 attorneys
representing parties other than the ones who disclose the existence of fact
witnesses are allowed to take their depositions and use other discovery
devices to acquire information about them.374 Experts who have been
disclosed as possible trial witnesses should be treated the same way.375
Indeed, if any distinction is justified, more disclosure and discovery376
should be allowed with regard to experts,377 due to the substantial influ-
the expert at or before the hearing." FED. R. EVID. 703; infra note 379; see also UNIF. R.
EviD. 703; Easton, supra note 22, at 660, n.45 (outlining state law).
If a witness is presenting non-opinion testimony, the party offering the testimony must
establish that the testimony is based upon the witness's personal knowledge. FED. R.
EVID. 602; see also UNIF. R. EVID. 602; Easton, supra note 22, at 658 n.44 (citing state
evidence law provisions similar to Federal Rule 602). This restriction applies to both a
"lay" and an "expert" witness, when either is presenting non-opinion testimony. See FED.
R. Evin. 602 (stating that the personal knowledge requirement is not applicable when an
expert is presenting opinion testimony under Rule 703); UNIF. R. EvD. 602 (similar).
Therefore, although at least one court seems to have dismissed the notion in the case
before it, see Agron v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 176 F.R.D. 445, 448-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), it is
possible that an expert's testimony will consist not only of her opinions, but also of her
factual observations. See H.R. Doc. 106-225, at 38 (2000); Tidemann v. Nadler Golf Car
Sales, Inc., 224 F.3d 719, 724 (7th Cir. 2000). Quarantillo v. Consol. Rail Corp., 106 F.R.D.
435, 437 (W.D.N.Y. 1985); Delcastor, Inc. v. Vail Assocs., 108 F.R.D. 405, 408 (D. Colo.
1985). This possibility provides an additional reason to eliminate distinctions between
"fact" and "expert" witnesses.
370. Of course, the mere fact that the attorney who retained the expert has suggested
that she is competent by disclosing her as a possible trial witness does not necessarily mean
that the witness is indeed competent. If there are crucial problems with the expert's quali-
fications or analysis, the court should exclude her opinions. See supra note 292.
371. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 257-65 and accompanying text.
373. See Easton, supra note 22, at 713.
374. FED R. Civ. P. 26-37; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) advisory committee's notes
(1937) (noting that Rule 26 was originally drafted to follow the practice of several states
that "authorize the taking of ordinary depositions, without restriction, from any persons
who have knowledge of relevant facts"); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee's notes
(1946) ("The purpose of discovery is to allow a broad search for facts, the names of wit-
nesses, or any other matters which may aid a party in the preparation or presentation of his
case.").
375. See Easton, supra note 21, at 565-68 (arguing for similar treatment of fact and
expert witnesses regarding reporting of bases for opinions).
376. Cf. State ex rel. Tracy v. Dandurand, 30 S.W.3d 831, 834 (Mo. 2000) (en banc)
(noting that privileged or work product documents used to refresh the recollection of fact
witnesses may be outside the scope of discovery, but such documents shown to experts are
discoverable because "[t]he documents, materials, and other information provided to him
are the sources of the facts that he knows").
377. See Waits, supra note 128, at 441 n.198; cf. Easton, supra note 22, at 714, 721, n.270
(arguing the same point regarding ex parte contact with fact and expert witnesses).
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ence attorneys have over the experts they hire378 and to an important
privilege that experts enjoy, 379 that fact witnesses do not 38 0-relying on
information provided to them by attorneys in reaching their opinions. 381
If the system allows attorneys to affect expert witness testimony, it should
protect against the dangers of this influence by encouraging and allowing
disclosure of, discovery about, and trial testimony from these biased
witnesses.
C. A CLEAR RULE WILL FACILITATE ArTORNEY PLANNING AND
DECISION MAKING
As outlined in greater detail above, the current case law is a
hodgepodge of decisions allowing Red Rover opinions in some instances
and in some courtrooms and disallowing it in other instances and in other
378. See supra notes 318-37 and accompanying text.
379. Experts are allowed to base their opinions not only upon their own observations,
but also upon information provided to them, including inadmissible data. The pre-2000
version of Rule 703 stated:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opin-
ion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at
or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts
or data need not be admissible in evidence.
FED. R. EvIo. 703, 28 U.S.C. App.-Rules of Evid. (1994) (amended 2000).
Many states have evidence law provisions identical or substantially similar to the pre-
2000 version of Federal Rule 703. See Easton, supra note 22, at 660, n.45; see also UNIF. R.
EVID. 703.
Before 2000, federal courts disagreed about whether a party offering an expert's testi-
mony could inform the jury about the inadmissible bases of the opinion. See FED. R. EVID.
703 advisory committee's note (2000). In 2000, provisions were added to Rule 703 to make
it clear that the data supporting an expert's opinion are not necessarily admissible. See
FED. R. EVID. 703 ("Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to
the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their
probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially out-
weighs their prejudicial effect."); H.R. Doc. 106-225, at 53-54 (2000).
380. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a fact witness cannot base her testimony
upon information provided to her by an attorney or anyone else. Instead, Rule 602 states,
"A [fact] witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to
support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter." FED. R. EVID.
602; see also UNIF. R. EVID. 602; Easton, supra note 22, at 658 n.44 (outlining state law).
The personal knowledge requirement is not the only evidence law doctrine that prevents
a fact witness from basing her testimony on information provided by attorneys. To the
extent that a fact witness, as opposed to an expert witness, is testifying to an opinion or
inference, Rule 701(a) provides that the opinion must be "rationally based on the percep-
tion of the witness." FED. R. EVID. 701; see also UNIF. R. EvIn. 701; Easton, supra note 22,
at 658, n.44 (cataloguing state law).
381. Because attorneys are well aware of an expert's license to rely upon inadmissible
information in forming their opinions, see supra note 379, they provide substantial quanti-
ties of such information to the experts they retain. See In re Air Crash Disaster at Staple-
ton Int'l Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1442, 1444 (D. Colo. 1988); Applegate, supra note 99, at 295-
96 ([T]he Federal Rules of Evidence contemplate some degree of preparation by the spon-
soring party.... The basis of the expert's testimony can be 'facts or data.., made known
... at or before the hearing.' Witness preparation usually provides the foundational mate-
rial for the testimony.") (quoting FED. R. EVID. 703); Easton, supra note 21, at 495-96;
Lubet, supra note 42, at 469; Mickus, supra note 320, at 788-89.
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courtrooms.382 Many of these decisions rely upon the trial court's discre-
tion or upon balancing tests that do not lead to predictable results.383
The results of decisions regarding the admissibility of Red Rover bias
evidence are somewhat more uniform,384 but the courts' reliance upon
Rule 403 in these decisions385 again suggests less than completely predict-
able results in future cases.
Although trial courts can and should exercise discretion on evidentiary
matters,386 they should strive to treat like cases alike.387 When rules re-
garding the admissibility of categorical types of evidence are inconsistent,
attorneys must make decisions without knowing the full consequences of
these decisions. 388
382. The current less-than-clear law is nicely illustrated by a case where a magistrate
judge held that a de-disclosed expert could not be deposed, because the magistrate judge
believed that the district judge's holding in a previous case required this result, only to be
reversed by the very same district judge, who allowed the deposition. See House v. Com-
bined Ins. Co. of Am., 168 F.R.D. 236, 238-39 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
383. See supra notes 77-78, 83 and accompanying text.
384. See supra notes 87, 89-90 and accompanying text.
385. See supra notes 250-53 and accompanying text.
386. See DiCarlo v. Keller Ladders, Inc., 211 F.3d 465, 467 (8th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Cunningham, 194 F.3d 1186, 1193-94 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Link, Nos.
98-1305, 98-1747, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 24310, at *24 (6th Cir. Sept. 27, 1999); United
States v. Smith, Nos. 97-2837, 97-2839, 97-3570, 97-4088, 98-1101, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
6010, at *9 (7th Cir. Mar. 25, 1999).
387. Cf. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997) (stating that the Equal Protection
Clause "embodies a general rule that States must treat like cases alike"); Tax Analysis v.
IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("Treating like cases alike is, we have said, 'the
most basic principle of jurisprudence.' LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1393 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (en banc)."); Koff v. United States, 3 F.3d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting the
importance of uniformity in the court's decisions); In re Garcia, 844 F.2d 1528, 1538 (11th
Cir. 1988) ("In such technical areas of civil procedure, we should choose one, clear rule.");
Keasler v. United States, 766 F.2d 1227, 1233 (8th Cir. 1985) (asserting that inter-circuit
uniformity is desirable); Jones v. Mabry, 723 F.2d 590, 596 (8th Cir. 1983) ("A fundamental
duty of courts of justice is to decide like cases alike .... ); George H. Brown, Environmen-
tal Lawyers and the Public Interest: A Response to David Dana, 74 OR. L. REv. 85, 95
(1995) (bemoaning the "unpredictable results" that come from unclear rules); Joel Slawot-
sky, Rule 37 Discovery Sanctions-The Need for Supreme Court Ordered National Uni-
formity, 104 DICK. L. REv. 471, 501 (2000) (asserting, in the discovery sanction context,
that "[clourts and attorneys need clear rules to follow to reduce the potential for inconsis-
tent decisions").
388. Cf. State ex rel. Tracy v. Dandurand, 30 S.W.3d 831, 836 (Mo. 2000) (en banc)
(extolling the benefits of an expert discovery "'bright line' rule" that "is clear, understand-
able, and does not require the application of a multi-prong test"); Steven R. Bough, Spit-
ting in a Judge's Face: The 8th Circuit's Treatment of Rule 37 Dismissal and Default
Discovery Sanctions, 43 S.D. L. REv. 36, 54 (1998) ("Judges and trial attorneys need clear
rules to follow."); Brown, supra note 387, at 95 (asserting that "lawyers need clear rules");
Easton, supra note 21, at 569-72 (discussing the preference for clear rules among attorneys
who must otherwise make strategic decisions based upon inconclusive precedent); Roberta
K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes To Include the Non-Adver-
sarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. Rev. 923, 963-64 (1996) (promoting specific,
clear regulations); Slawotsky, supra note 387, at 501 (2000) (making a similar argument in
the discovery sanction context); Mary-Alice Brady, Note, Balancing the Rights of Debtors
and Creditors: § 522(F)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, 39 B.C. L. REv. 1215 (1998) ("[Tjhe
bankruptcy laws must, at a minimum, set forth clear rules and provide for predictable re-
sults so that creditors, debtors and their attorneys can plan their future relationships.").
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For example, in the current system an attorney must decide whether to
disclose an expert she has consulted as a possible trial witnesses without
knowing whether such disclosure will make the expert available as a wit-
ness to her opponent. Similarly, attorneys who receive a disclosure of an
expert do not know whether the court will permit them to use the witness
at trial. Therefore, even if they are fully satisfied with the expert's opin-
ions, they may be forced to retain an otherwise unnecessary expert of
their own to present the same opinions.3 89 Court adoption of a clear pol-
icy of admitting Red Rover evidence, absent unusual circumstances, 390
would clarify these matters for all attorneys other than the few who actu-
ally do face unusual circumstances.
Attorneys who know that the experts they disclose as possible wit-
nesses will be available as witnesses for any party will think very seriously
about whether a particular expert should be disclosed.391 Because many
attorneys now believe, with some justification, that they can de-disclose a
previously disclosed expert, they may make decisions that will later haunt
their clients in jurisdictions where courts do allow Red Rover opinion
testimony.392
Similarly, a system that allows Red Rover evidence will sometimes lead
to reduced expert witness expenses for litigants. Under this system, an
attorney who would otherwise hire an expert in a particular field may
refrain from doing so if she learns that opposing counsel has designated
an expert who will provide the opinions she desires as a Red Rover.393
This is particularly likely if the attorney knows that the court will allow
testimony about the expert's relationship with her original employer, be-
cause the jury might be more likely to credit the Red Rover's opinions
than the opinions of an expert who worked at all times for the attorney
who is presenting her testimony at trial.394 Although the presence of
helpful Red Rover opinions will not always lead to a decision not to hire
an expert,395 it will save the parties the expense of retaining and deposing
389. See supra notes 238-43 and accompanying text.
390. See supra notes 311-14 and accompanying text.
391. See House v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 168 F.R.D. 236, 247 (N.D. Iowa 1996)
("The court's holding [allowing a deposition of a de-disclosed expert] will serve the salu-
tary policy of requiring parties to give some thought and care to their expert witness desig-
nations, because once those designations are made, the party will have to live with the
consequence that the opposing party will likely be given the opportunity to depose the
expert or even to call the expert at trial on their own behalf.").
392. Id. at 248.
393. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
394. See supra Part III.C.1.
395. In some cases, the party who plans to use the Red Rover expert may have already
retained its own expert and absorbed the cost of preparing the expert to testify at trial. In
others, that party may not be prepared to risk going to trial with only the Red Rover
expert's testimony on a critical issue, if it can find a more qualified expert or one who will
make a more persuasive witness at trial. For example, if the Red Rover testimony can only
be presented through the reading of a deposition transcript, the party may also wish to call
a live witness at trial.
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an extra expert in some cases.396
Because attorneys ultimately will react to applicable rules, 397 adoption
of a Red Rover admission policy will likely result in other modifications
of attorney behavior regarding experts. For example, attorneys who re-
tain experts with the ultimate goal of finding experts who can testify at
trial will be even more likely to initially retain them as consultants. Al-
though many attorneys already follow this practice,398 some attorneys or,
perhaps more correctly, attorneys on some occasions retain experts and
immediately disclose them as possible trial witnesses, before the experts
have had the chance to review the available evidence and reach opin-
ions. 399 Attorneys are often forced into this practice because they have
not located an expert until just before the expiration of the court's dead-
line for the disclosure of expert witnesses. If courts made it clear that all
disclosed experts can be called by any party, attorneys would have even
more motivation to hire experts as consultants, and to do so early enough
that they will have time to find and retain new40 0 experts if necessary. By
expediting the retention of experts,40 1 this change will also expedite the
receipt by attorneys of information about their chances of success on the
merits because discussions between consulted experts and retaining attor-
neys will take place earlier in the pretrial period. Early acquisition of
information about the merits of the case will lead to speedier and more
efficient resolution of some cases because well-informed parties are more
able to reach settlement agreements. 402 When settlement occurs early in
the pretrial process, parties are spared unnecessary attorneys' fees, expert
396. A clear policy of allowing depositions and trial testimony from all disclosed ex-
perts could lead to reduced expert witness expenses in one other way. Under such a sys-
tem, attorneys might be a bit less enthusiastic about hiring numerous experts in a given
case, because one or more of the experts might be ultimately be used against the attorney
by opposing counsel. Therefore, attorneys might be more careful about limiting their list
of experts to those that are truly needed.
397. See Tudor Dev. Group, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 968 F.2d 357, 369 (3d Cir.
1992) (Becker, J., dissenting); United States ex rel. Balzer Pac. Equip. Co. v. Fid. & De-
posit Co. of Md., 895 F.2d 546, 555 (9th Cir. 1989) (Kozinski, J., dissenting in part).
398. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
399. See supra note 25.
400. See supra note 343-45 and accompanying text.
401. If attorneys knew that all disclosed experts could be deposed by their opponents,
some attorneys might also disclose their experts well in advance of the court's deadline for
disclosure, to give themselves time to find a new expert if the deposition of their initial
expert revealed that she would be a more helpful witness to their opponent than to her.
Cf. House v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 168 F.R.D. 236, 242 (N.D. Iowa 1996) ("The
decision in In re Shell Oil suggests that a party may change anticipated witnesses to non-
witnesses up until the court-imposed deadline for exchange of witness lists .... ). To some
extent, however, this pressure exists even if the attorney believes that the court will let her
render an expert ineligible to testify by de-disclosing her, because an attorney who de-
discloses an expert will presumably still have to find and disclose a new expert before the
court's deadline. A clear policy of allowing depositions of all disclosed experts may simply
sharpen the attorney's concern about the need to have an expert review the available evi-
dence and reach opinions in advance of the disclosure deadline, so that the attorney will
not face the prospect of not being allowed to name an expert in a particular field due to
passage of the deadline.
402. See supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text.
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witness fees, discovery expenses, and other costs that would be incurred
through later settlement.
The proposed system of regular admission of Red Rover evidence
might also affect attorney behavior in a negative direction, however.
Once such a system is adopted, some attorneys might be even more prone
to hire experts who are likely to reach the opinions desired by these attor-
neys40 3 because an expert who reaches opinions that are helpful only to
the attorney retaining her ordinarily will not become a Red Rover expert.
While clear rules allowing Red Rover evidence might move some attor-
neys to be more motivated to retain "dependable" experts who are very
likely to reach opinions they prefer, this effect should not be overstated.
Because Red Rover testimony, though usually not Red Rover bias evi-
dence, is currently admissible under some circumstances in some
courts,40 4 attorneys already have some reason to fear that their oppo-
nents will benefit from their expert's opinions. Even without this fear in
either the current or proposed system, there are several factors that can
lead attorneys to try to retain "dependable" experts, including the costs
of multiple experts and the recognition of the need for certain expert
opinions to avoid summary judgment and reach the jury in weak cases.
At the same time, there are offsetting considerations that lead some at-
torneys to avoid experts whose opinions are overly subject to the molding
of their employers, including the belief among many trial attorneys that
such experts do not make credible witnesses40 5 and the desire of attor-
neys to learn about problems with their cases from their own experts,
rather than from juries returning adverse verdicts.40 6 Therefore, in both
the current and the proposed 40 7 system, some attorneys will search for
and hire "dependable" experts and other attorneys will look for straight-
shooting experts who are more likely to reach opinions that are contrary
to those desired by their employers.
403. See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 74-75, 77-80 and accompanying text.
405. See Andrade v. Parsons Corp., No. CV85-3344-RJK, 90 WL 757367, at *7-8 (C.D.
Cal. June 21, 1990) ("[Plaintiffs' expert] portrayed himself as an advocate rather than an
expert hired to render an opinion, and thus the Court finds that [he] was not a credible
witness .... At the trial, [his] testimony did the plaintiffs more harm than good.").
406. See STEPHEN D. EASTON, How TO WIN JURY TRIALS: BUILDING CREDIBILITY
WITH JUDGES AND JURIES 163-64 (1998).
407. Under the proposed system, an attorney might be even more interested in retain-
ing an honest expert, because such a person might be less likely to be tempted by the fees
that could be generated by reaching opinions that could be helpful to her original em-
ployer's opponent. See County of L.A. v. Super. Ct., 271 Cal. Rptr. 698, 705 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990) (discussing the possibility that an expert "could 'sell' his or her opinions to the high-
est bidder"). A less than forthright expert could be a substantial problem for an attorney
who initially retains her in a system that regularly allows Red Rover evidence.
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D. ROuTINE ADMISSION OF RED ROVER EVIDENCE
WILL DECREASE THE COMFORT LEVEL OF
EXPERT-ATTORNEY RELATIONSHIPS
One final way in which attorneys are likely to react to the habitual
admission of Red Rover evidence deserves special attention. If courts
conclusively establish that Red Rover opinions and evidence about the
original retention of Red Rover experts is ordinarily admissible, attor-
neys may become somewhat more circumspect in their relationships with
the experts they retain.408 If there is a possibility that a person who is
now working with an attorney may appear, either through the unavoida-
ble power of a subpoena or voluntarily, as a witness for that attorney's
opponent, the attorney is likely to be a bit more careful in her efforts to
shape the witness's opinions. The certainty of a deposition of the expert
alone40 9 should make the attorney think twice about taking overly direct
steps to influence the expert's analysis and opinions.
While the development of schisms between experts and their employ-
ers may be a disquieting prospect for some,410 including many trial attor-
neys who have become accustomed to very cozy relationships with
retained experts,41 I it is actually a rather promising prospect for a system
that views litigation as a search for truth. As discussed previously, a sys-
tem that relies on attorneys to select, employ, socialize, instruct, guide,
compensate, and empower 412 some of its most important 41 3 witnesses
runs the substantial risk that these influences will, at least on occasion,
overcome those witnesses' judgment.414 Therefore, reasonable steps that
408. Cf. Easton, supra note 21, at 607-608 (arguing that full disclosure of expert-attor-
ney communications leads to less direct control by retaining attorneys over experts).
409. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
410. See Koch Ref. Co. v. Jennifer L. Beaudreaux MV, 85 F.3d 1178, 1182 (5th Cir.
1996) (suggesting that prevention of Red Rover testimony prevents expert conflicts of in-
terest); Nexxus Prods. Co. v. CVS N.Y., Inc., 188 F.R.D. 7, 10-11 (D. Mass. 1999) (opining
that "communication between expert and attorney [should] remain unconstrained"); Ken-
nedy v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp.-Booneville, Inc., 179 F.R.D. 520, 522 (N.D. Miss. 1998) (as-
serting that "an attorney should be able to communicate freely with his retained expert");
Karn v. Ingersol-Rand Co., 168 F.R.D. 633, 640 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (admitting that some
want to allow attorneys to have "uninhibited, freewheeling interchanges with their expert
witnesses.").
411. See Easton, supra note 21, at 606 n.469 (noting the trial bar's negative reaction to
proposals that limit unfettered exchanges between experts and retaining attorneys).
412. See supra notes 318-33 and accompanying text.
413. See Karn, 168 F.R.D. at 639 ("[T]he impact of expert witnesses on modern-day
litigation cannot be overstated ...."); Lunghi v. Clark Equip. Co., 200 Cal. Rptr. 387, 388
(Cal. Ct. App. 1984) ("In the instant [product liability] case, the primary focus of the jury
must have been on the expert testimony .... In this sort of analysis, the jury necessarily
relies heavily on the testimony of experts."); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Jackson, 636 So. 2d 310,
315 (Miss. 1992) ("In the trial of this case, the search for truth focused on a battle of the
experts ...."); White v. Vanderbilt Univ., 21 S.W.3d 215, 230 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (re-
versing due to trial court's improper exclusion of Red Rover testimony because "the trial
court's error, more probably than not, affected the outcome of the case").
414. See Barna v. United States, No. 95 C 6552, 1997 WL 417847, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July
23, 1997) (noting that "expert testimony may become another way in which counsel places
his view of the case or the evidence in front of the jury"); Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex,
Inc., 139 F.R.D. 384, 396 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (observing that "some lawyers take professional
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can be taken to lessen or counter these influences might increase the
chances that experts will reach correct opinions in more cases. 415 Al-
though too much should not be made of the point, allowing depositions of
de-disclosed experts and admitting both the opinion testimony of Red
Rovers and related bias evidence are reasonable steps in the right
direction.
VI. CONCLUSION
In many cases, attorneys retain expert witnesses who reach the opin-
ions that the attorneys desired when they retained them. In fact, the ex-
pert who reaches the opinions that the attorney sought is so
commonplace that attorneys and judges who earn their livings litigating
civil cases subconsciously expect almost every expert to say what the at-
torney hired her to say.416
If these attorneys and judges could step back from this system and
scrutinize it from afar, they might be a bit uncomfortable with it. In many
cases, at least one expert testifies to an opinion that is directly contra-
dicted by an opinion testified to by another expert, even when the ques-
tion at hand can only have one correct answer.417 In other words, in
countless cases litigated in our civil justice system, expert witnesses testify
to opinions that are, quite simply, wrong. Perhaps it should be at least a
bit distressing that it is so easy to retain experts who are willing to swear
to opinions that are incorrect. 418
The trick, of course, is that it is not easy to identify which experts are
wrong in a given case, even when it is clear that at least some of the
exrerts are indeed wrong. We assign this task to jurors. If our system is
indeed a search for truth, it is the jurors who must find it. This is not an
easy task, particularly when the jurors are faced with directly conflicting
pride in their ability to indirectly 'control' their experts"); Marcus, supra note 203, at 1646-
47 ("[Tlhe intensity of face-to-face preparation may foster shading of testimony ....");
Mickus, supra note 320, at 791 (suggesting that sometimes "the expert's opinion is not the
result of independent inquiry and analysis performed by the heavily credentialed individ-
ual on the witness stand, but is instead the product of counsel's directives or suggestions").
415. See Easton, supra note 21, at 608.
416. See Oneida, Ltd. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 611, 619 (1999) (observing that attor-
neys often make "strong suggestions... on what conclusions should be drawn and in what
terms."); A. Terzi Prods., Inc. v. Theatrical Protective Union, Local No. One, No. 97
CIV.3615 RCC DFE, 1999 WL 33296, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 1999) (documenting that the
attorney "apparently then wrote the report and the expert signed it"); Musselman v. Phil-
lips, 176 F.R.D. 194, 201 (D. Md. 1997) (noting that a retaining attorney "provided detailed
instructions to the experts about how to present their opinions and supporting basis, in
order to comply with the disclosure requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(B)-going so far as to
outline the specific facts to be included in the opinions"); Intermedics, 139 F.R.D. at 390
(referring to the possibility that "the opinions an expert was presenting at trial as his own
had in fact been spoon fed to him and written for him by the lawyer who retained him");
Mickus, supra note 320, at 790 (contending that "communications from counsel to the ex-
pert ... may contain counsel's overt or covert suggestions about how the expert should
structure his opinion.").
417. See supra notes 346-49 and accompanying text.
418. See supra note 343 and accompanying text.
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expert testimony. How are they to decide which of two impressively
qualified experts is wrong?
If we are going to require jurors to decide this rather staggering ques-
tion, 419 the least we can do is give them every reasonably relevant piece
of information that they might use in their search for the correct answer,
absent some legal doctrine prohibiting such information. Information,
which we lawyers and judges refer to as "evidence," is in the final analysis
the only thing that the jurors will receive to resolve this and other factual
issues. 420 In fairness to the jurors, they should be entitled to hear from a
witness who was once declared by the party who now objects to her testi-
mony to be an expert in her field who is capable of reaching opinions that
will help the jurors decide the case. 421 If we want the jurors to fully eval-
uate this witness's testimony, we should also provide them with informa-
tion about the expert's relationships with the parties, just as we provide
jurors with information about the relationships between fact witnesses
and the parties. 422
With this information, along with all other admissible relevant evi-
dence, jurors have a decent chance of finding the truth. If we did not
believe that, we could not support a system that calls upon them to do
just that. If we do believe it, we should zealously guard against anything
that decreases those prospects, including the unnecessary exclusion of
Red Rover evidence.
419. The Florida pattern jury instructions set out the task the jury faces:
The jury, and only the jury, has the duty to consider the evidence, weigh it,
and decide what it means. It is also the jury, and only the jury who has the
duty to consider the appearance and testimony of the witnesses, and to de-
cide whether to believe a witness.
1 FLORIDA FORMS OF JURY INSTRUCTION § 2.01 (optional) (2000).
420. See, e.g., I MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.01, Form Jury Instruction 2-
4 cmt. n.2 (2000); JOHN M. DINSE ET AL, supra note 287, § 1.00 (California) ("You must
decide all questions of fact in this case from the evidence received in this trial and not from
any other source."); 1 FLORIDA FORMS OF JURY INSTRUCTION § 2.40 (2000) ("Your verdict
must be based on the evidence that has been received and the law on which I have in-
structed you."); Mo. Sup. CT. COMM. ON CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, MISSOURI APPROVED
JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3.01 (5th ed. 1996) ("In determining whether you believe any ...
proposition, you must consider only the evidence and the reasonable inferences derived
from the evidence."); VIRGINIA MODEL JURY INSTRUCrIONS, CIVIL § 2.000 (1998).
421. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
422. See supra notes 257-65 and accompanying text.
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